A credit risk model for agricultural loan portfolios under the new Basel Capital Accord by Kim, Juno
  
 
A CREDIT RISK MODEL FOR AGRICULTURAL LOAN 
PORTFOLIOS UNDER THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD 
 
 
A Dissertation 
by 
JUNO KIM 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
May 2005 
 
 
 
Major Subject: Agricultural Economics 
  
A CREDIT RISK MODEL FOR AGRICULTURAL LOAN 
PORTFOLIOS UNDER THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD 
 
A Dissertation 
by 
JUNO KIM 
 
Submitted to Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
Approved as to style and content by: 
 
John B. Penson, Jr. 
(Chair of Committee) 
   
James W. Richardson 
(Member)  
Danny A. Klinefelter 
(Member) 
       
James W. Kolari 
(Member)  
A. Gene Nelson 
(Head of Department) 
     
 
May 2005 
 
Major Subject: Agricultural Economics
  
iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
A Credit Risk Model for Agricultural Loan Portfolios  
under the New Basel Capital Accord. (May 2005) 
Juno Kim, B.S., Korea University; 
M.S., Korea University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. John B. Penson, Jr. 
 
The New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) provides added emphasis to the 
development of portfolio credit risk models. An important regulatory change in Basel II 
is the differentiated treatment in measuring capital requirements for the corporate 
exposures and retail exposures. Basel II allows agricultural loans to be categorized and 
treated as the retail exposures. However, portfolio credit risk model for agricultural loans 
is still in their infancy. Most portfolio credit risk models being used have been developed 
for corporate exposures, and are not generally applicable to agricultural loan portfolio.  
The objective of this study is to develop a credit risk model for agricultural loan 
portfolios. The model developed in this study reflects characteristics of the agricultural 
sector, loans and borrowers and designed to be consistent with Basel II, including 
consideration given to forecasting accuracy and model applicability. This study 
conceptualizes a theory of loan default for farm borrowers. A theoretical model is 
developed based on the default theory with several assumptions to simplify the model.  
An annual default model is specified using FDIC state level data over the 1985 to 
2003. Five state models covering Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, and Nebraska are 
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estimated as a logistic function. Explanatory variables for the model are a three-year 
moving average of net cash income per acre from crops, net cash income per cwt from 
livestock, government payments per acre, the unemployment rate, and a trend. Net cash 
income generated by state reflects the five major commodities: corn, soybeans, wheat, 
fed cattle, and hogs. A simulation model is developed to generate the stochastic default 
rates by state over the 2004 to 2007 period, providing the probability of default and the 
loan loss distribution in a pro forma context that facilitates proactive decision making. 
The model also generates expected loan loss, VaR, and capital requirements.  
This study suggests two key conclusions helpful to future credit risk modeling 
efforts for agricultural loan portfolios: (1) net cash income is a significant leading 
indicator to default, and (2) the credit risk model should be segmented by commodity 
and geographical location.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Banks face numerous risks affecting performance throughout its business line. 
Since banks are, in fact, firms balancing risk and return characteristics in alternative 
management strategies to obtain profit, high risk in banks’ management is unavoidable. 
The success or failure of banks is closely related to their ability to manage risk. Banks 
face several sources of risks, including credit risk, market risk, operational risk, liquidity 
risk, legal risk and reputation risk. The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (The 
Basel Committee, 2000) defines credit risk as “the potential that a bank borrower or 
counterparty will fail to meet its obligation in accordance with agreed term.” Credit risk 
is mostly associated with loans and securities in banks’ balance sheet and is the largest 
risk confronted by commercial banks in the U.S. Credit risk is regarded as the primary 
cause of bank failures in recent years, and it is the most visible risk faced by bank 
management (Fraser et al., 2001). 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the banking industry was confronted by the forces 
of financial deregulation and globalization. Many banks experienced growing 
competition. Many suffered heavy loan losses during the late-1980s and early-1990s at 
commercial banks in general, and during the mid-1980s at largely agricultural banks. 
From these experiences, banks began to realize the importance of managing credit risk   
 
 
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Banking and Finance. 
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and developing analytical tools to evaluate credit risk. In particular, bank concerns 
shifted from credit risk at the individual transaction level toward credit risk at the 
portfolio level. Credit risk modeling has been developed rapidly over the past decades to 
become a key component in the risk management system of the commercial banking 
industry (Lopez and Saidenberg, 2000).  
The New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) provides the emphasis to the 
development of portfolio credit risk models. The original Basel Capital Accord was 
implemented in 1988 and became the world standard for bank capital requirements. It 
had banks maintain at least an eight percent capital to risk-weighted asset ratio as a 
cushion against possible credit losses. The Basel II, which was proposed in 2004 and 
will be implemented in 2006, is more risk sensitive than the initial 1988 Accord, but 
offers banks a range of options for measuring credit risk: (1) Standard Approach, (2) 
Foundation Internal Rating Based (IRB) Approach, and (3) Advanced Internal Rating 
Based Approach. The standard approach is similar to the 1988 Accord. The IRB 
approaches 1  allow banks to use an internal rating model for portfolio credit risk 
assessment and required capital calculation. In other words, banks need a portfolio credit 
risk model to implement the IRB approaches under Basel II.  
Another critical implication of Basel II is the differentiated treatment of 
measuring capital requirements for corporate versus retail exposures. Banks can measure 
the credit risk for retail portfolio as a whole and can “ignore” credit risk at the exposure 
level. This differentiated treatment underscores bank interest in credit risk models for 
                                                 
1
 The differences between the foundation IRB and advanced IRB will be discussed in Chapter II. 
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retail credit, which includes individual loans, mortgage loans, small business loans, and 
loans managed on a pooled basis. Survey results reported by the Basel Committee 
(2003) suggest that the implementation of Basel II can considerably reduce capital 
requirements for retail exposures, which stimulates interest in credit risk modeling of 
these exposures. The demand for a portfolio credit risk model for retail exposures will be 
increasing in the future as well. Basel II implicitly suggests that agricultural loan 
portfolios can be classified as retail exposure. Agricultural loans are made mostly to 
farmers (individuals) or small businesses. These exposures often permit pooling of loans.  
The portfolio credit risk model methodology requires estimation of the 
probability of default or probability of loan losses for a loan portfolio over a particular 
time horizon. This methodology was initially developed in the 1990s for industrial 
applications. There are several commercial models developed for sale to third parties; 
these include Portfolio Manager, CreditMetrics, Credit Risk Plus, and CreditPortfolio 
View. These models were originally designed for corporate loan portfolios. However, it 
is hard to adapt the models of large corporate loan exposures to retail loan exposures 
because of cost and data restrictions (Burns, 2002; Dietsch and Petey, 2002; Ieda, et al, 
2000). The literature on the theoretical underpinnings for credit risk in retail loan 
portfolios is relatively sparse. 
Credit risk modeling of agricultural loan portfolios is still in the beginning stages. 
Only two literature citations can be found. Moreover, one can question whether these 
studies use the appropriate theory or methodology, and if they are applicable to 
agricultural banks. When modeling credit risk for agricultural loans, one must account 
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for the attributes of agricultural sector and its borrowers. The U.S. agricultural sector 
typically experiences cash flow stress resulting from relatively low but volatile rates-of-
return to production assets. The performance of the sector is also influenced by 
economic cycles and is highly correlated with farm typology, commodity, and 
geographical location. Credit risk for agricultural loans is closely related to a farm’s net 
cash flows like other retail loan categories. However, these cash flows exhibit annual 
cycles. Agricultural banks need a unique credit risk model for their loan portfolio that 
captures these and other characteristics unique to agriculture. 
The objective of this research is to develop a credit risk model for an agricultural 
loan portfolio. This model takes into account the characteristics of the agricultural sector, 
attributes of agricultural loans and borrowers, and restrictions faced by agricultural 
banks. The proposed model is also consistent with Basel II, including consideration 
given to forecasting accuracy and applicability. The model developed in this study has 
following characteristics: 
(i) It conceptualizes a theory of loan default for farmers, which is based on causal 
relationship between creditworthiness and economic factors at the micro level. The 
theoretical model is developed around the theory of loan default and reflects several 
assumptions introduced to simplify the model. 
(ii) It regards net cash income as the key factor affecting credit risk for agricultural 
loans as opposed to asset value or collateral.  
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(iii) It specifies credit risk by loan segments (or sub-portfolio level), which can be 
classified by region and/or primary commodity. As a result, it reduces data 
requirements for modeling and focuses the applicability of the model.  
(iv) The simulation phase of the study uses several macroeconomic variables as risk 
derivers to capture future trends in the state-of economy, which allows credit risk to 
be estimated in proactive manner.  
(v) The model will generate loss distributions and calculate expected losses, the VaR 
and associated capital requirements.  
The next chapter defines credit risk and its relationship with banking theory. 
Measures of credit risk are also discussed, and the Basel II Accord is summarized in 
detail along with its application to agricultural loan portfolios. Chapter III describes 
existing credit risk models. This includes the literature on stand-alone credit risk models 
as well as portfolio credit risk models. Recent applications of portfolio credit risk models 
for retail exposures are discussed, as are portfolio credit risk models for agricultural loan 
portfolios. Chapter IV develops a theoretical portfolio credit risk model and an empirical 
default model for an agricultural loan portfolio. Calibration models for simulation are 
specified, and simulation processes are examined. Chapter V describes the original data 
source, generated data, and data generation process. Estimation results of the model are 
tabulated and compared. Chapter VI provides a validation of the default model and 
simulation model, and presents the simulation results for the default rate, expected losses, 
VaR, and capital requirements. Chapter VII presents a summary of this study, 
conclusions reached, and suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
CREDIT RISK  AND THE BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of the existing issues 
surrounding credit risk management in agricultural banking. Basic theories and 
application processes for credit risk management in agricultural portfolios are similar to 
those for commercial loans in general. This chapter first discusses the definition and the 
role of credit risk management in banking in the context of banking theory. Several 
measures of credit risk used in the banking industry are explained. The New Basel 
Capital Accord, which is expected to change bank credit risk management, is 
summarized. Its implications for credit risk management for agricultural loan portfolios 
are discussed.  
 
Credit Risk in Banking 
  There is a substantial literature on models explaining the behavior of banking 
firms using neoclassical microeconomic theory. Early work by Klein (1971) represents a 
corner stone in the theory of the banking firm, and was followed by Monti (1972), 
Baltensperger (1980), Santomero (1984), and Dermine (1986). These models assume 
that the bank is operated to maximize expected profit, and incorporates the role of a bank 
as a financial intermediary that performs both a brokerage and a risk transformation 
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function (O’Hara, 1983). As such, the bank is viewed as a firm accepting and managing 
risks to earn profit.  
Adopting the assumption of a profit maximizing banking firm, we can define 
banking risks as the adverse impact on profitability of several distinct sources of 
uncertainty (Bessis, 2002). The major role of banking in an economy is to bring together 
borrowers and lenders of funds. Since the bank is subject to credit and market risks on 
the funds it lends and to withdrawal risk on the funds it borrows, it must contend with 
risk associated with both its assets and its liabilities (O’Hara, 1983). In fact, banks face 
numerous risks affecting profitability throughout its business line. The management of 
these risks has always been a major component of bank management. Banks can also be 
defined as firms balancing risk/return characteristics of alternative opportunities with the 
goal of maximizing profit. By offering depositors financial instruments with desirable 
risk/return characteristics, banks encourage savings. By discriminating credit requests, 
banks channel funds into socially productive and profitable uses (Fraser et al., 2001). 
The major sources of banking risks are classified into four categories: (1) credit 
risk, (2) market risk, (3) operational risk and (4) performance risk. Credit risk is the 
change in asset value due to changes in the perceived ability of counterparties to meet 
their contractual obligation.2 Market risk is the change in asset value due to changes in 
underlying economic factors such as interest rates, exchange rates, and equity and 
commodity prices. Operational risk comes from costs incurred through mistakes made in 
                                                 
2
 This definition reflects the theory of asset value model proposed by Merton. This model is discussed in 
Chapter III.  
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carrying out transactions such as settlement failures, failures to meet regulatory 
requirements, and untimely collections.  Performance risk encompasses losses resulting 
from the failure to properly monitor employees or to use appropriate methods (Pyle, 
1997).  
The classification of banking risks, however, differs by researcher or supervisory 
agency. The Basel Committee (1997) lists the key risks faced by banks as credit risk, 
country and transfer risk, market risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, 
legal risk, and reputation risk. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC, 
2001)3 has defined nine categories of risk for bank supervision purposes. These risks are: 
credit, interest rate, liquidity, price, foreign currency translation, transaction, compliance, 
strategic, and reputation. Bessis (2002) summarizes the financial risks faced by banks as 
credit risk, interest risk market risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, foreign exchange risk, 
and other risk. 
Credit risk, which is the focus of this research, is defined by the Basel Committee 
(2000) as “the potential that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its 
obligations in accordance with agreed terms.” It is usually associated with loans and 
securities, which by generating interest income, are the primary source of bank revenue. 
Credit risk is the largest risk faced by commercial banks in the U.S. Loans made up 
56.87% of total banking assets at year-end 2003, while securities made up an additional 
21.89% (See Table 1). Loans are the major and most obvious source of credit risk to 
                                                 
3 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is the regulator of national banks. It charters, 
regulates, and supervises all national banks and also supervises the federal branches and agencies of 
foreign banks.  
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banks. However, other sources of credit risk exist throughout the activities of a bank, 
including in the banking book, the trading book,4 and both on and off the balance sheet5. 
Banks are increasingly facing credit risk (or counterparty risk) in various financial 
instruments other than loans, including acceptances, inter-bank transactions, trade 
financing, foreign exchange transactions, financial futures, swaps, bonds, equities, 
options, in the extension of commitments and guarantees and in the settlement of 
transactions (The Basel Committee, 2000).  
 
Table 1  Asset Portfolio Composition of U.S. Bank, 2003 
Asset Portfolios    % 
Interest Earning Asset 86.06 
 
Loan and Leases 56.87 
 
 Commercial and industrial 12.20 
 
 Consumer 9.06 
 
 Real estate 29.91 
 
 Other loans 3.58 
 
 Lease 2.12 
 
Securities 21.98 
 
 Investment Account 18.96 
 
 Trading Account 3.02 
 
Other interest-earning assets 7.21 
Non-interest-earning Assets 13.94 
Sum 100.00 
                    Source: Carlson and Perli (2004) 
                                                 
4
 A bank’s trading book includes equities and fixed income securities held for dealing or proprietary 
trading. It also includes equity and fixed income derivatives, repurchase agreement, certain forms of 
securities lending and exposures due to unsettled transactions. 
5
 Off-balance sheet credits in banks do not appear on balance sheets. Usually, they represent financing 
from sources other than debt and equity offerings, such as joint ventures, R&D partnerships, and operating 
leases. 
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The primary effect of high credit risk on a bank is loss in assets and interest 
income. This reduces the bank’s profit, depletes its capital, and might at the extreme lead 
bank failure. Liang (1989) shows empirically that credit risk reduces bank profit because 
a bank recognizes expected costs associated with high risk, such as higher premiums on 
uninsured deposits demanded by risk averse investors. Berger and DeYoung (1997) 
examine the inter-temporal relationship between loan quality and cost efficiency using 
the Granger causality concept. Their empirical results suggest that high levels of 
problem loans cause banks to increase spending on monitoring, working out, and/or 
selling off these loans, and possibly become more diligent in administering the portion 
of their existing loan portfolio that is currently performing. Credit risk is regarded as the 
primary cause of bank failures in recent years, and it is the most visible risk faced by 
bank management (Fraser et al., 2001). 
During 1980s and 1990s, the banking industry was confronted by the forces of 
financial deregulation and globalization. Many banks suffered during this period for a 
multitude of reasons, including the heavy loan losses emerging during late-1980s and 
early-1990s. There have been other drivers of change the industry, such as a worldwide 
structural increase in the number of bankruptcies, a trend towards disintermediation by 
the highest quality and largest borrowers, more competitive margins on loans, a 
declining value of real assets, and a dramatic growth of off-balance sheet instruments 
with inherent default risk exposure (Altman and Saunders, 1998). These worldwide 
phenomena have led to the development of modern credit risk management techniques. 
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Credit risk modeling has been developed rapidly over the past decades to become a key 
component in the risk management system of the banking industry. Credit risk models 
help bank management measure the credit risk associated with individual loans as well 
as their asset portfolio. They enable a bank to forecast possible credit losses over the 
coming year, to differentiate loan price over lenders having different risk, to determine 
the loan loss reserves and risk-based capital requirements, to evaluate credit 
concentration and set concentrate limits, and to measure risk-adjusted profitability 
(Lopez and Saidenberg, 2000).  
The goal of credit risk management is to maximize a bank’s risk-adjusted rate of 
return by maintaining credit risk exposure within acceptable parameters. Banks need to 
manage the credit risk inherent in the entire portfolio as well as the risk in individual 
credits or transactions. Banks should also consider the relationships between credit risk 
and other risks. The effective management of credit risk is a critical element of a 
comprehensive approach to risk management and essential to the long-term success of 
any banking organization (Basel Committee, 2000).  
 
Measure of Credit Risk 
Most credit risk models consider two sources of credit risk: default risk and 
migration risk. Default risk is the risk that counterparties default, meaning that they fail 
to meet their debt obligation. Default triggers a total or partial loss of any amount lent to 
the counterparty. Migration risk is the risk that obligors’ credit rating goes down into a 
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lower loan classification. The deterioration of credit rating doesn’t imply default but it 
does imply that the probability of default increased (Bessis, 2002).  
There have been various arguments about the definition of default. They vary by 
models and by banks, and depend on the philosophy and/or data available to each model 
builder. Liquidation, bankruptcy filing, loan loss (or charge off), non-performing loan, or 
loan delayed in payment obligation are used at many banks as proxies of loan default. 
The Basel II suggests, in the §452, a conservative definition of default for a bank to use 
when calculating the capital requirement (The Basel Committee, 2004): 
“A default is considered to have occurred with regard to a particular obligor when 
either or both of the two following events have taken place. 
• The bank considers that the obligor is unlikely to pay its credit obligations to the 
banking group in full, without recourse by the bank to actions such as realizing 
security (if held). 
• The obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material credit obligation to the 
banking group. Overdrafts will be considered as being past due once the customer has 
breached an advised limit or been advised of a limit smaller than current 
outstanding.” 
Default risk can be measured at individual loan level, which is called stand-alone 
credit risk, and at portfolio level, which is called portfolio credit risk. The most direct 
and common measure of default risk is the probability of default (PD), which is the 
likelihood that a loan falls into default. It captures the volatility of default risk and is 
usually expressed as a distribution and its parameters, probability density function (PDF) 
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or cumulative distribution function (CDF). It is calculated for an individual borrower as 
well as for entire bank portfolio.  
When calculating default risk at the portfolio level, Value at Risk or simply VaR 
has become the industry standard measure.6 It is defined as the loss exceeding expected 
loss (or unexpected loss) at some given fraction of occurrences (the confidence interval) 
if a portfolio is held for a particular time (holding period). When estimating credit risk 
facing a bank, common practice is to employ a long holding period (one year or more) 
and a small confidence level, usually one percent or less (Jackson and Perraudin, 1999). 
VaR is a theoretical measure of the potential loss for a portfolio capturing downside risk. 
Its concept is favored for three major reasons, which are providing a complete view of 
portfolio risk, measuring economic capital, and assigning a fungible value to risk (Bessis, 
2002).  
VaR is usually measured by the probability distribution function of loan losses 
and requires two more risk measures: (1) exposure at default (EAD), which, for loan 
commitments measures the amount of the facility that is likely to be drawn if a default 
occurs, and (2) loss given default (LGD), which measures the proportion of the exposure 
that will be lost if a default occurs. The probability (or distribution) of loan loss is 
measured by following formula: 
(2.1) Probability of Loan Loss = LGDEADPDLoanTotal ××× .  
                                                 
6
 VaR was initiated to measure market risk in trading portfolios. It has roots in Modern Portfolio Theory  
and a crude VaR measure was published by Leavens in 1945. VaR becomes a proprietary risk measure in 
1990s after the Basel Committee authorized the utilization of VaR when banks calculate capital 
requirement (Holton, 2002). 
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Figure 1 illustrates the VaR concept for a distribution of loan loss. There are two critical 
points on the graph; (1) expected loss and (2) maximum loss (or 99th or more 
percentiles). VaR at a given confidence interval is the maximum loan loss less expected 
loss, which is the same to unexpected loss, or  
(2.2) Value at Risk (Unexpected Loss) = Maximum Loan Loss – Expected Loss. 
VaR represents the required capital in excess of expected losses necessary for absorbing 
deviations from average losses. 
 
 
Amount of Loss
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
Unexpected Loss
(Value at Risk)
Maximum Loss 
(99% percentile)
Expected Loss
 
Figure 1  Measure of Value at Risk on Loss Distribution 
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The Basel Capital Accords 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is an international organization, 
which assists central banks of member countries by regulating international banking 
standards and promoting international monetary and financial cooperation. In 1974, 
central bank supervisors from ten industrialized countries established the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. 7  The Basel Committee does not have formal 
supervisory authority and legal force against its members, but it formulates broad 
supervisory standards and guidelines that each country’s government can use to 
determine the best policy for their own national systems. The Basel Committee 
developed several sets of standards such as the Capital Accord (The Basel Committee, 
1988) and the Core Principals (The Basel Committee, 1997). These standards have been 
gradually introduced and received powerful backing not only in member countries but 
also in all countries with active international banks.  
The Basel Committee introduced regulations for capital in 1988 known as the 
Basel Capital Accord. The Accord was enforced for internationally active banks in the 
G10 countries, which meant they had to maintain at least an eight percent of capital to 
risk-weighted assets8 ratio as a cushion against possible credit losses. This requirement 
                                                 
7
 The committee consists of senior supervisory representatives from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. It meets 
every three months at BIS in Basel, Switzerland. 
8
 The capital ratio of a bank is total capital divided by risk-weighted asset. The Accord standardizes the 
credit risk of each asset according to its characteristics, and uses the standardized risks to calculate risk-
weighted assets. For example, the risk weight of cash is 0%, that of a loan fully secured by mortgage is 
50%, and that of private loan is 100%. Accordingly, the denominator of the capital ratio is the sum of risk-
weighted assets. 
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became a world standard during the 1990s. Over 100 countries have since applied the 
Basel framework to their banking system (The Basel Committee, 2001).  
In June 1999, the Committee issued a proposal for a New Capital Adequacy 
Framework (First Consultative Package on the New Basel Capital Accord) to replace the 
1988 Accord and had published two more Consultative Documents in January 2001 and 
April 2003. After extensive interactions with banks and industry groups, the Basel 
Committee published the final document, “International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standard, a Revised Framework,” which is widely known 
“Basel II” in June 2004. Basel II will affect bank risk management and financial markets 
much like the 1988 Accord. The central bank in each country will force banks to adopt 
Basel II. Even small banks might face the same situation. Those interested in credit risk 
and its modeling, from academic researchers to practitioners in banks, should understand 
the new regulation because compatibility with Basel II will be required for any credit 
risk model. The balance of this chapter discusses detail regulations for credit risk in the 
Basel II and issues related to agricultural loan portfolios.  
Basel II is more risk sensitive than the 1988 Capital Accord. It offers banks a 
range of new options for measuring both credit and operational risk. It is built on three 
pillars, which are (1) minimum capital requirements, (2) supervisory review process and 
(3) market discipline. The first pillar sets out the calculation of the total minimum capital 
requirements for credit, market, and operational risk. The minimum capital requirement 
is calculated using three fundamental elements: (1) regulatory capital, (2) risk weighted 
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assets and (3) minimum ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets (no lower than 8%), 
which is the same as the past definitions, or:   
(2.3) Capital ratio = regulatory capital / total risk weighted assets. 
The major innovation of Basel II is the introduction of three distinct options for 
the calculation of credit risk and three others for operational risk, while the market risk 
measures remain unchanged. The standardized approach for credit risk is similar to the 
1988 Capital Accord. Banks are required to allot their credit exposures into supervisory 
categories based on observable characteristics of exposure. Basel II establishes fixed risk 
weights by external credit assessments for each supervisory category. The Internal 
Rating Based (IRB) approach is different from the standardized approach in that banks 
can apply the internal rating or model for credit risk assessment for their loan exposure 
and, can use the results as primary inputs to calculate their own capital requirement. The 
IRB calculation of risk-weighted assets relies on four risk components, which include (1) 
measures of probability of default or PD, (2) loss given default or LGD, (3) the exposure 
at default or EAD, and (4) effective maturity or M. Basel II suggests two IRB 
approaches, foundation and advanced IRB, which differ in terms of the risk components 
estimated by the bank. Banks using advanced IRB must provide their own estimates of 
all risk components, but foundation IRB bank can use supervisory values given for LGD, 
EAD, and M.  Figure 2 illustrates the basic structure of the Basel II. 
  
18 
 
 
Figure 2  Structure of New Basel Capital Accord 
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We cannot find the word “Agriculture” in the Basel II document, and there is no 
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partnership, or proprietorship. Within the corporate asset class, five sub-classes of 
specialized lending are identified and regulated separately: (1) project finance, (2) object 
finance, (3) commodities finance, (4) income-producing real estate and (5) high-
volatility commercial real estate. 
Agricultural loans could be categorized as a corporate exposure. However, it is 
more fitting that they be classified as retail exposures since agricultural loans are mostly 
loans to farmers (individuals) or small businesses; a number of these exposures can 
make a pool. According to the definition of retail exposure in Basel II, an exposure can 
be categorized as a retail exposure if it meets all of the following criteria: (1) nature of 
borrower or low value of individual exposure, (2) exposure to individuals, personal term 
loan and leases, (3) residential mortgage loans, (4) small business loan managed as retail 
exposures and less than one million euro, and (5) one of a large pool of exposures 
managed by the bank on a pooled basis. Although agricultural loans are not a retail 
exposure by the general definition of ‘retail exposure’, according to the definitions of 
Basel II, agricultural exposures should be categorized and treated as retail exposures 
when estimating risk components and calculate risk-weighted assets in agricultural loan 
portfolios. 
Banks typically manage retail exposures on a portfolio or pool basis, where each 
portfolio contains exposures with similar risk characteristics. One of the most significant 
differences between the corporate and retail categories in the IRB approach is that the 
risk inputs (PD, LGD, EAD, and M) for retail exposures do not have to be assigned at 
the level of an individual exposure. Therefore, a key characteristic of the retail IRB 
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framework is that the risk inputs for retail exposures would be assigned to portfolios or 
pools of exposures rather than to individual exposures. There is no distinction between a 
foundation and advanced IRB approach for the retail exposure, so banks must provide 
their own estimates of PD, LGD, and EAD. Before banks apply the IRB approach to 
retail exposures, they must assign each exposure in the retail portfolio into a particular 
pool or segment. In determining how to group their retail exposures into portfolio 
segments for the purpose of assigning IRB risk inputs, banks should use a segmentation 
approach that is consistent with their approach for internal risk assessment purposes and 
that classifies exposures according to predominant risk characteristics (OCC et. al., 
2004). 
 
Summary 
This chapter presented an overview of the key issues in credit risk management 
of agricultural loan portfolios. Since banks are firms balancing risk and return 
characteristics among alternative opportunities, banks cannot avoid risks. There are 
several categories of banking risks, but credit risk is the largest risk faced by banks. 
Credit risk management has been widely applied in the banking industry after the 1990s. 
Environments around the banking industry became riskier, increasing bank concerns 
about the credit risk management. Effective credit risk management has become an 
important factor of bank success.  
Credit risk can be measured at the exposure level and the portfolio level. VaR is 
the industry standard for portfolio credit risk. Basel II shares the VaR concept in its 
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regulation and provides the emphasis to the portfolio credit risk. An important 
implication of Basel II is differentiated treatment of measuring capital requirements for 
corporate exposure and retail exposure. 
 The most important implication of this chapter is the argument that agricultural 
loans should be categorized and treated as retail exposures. The reason is agricultural 
exposures are typically managed on a portfolio basis, and many exposures in the same 
portfolio have similar risk characteristics. In the next chapter, an extensive review of the 
literature on the credit risk models at the exposure level and portfolio level is provided. 
The review makes clear the differences between the stand-alone credit risk model and 
portfolio credit risk model as well as the differences between the corporate and retail 
portfolio credit risk models. Modeling issues on portfolio credit risk for the retail 
exposures will be discussed further, and recent models developed for retail loans and 
agricultural loans are detailed. 
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CHAPTER III 
CREDIT RISK MODELS 
 
Credit risk models initiated by financial institutions arise from a question that is 
simple to ask but hard to answer: which is a good credit and which is a bad credit? 
Banks have devoted considerable resources addressing this question, and research in the 
field of credit risk modeling has developed rapidly over the past decades. A credit risk 
model helps bank management evaluate the credit risk of individual loans as well as its 
whole portfolio. It also enables a bank to forecast possible credit losses over the coming 
years, to differentiate loan price over borrowers exhibiting different risk, to determine 
the loan loss reserves and the risk based capital requirements, to evaluate credit 
concentration and set concentrate limits, and to measure risk-adjusted profitability 
(Lopez and Saidenberg, 2000). 
There have been two lines of research in this area. The first one is a stand-alone 
credit risk model, which attempts to evaluate credibility at the transaction or account 
level such as a firm or individual borrower. The other is a portfolio credit risk model, 
which measures credit risk at the portfolio level. The portfolio credit risk modeling 
began later but has been the focus of more attention recently. Banks are increasingly 
measuring and managing credit risk at the portfolio level in addition to the transaction 
level. This has occurred for a number of reasons. First, banks realize that traditional 
classifications of good and bad loans are not sufficient to properly manage their credit 
risk because all credits could potentially default under a particular extraordinary 
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economic scenario. Second, possible errors in selecting and pricing individual loans are 
decreasing, but diversification and timing impacts on bank credit risk is increasing. Bank 
management needs more proactive risk measures for loan exposure after the loan has 
been originated (Wilson, 1998).  
This chapter reviews the literature for credit risk models. The following section 
reviews existing models for stand-alone and portfolio credit risk. This literature includes 
journal articles, research papers, and commercial models developed by consulting firms. 
The literature on portfolio credit risk models for retail exposures is reviewed. Finally, 
recent research in the literature on portfolio credit risk for agricultural loans is discussed. 
 
Stand-alone Credit Risk Model 
As discussed in Chapter II, banks have made wide use of the probability of 
default (PD) as a proxy of the risk inherent in an individual credit.9 There have been 
three broad categories of traditional models used to estimate the credit risk at individual 
loan level: (1) expert systems, (2) internal and external credit rating, and (3) credit 
scoring models. 
  
Expert Systems 
About 20 years ago, most financial institutions relied virtually exclusively on 
subjective analysis or the so-called banker expert system to assess the credit risk of 
                                                 
9
 Loss given default (LGD) may be more accurate measure of credit risk, but the use of DP is common 
practically since banks appear to have greater difficulty in estimating LGD (The Basel Committee, 2000).  
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borrowers. Bank loan officers used information on various borrower characteristics, 
which are called as the “5 Cs” of credit. They are (1) character of borrower (reputation), 
(2) capital (leverage), (3) capacity (volatility of earnings), (4) collateral, and (5) 
condition (macroeconomic cycle). Because human experts have evaluated the “5 Cs” 
subjectively, they might be inconsistent. Moreover, expert systems specify no weighting 
scheme that would order the “5 Cs” in terms of their relative importance in forecasting 
default probability (Allen et al., 2004; Altman and Saunders, 1998; Tomas, 2000).  
 
Credit Rating 
A credit rating is a summary indicator of risk for banks’ individual credit 
exposures (Treacy and Carey, 2000). In general, they depend on a number of factors, 
quantitative financial ratios and qualitative variables. The credit rating usually includes 
from six to ten different ranks,10 but they are not quantitative measures of risk but rather 
a qualitative ordering (Bessis, 2002). External credit ratings refer to the rating system or 
ratings from the system independently made outside the banks or creditors, while 
internal credit ratings are those constructed in the banks for their own use. Moody’s first 
offered external credit ratings of the U.S. firm in 1909. Now, banks can use many 
external credit ratings to apply for their credit risk management process. Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s are the leading companies in the market, and there are many public 
and commercial rating agencies.  
                                                 
10
 Ratings are usually expressed as numbers (1, 2, 3, …) or characters (AAA, AA, BBB, BB, CC, …).  
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Internal credit ratings have become more and more critical for credit risk 
management in large U.S. banks. Bank internal rating systems differ from external 
ratings in architecture and operating design as well as in the uses to which ratings are 
applied, because they are designed by bank personnel and are usually not revealed to 
outsiders. Internal rating systems across banks are also considerably diversified. The 
number of grades and the risk associated with each grade vary across institutions 
because differences exist in who assigns ratings and how rating assignments are 
reviewed (Treacy and Carey, 2000).  Internal credit rating systems has also been 
enforced by regulators and examiners of banks. The Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency has long required banks to implement a rating system (Allen et al., 2004). The 
Basel II is the most powerful driving force in this area today. Banks should have an 
internal rating system when calculating their capital requirements. Basel II also regulates 
the detail in the design of an internal rating system such as rating dimension, system 
structure, rating criteria, assessment horizon, use of model, and documentation of rating 
system design. 
Banks usually use credit ratings in the lending process, credit monitoring, loan 
pricing, management decision-making, and in calculating inputs for portfolio credit risk 
model. Banks typically utilize the credit ratings for business and institutional loans, but 
not for consumer loans. In the U.S., credit ratings are used for large companies while 
credit scoring models are used for small business loans and consumer credit (ERisk, 
2002).  
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While credit ratings themselves do not represent the default probability of a 
borrower, they are transformed into the probability of default for use in portfolio credit 
risk models. Commercial rating companies offer probabilities of default for each rating 
from historical data for their client banks. Banks can also map internal ratings to the 
external ratings with pre-measured probability of default, or estimate the probability of 
default directly from own historical data by internal ratings.   
 
Credit Scoring 
Credit scoring began as a tool for banks to decide whether or not to grant credit 
to consumers (Thomas, 2000). Durand (1941) was the first paper that employed 
statistical methods in discriminating good and bad loans. Since then, many researchers 
have made efforts to develop better theoretical and empirical models. New statistical 
methodologies have been utilized in this area, and remarkable development in computer 
systems enables banks to apply a variety of new models. Today, many banks are 
implementing credit scoring models in their credit decision-making. Credit scoring 
models are widely used in credit card approval, mortgage loans, and consumer loans and 
are increasingly used for business loan applications (Mester, 1997). 11   When 
constructing a credit scoring model, banks are confronted by two critical issues, (1) the 
functional form and (2) choice of explanatory variables. Table 2 summarizes the 
advantages and disadvantages of current credit scoring models by functional form.  
                                                 
11
 97% of banks use credit scoring model to approve credit card applications and 70% of banks use credit 
scoring in their small business lending. 
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Table 2  Comparison of Credit Scoring Models 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
Discriminant 
Analysis 
• Good performance in large sample 
• Technical convenience in estimation 
and maintenance 
• Statistical problems and inefficient 
estimator 
• Don’t produce default probability Linear 
Linear  
Probability 
Model 
• Good performance in large sample  
• Suggest default probability  
• Easily interpretable parameters 
• Inefficient estimator 
• Estimated probability might lie 
outside the interval (0, 1) 
Logit 
Model 
• Good statistical properties and no strict 
assumption on data 
• Show the probability of default 
• Good performance 
• Hard to interpret parameters 
Parametric 
 
Model 
Non-
linear 
Probit 
Model 
• Good statistical properties and no strict 
assumption on data 
• Show the probability of default 
• Hard to interpret parameters  
• Relatively complicated estimation 
process 
Linear 
Programming 
• Deal with a lot of variables  
• High flexibility in modeling 
• Don’t need pre-specification of model 
• No default probability and parameters  
• Low comprehensibility  
• Low prediction accuracy 
Neural 
Network  
• Good prediction in small sample 
• High flexibility in modeling 
• Don’t need pre-specification of model 
• No default probability and parameters 
• Low comprehensibility 
Non-parametric 
 
Model 
Recursive 
Partitioning 
Technique 
• Best performance in many papers  
• High flexibility in modeling 
• Don’t need pre-specification of model 
• No default probability and parameters 
• Low comprehensibility 
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There is no common consensus on which variables should be included in a credit 
scoring model because economic theory hardly supports the issue. As a practical matter, 
the choice of the explanatory variables largely relies on data availability. There are four 
methodological forms of parametric models in the credit scoring literature: (1) 
discriminant analysis (DA), (2) linear probability models (LPM), (3) logit models and 
(4) probit models. DA assumes that there are two groups of loans, good and bad, and 
finds the best linear combination of explanatory variables, i.e. characteristics of 
borrower, that can discriminate each group (Betubiza and Leatham, 1990).  
There is a great deal of literature on discriminant analysis in 1970s and 1980s, 
including studies by Altman et al. (1977), Sexton (1977), and Reichert et al. (1983). 
LPM, logit models and probit models employ standard statistical techniques and provide 
banks with the probability of default for a borrower. LPM use a least square regression 
approach, where the dependent variable is 1, if a borrower is in default, or 0, otherwise. 
The regression equation is expressed as a linear function of explanatory variables 
(Orgler, 1970). Logit and probit models are different from LPM in that they assume the 
probability of default is logistic or normal distribution. Application of logit and probit 
models in credit scoring began in the 1980s under the background development of 
quantitative choice model in 1970. After Wiginton (1980), and Grablowsky and Talley 
(1981), numerous papers have been published, and logit and probit analysis became the 
most preferred models in credit scoring research.    
It has been pointed that a weakness of DA is that the method doesn’t produce a 
probability of default. Furthermore, when DA models are estimated, the OLS estimator 
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used is not efficient because it basically assumes that explanatory variables of two 
groups are normally distributed and have the same variance-covariance matrix (Turvey, 
1991). Since the DA approach exhibited good performance in large samples in spite of 
statistical problems, and because it has the advantage of technical convenience in 
estimation and maintenance, it was widely used in the 1960s and 1970s.  
LPM has similar statistical problems to DA. Its biggest problem is that the 
estimated probability of default might exist outside the interval (0, 1). LPM has the 
advantage in that it can suggest default probability and its estimated parameters can be 
easily interpretable. It also has the advantage of technical convenience. Logit and probit 
models were developed to solve the statistical problems existing in DA and LPM. 
Estimators of logit and probit model are efficient and consistent. These methods don't 
need the strict assumptions on data. Loan officers can conveniently calculate the default 
probability of a borrower with the logit or probit model, but the parameters estimated are 
more difficult to understand because of their nonlinear characteristics (Green, 2000; 
Maddala, 1983). 
Since the 1980s, there have been many attempts to use non-parametric statistics 
or artificial intelligence techniques such as neural networks, recursive partitioning 
algorithms, expert systems, and nearest neighbor methods. These models are highly 
flexible in modeling because they don’t have distributional assumptions on data and/or 
don't require pre-specification of the model (Chhikara, 1989). Much attention has been 
given recently on new methodologies. Some argue that new techniques can improve the 
predictive accuracy of credit scoring models. (Desai et al., 1996; Freed and Glover, 
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1981; Frydman et al, 1985; Henley and Hand, 1996; Srinivasan and Kim, 1987). Many 
consulting institutions are applying these new statistical techniques. In spite of their 
statistical advantages and good performance, these models have as many limitations as 
non-parametric models. Most of all, they cannot provide the probability of default and 
informative parameters useful in loan pricing, management policy decisions, and 
portfolio credit risk modeling.  
Model accuracy has been a critical argument in research on credit scoring 
model.12 There have been many papers arguing a specific model represents the best 
accuracy, but generally there were no major differences in performance among these 
models. Thomas (2003) argued that there is no conclusive evidence on model accuracy 
and there is no agreement on which statistical technique should be preferred. No matter 
what model banks use, the application of credit scoring can cut operating costs by 
making the loan process simple, reduce potential loan losses, and focus attention more 
on problem loans. Banks are expending the application of credit scoring over their credit 
line. For example, recent modifications of credit scoring models have given banks the 
opportunity to treat small business loans as retail credit (Allen et al., 2004; Longenecker 
et al., 1997; Mester, 1997). 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Type I error and type II error are used for statistical measure of model accuracy that represent how well 
a model can predict good or bad loan. In credit scoring model, type I error, classifying bad loan as good, is 
more important than type II error, classifying good loan as bad.  
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Portfolio Credit Risk Model 
The portfolio credit risk model is a methodology that estimates the probability of 
default and loan loss for a loan portfolio over a particular time horizon. It usually 
combines the probabilities of default for individual loans and estimates the probability of 
default at portfolio level by aggregation (Lopez, 2001). Portfolio credit risk modeling is 
a process to find specific solutions to the two main problems: (1) the modeling of the 
probability of default for individual loans, and (2) the construction of the joint 
distribution (or probability) of default by taking into account the correlations between 
defaults in the portfolio (Dietsch and Petey, 2002). Therefore, the key inputs to a 
portfolio credit risk model are: (1) stand-alone credit risk measure for each loan, (2) its 
weight in the loan portfolio and (3) the correlation of default between each pair of loans.  
Portfolio credit risk models were initially developed for commercial use in the 
1990s. These models include proprietary applications constructed for internal use by 
financial institutions as well as others intended for sale or distribution to third parties. 
There are four leading portfolio credit risk or “vender” models: (1) Portfolio Manager by 
Moody’s KMV, (2) CreditMetrics by the CreditMetrics Group, (3) Credit Risk Plus by 
Credit Suisse Financial Products and (4) CreditPortfolio View by McKinsey. The 
underlying assumptions, theoretical background, mathematical structure and solution of 
these models are summarized in technical documents published by these companies, 
which include Crosbie and Bohn (2002), Gupton et al. (1997), Credit Suisse (1997), and 
Wilson (1997a, 1997b). Current portfolio credit risk models can be traced to three 
alternative forms: (1) option-based structursal models, (2) reduced form (actuarial) 
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models, and (3) multi-factor econometric model. The following comparative description 
is summarized from available technical documents, and by Koyluoglu and Hickman 
(1999), Crouhy et al. (2000), and Gordy (2000). 
 
Option-based Structural Model 
The option-based structural model consists of two parts: (1) default model13 and 
(2) correlation model. The default model relies on an asset value model proposed by 
Black and Scholes (1973) for option pricing and discussed in detail by Merton (1974). It 
specifies unconditional probabilities of default for individual loans. The Black-Scholes 
model assumes the market value of the firm’s underlying assets follows the following 
stochastic process: 
(3.1) dzVdtVdV AAAA σµ += , 
where VA is firm’s asset value,  is firm’s asset value drift rate, A is asset volatility, and 
dz is Wiener process, which assumes z ~ N(0, 1). The asset value at time t, VtA, given 
the initial asset value, V0A, can be written as follows: 
(3.2) εσσµ ttVV AAAAt 2
2
0 )
2
(lnln +−+= , 
                                                 
13
 Default models are a category of models to assess the probability of default by an obligor. They differ 
from credit scoring models in two ways: (1) Credit scoring is usually applied to individual or small 
business, but default models are applied more to larger credits such as corporate. (2) Credit scoring models 
are statistical, regressing instances of default against various risk indicators. Default models directly model 
the default process, and are typically calibrated to market variables such as the obligor's stock price. 
(www.riskglossary.com/articles/portfolio_credit_risk.htm) 
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where  is expected return on the firm’s asset and  is the random component of the 
firm’s return.  
The value of equity can be viewed as a call option on the value of a firm’s assets. 
Thus the equity value can be calculated by the Black-Scholes’ option price formula. The 
firm’s equity and its volatility can be valued as a function of the asset value at time t 
(VtA), maturity value of debt (Debt), asset volatility (A), and risk-free interest rate (r), 
or: 
(3.3) ),,,( rDebtVforV AAtEEt σσ = . 
Asset value and volatility are the only unknown variables in these relationships, and thus 
two equations can be solved to estimate asset value and its volatility. The Merton model 
regards a firm in default when the value of a firm’s assets falls below its outstanding 
debt obligations.   
To estimate credit risk at the portfolio level from probability of default or loan 
loss of each loan, which aggregates individual credit risk, correlations must be accounted 
for as illustrated by the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) of Markowitz (1952). If 
correlations or diversification effects in a loan portfolio are ignored, portfolio credit risk 
could be over estimated unless the correlations are equal to one. The multi-factor 
structural model is the general specification for the correlations which assigns default 
correlations to pairs of obligations.  
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Portfolio Manager, which was the first portfolio credit risk model, was developed 
by KMV14 in 1993. It implements the Merton model in its commercial credit risk model 
for loan portfolios. Based on the option price model, KMV estimates expected asset 
value and asset volatility as a function of the existing capital structure of the firm, equity 
value (or stock price), and its volatility. It measures the number of standard deviations 
between the mean of the future distribution of the asset and a critical threshold, the 
default point, which is called distance-to-default (DD). The probability of default (or 
expected default frequency, EDF) for each individual loan is directly calculated by the 
predetermined relationship between the distance-to-default and historical default or 
bankruptcy frequencies. The relationship15 is developed from the database managed by 
KMV, which contains the firm’s stock price and balance sheet.  
To estimate credit risk at the portfolio level, Portfolio Manager uses asset return 
correlations between all pairs of obligors as a proxy of asset correlation, which takes the 
effect of portfolio diversification into account. It is derived from a multi-factor structural 
model16 to avoid computational problems expected from a huge correlation matrix in a 
large loan portfolio. In the multi-factor model, asset return is assumed to be generated by 
systematic factors and idiosyncratic factors, and its correlations between two borrowers 
are only explained by the common systematic factors to all firms. Finally, Monte Carlo 
                                                 
14
 KMV was merged by Moody's Corporation and formed Moody’s KMV in 2002. 
15
 The relationship is made based on the U.S. data and its derivation is not thoroughly explained 
16
 For this reason, option-based structural model is also called as ‘factor model’ or ‘conditionally 
independent credit risk model. 
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simulation provides a loss distribution for the loan portfolio, and VaR is used to measure 
portfolio credit risk. 
CreditMetrics, which was developed by RiskMetrics Group17, has similarities 
with Portfolio Manager in several aspects. This model uses the Merton’s asset value 
model for the calculation of individual credit risk, a multi-factor model for correlation, 
and Monte Carlo simulation for the portfolio loss distribution. However, the 
CreditMetrics approach is based on credit migration analysis. It assumes that all 
borrowers can be assigned to rating classes, and all borrowers within a same rating class 
are credit-homogeneous with the same probability of default and the same transition 
probabilities. Modeling begins with specification of a rating system and calculation of a 
transition matrix, which represents the average annual frequencies of migration among 
credit classes. Banks can use a commercial rating system and its transition matrix 
constructed by Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s, or a proprietary internal rating system. 
Once a firm is assigned to a rating class, the probabilities of migration from one rating 
class to the other rating class are decided by the transition matrix. CreditMetrics 
estimates expected asset values and their volatilities of a firm by credit ratings to which 
migration is supposed to be taken place. Asset value distribution of individual exposure 
is estimated by asset pricing model over a chosen time horizon from the transition matrix, 
asset values and asset volatilities. CreditMetrics use equity prices (or stock prices) of 
publicly traded firms as a proxy to calculate asset correlation.  
                                                 
17
 RiskMetrics Group was established in 1994 as a division of JP Morgan, and become an independent 
company in 1998. 
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Reduced Form Model  
The reduced form model was originally introduced by Jarrow and Turnbull 
(1992) and subsequent research includes Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Jarrow et al. 
(1997) and Duffie and Singleton (1999). It uses a mathematical technique common in 
loss distribution modeling developed in the insurance industry, the so called actuarial 
model.18 Credit Suisse Financial Products developed a commercial reduced form model 
named Credit Risk Plus in 1997. 
Credit Risk Plus only models default risk, not migration risk. In other words, it is 
assumed that at the end of the risk horizon the borrower is in one of two states, default or 
non-default. Contrary to the option-based structural model, this model doesn’t make any 
assumptions on timing and causality between default and other variables. The influence 
of systematic factors on the default rate is supposed to be captured through default rate 
volatilities instead of default correlation between borrowers. It further assumes that the 
probability of default for a loan is constant over time. 
Credit Risk Plus first assigns each loan to a credit rating category (or segment) 
and calculates key inputs for each loan: (1) credit exposure, (2) obligor default rate, and 
(3) obligor default rate volatilities. Default rates for each loan are usually estimated by 
mapping of default rate to its credit rating.19 Default rate volatility is defined as the 
historical standard deviation of the default rate. Loans are assumed to be mutually 
independent of each other, and each rating category consists of homogeneous loans with 
                                                 
18
 It is also called as intensity model or mortality models of default. 
19
 This implies that banks already have rating system or can use agency ratings. Banks also should have 
historical default rates by rating category. 
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identical credit risk characteristics such as default rate and volatility. If there are a large 
number of loans in a portfolio, the effect of a loan exposure on the probability of default 
to the portfolio is very small, and the default frequency in any given period is 
independent of default frequency in any other period. Under those conditions, the 
probability distribution for the number of defaults at the portfolio level during a given 
period of time can be represented by the following Poisson distribution:  
(3.4) 
!
)(
n
e
nP
n µµ −
= , 
where n is average number of defaults per year and  stands for the expected number of 
defaults in the portfolio.  
To estimate the loss distribution for a loan portfolio, the joint default behavior of 
loans is captured by treating the default rate of a portfolio as a continuous random 
variable with volatility, which incorporates uncertainty about the future state of loans. 
The default rate for each segment, X, is supposed to follow a gamma distribution and 
can be expressed as: 
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The default rate at the portfolio level is calculated by a probability generating function of 
a gamma distribution and a probability generating function for the entire portfolio 
derived by the multiplication of probability generating function for each segment. 
Finally, the distribution of the credit loss is estimated by the probability generating 
function, and depends on distributional assumptions, the default rate for each loan, the 
standard deviation of the default rate, and weight of each loan.  
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Multi-factor Econometric Model  
The multi-factor econometric model evaluates systemic credit risk of a country, 
an industry or a portfolio segment as opposed to an individual exposure. This model 
assumes a homogenous credit standing for firms within a portfolio segment and the 
existence of causal relationship between credit risk of a portfolio segment and economic 
conditions associated with the loan portfolio (Bessis, 2002). The econometric model 
begins with the intuitive theory that credit cycles follow business cycle closely, but its 
behavior is different from industries. Since the state of nature is, to a large extent, driven 
by macroeconomic factors, the econometric approach proposes a methodology to link 
the macroeconomic factors to the probability of default of a loan. 
CreditPortfolio View (CPV), which was the first multi-factor econometric model, 
was developed by Wilson (1997a, 1997b) of McKinsey. It focuses on the default rate 
and the migration rate. CPV consists of two model blocks: (1) the default block and (2) 
the time series block. In default block, default rate for a portfolio is formulated as a logit 
specification. The index variable (or default rate) is expressed as a linear function of 
macroeconomic variables (multi-factor model) and is assumed to follow logistic 
distribution as shown below: 
(3.6) )exp(1
1
it
it Z
Y
+
=   
(3.7) t
n
j
jtjit eXZ ++= 
=1
0 αα , 
where Yit is conditional probability of default in period t for ith segment,  Zit is the index 
value from the multi-factor model, Xjt macroeconomic variables, s are unknown 
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parameters and et is error term. Each macroeconomic variable is supposed to follow a 
univariate autoregressive process of order 2, or: 
(3.8) t
k
ktjjkjjt vXX ++= 
=
−
2
1
,0 αγ . 
This model simulates the joint distribution of default rate conditional on the 
macroeconomic factors like unemployment rate, rate of economic growth, government 
expenditure and aggregate savings rate. 
To estimate the distribution of default probabilities for a loan portfolio, the model 
first determines the stochastic macroeconomic state. This is accomplished by simulating 
the relevant macroeconomic variables over several years more than 1,000 times. The 
conditional defaults probability is then estimated by country or by industry segment. It is 
also assumed that all default correlations are caused by the correlated segment-specific 
default. This means there is no further information beyond country, industry, the state of 
nature, and the state of economy used for predicting the default correlation between 
borrowers. Finally the model estimates the default distribution for a portfolio from the 
relevant segment default distributions.  
 
Comparison of Models and Model Selection 
Portfolio credit risk models have developed under divergent theoretical 
backgrounds and are distinct in their assumptions, data requirements, individual credit 
risk measures, mathematical structure, and aggregation. First of all, option-based 
structural models apply an asset price model to estimate stand-alone credit risk, but the 
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other two types of models are built on an intensity model and econometric model, 
respectively. CreditMetrics and CreditPortfolio View take both migration and default 
risk into account, while the other two models deal with only default risk. Option-based 
structural models explicitly specify correlation with asset return to measure the joint 
probability of default. However, without explicit specification, Credit Risk Plus utilizes 
default rate volatilities and sub-portfolio weights. CreditPortfolio View uses 
dependencies on macroeconomic factors. For all those differences on the surface, 
Koyluoglu and Hickman (1999), and Gordy (2000) argue that the underlying 
mathematical structures are similar. 
An essential inquiry, “Which class of model is the best for our bank?” is based 
on bank risk management strategies. Unfortunately, professional and academic 
literatures still debate this issue, and set forth different answers without common 
consensus. Speaking in principle, the best model for one bank may be different from 
other banks, and is highly dependent on the structure and characteristic of its loan 
portfolio. For example, a big international bank and a small community bank might have 
quite different loan portfolios and demand different types of classes. The final selection 
criteria rest upon: (1) forecasting accuracy and (2) applicability. 
There is just a handful of studies on forecasting accuracy of portfolio credit risk 
models. Crouhy et al. (2000) and Gordy (2000) demonstrate the similarity of those 
models by showing that they give homogenous results if the input data is consistent. The 
empirical results of Rösch (2005), and Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2003) demonstrate 
CreditMetrics is more stable than Portfolio Manager. Sobhart et al. (2000) develops 
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several indicators20 to evaluate forecasting accuracy of credit risk models and argue that 
Portfolio Manager outperforms CreditMetrics, reduced-form models or simple z-score 
models. Jarrow and Protter (2004) suggest the reduced form model is the preferred 
approach if the bank is interested in pricing a firm’s risky debt or related credit 
derivatives. Since Basel II will be implemented beginning in 2006 and requires 
validation of the IRB approach, more discussion and research will be expected in the 
future. 
Applicability is a prerequisite condition for model selection. No matter how 
accurate a portfolio credit risk model is in forecasting, banks cannot choose any model 
for its loan portfolio unless it is applicable to the bank’s existing conditions. First, data 
required for the model should be available (data availability). One of the key data 
required for CreditMetrics model is historical asset prices for individual borrowers. If 
this data or its equivalent is not attainable, banks cannot use the model. Second, the 
model must be manageable by the bank (manageability). If a model is sound 
theoretically but is too complicated to be applied by a bank’s management, it cannot be a 
candidate model for adoption. Finally, cost efficiency of a model should be taken into 
account (cost efficiency). In Chapter II, the bank’s objective function was assumed to be 
profit maximization. Therefore, the cost of implementation and maintenance should be 
considered when banks make a decision on model selection. 
                                                 
20
 They include Cumulative Accuracy Profiles (CAPs), Accuracy Ratios (ARs), Conditional Information 
Entropy Ratio (CIER), and Mutual Information Entropy (MIE). See the working papers for the details. 
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In terms of data availability, CreditMetrics has big handicap because it might be 
the most data demanding model. It needs huge cross-sectional data with enough length 
in number of years. The rating system, transition matrix, and stock price data are the 
essential inputs for this model. Portfolio Manager also needs historical capital and debt 
structure data for individual firms, which is hard to obtain in small-to-medium enterprise 
(SME) or retail loan portfolio. Reduced form models demand relatively small amounts 
of data, which include the size of exposures and their default probabilities for individual 
exposures. CreditPortfolio Views has an advantage in this regard. It needs aggregated 
data at segment level such as historical default rate, migration rate and macroeconomic 
variable. However, this model requires time series modeling for the macroeconomic 
variables and assumptions on the error terms in the time series models.  
 
Portfolio Credit Risk Models for Retail Loans 
There are a number of attributes that differentiate retail loan portfolios from 
corporate loan portfolios. Retail loan portfolios usually consist of a large number of 
small size exposures, and the proportion of a loan in bank portfolio is relatively small. 
The banking industry and its regulators have viewed expected credit losses of retail loans 
is relatively higher but predictable, and unexpected credit losses are relatively low. On 
the other hand, corporate loan portfolios are regarded as having almost the opposite 
characteristics, especially having large unexpected losses that could often threaten bank 
solvency (Burns, 2002). Data availability in retail exposures is also a challenge. 
Corporate credit risk models use rich information such as firm financial statements and 
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market data, but they are usually not available in retail loans or are too costly to obtain. 
It is difficult to measure the asset value of a borrower, and there is no continuously 
available market price because the market mechanism for continuously trading in retail 
loans doesn’t exist. In consumer loans and small business loans, default is more closely 
related to their cash flows and the fact that their income becomes insufficient to service 
the loan, but the information is also not easy to acquire. The relevant information is 
reduced to a credit score and a behavioral score, but these scores are known only to the 
lender, not to the whole market. (Allen et al., 2004; Dietsch and Petey, 2002; Thomas, 
2003).  
In this sense, it is not surprising that both regulators and risk management have 
paid less attention to retail portfolio credit risk. After the first consultative document for 
Basel II was proposed in 1999, the need to develop an accurate credit risk model for a 
retail loan portfolio and to develop segmentation method for a loan portfolio in an 
optimal way is of more interest to bank management. Interest in retail portfolio credit 
risk modeling is inspired by the fact that the new Basel II proposal begins to apply 
different regulations to retail exposures from corporate exposures, and that its 
implementation can reduce the capital requirements.21 Nevertheless, there is still very 
little literature on the theoretical underpinnings for capturing credit risk in retail loan 
                                                 
21
 The Basel Committee launched a comprehensive field test for banks, referred to as the third quantitative 
impact study, or QIS 3. The study focused on the impact of the Basel II proposals on minimum capital 
requirements (i.e. pillar one) before finalization of the third consultative paper (CP3), and it was published 
on October 2002 and updated on May, 2003. The paper reports that total credit risk will decrease 14% 
under the advanced IRB compare to current regulation and banks can reduce required capital for retail loan 
exposure up to 50%.   
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portfolios. Moreover, there have been only a few attempts to implement credit risk 
models developed in retail loan portfolios. Current portfolio credit risk models were 
originally designed and developed for corporate loan portfolios, and most applications of 
these models in the literature have focused on bonds or corporate loans (Carey, 1998; 
Crouhy et al., 2000; Bucay and Rosen, 2001; Thomas, 2003; Wilson, 1997a, 1997b). 
Now, banks are facing two important decisions: (1) should they develop an appropriate 
model specifically designed for their retail loan portfolio or (2) should they pick one of 
the current corporate models and modify it? In the latter case, what kind of model should 
they adopt?  
The general principles and theory of current portfolio credit risk models could be 
applicable to retail loans, but several studies question their applicability and 
appropriateness. As discussed above, the characteristics of a retail loan portfolio are 
quite different from a corporate loan portfolio. This restricts the application of current 
models to retail market. Limited information, especially lack of equity price data and 
credit ratings, hinders banks from applying an option-based structural model such as 
Portfolio Manager and CreditMetrics. It is hard to directly adopt the methodological 
choices being used in models for large corporate loan portfolios because they might 
require extensive resources to estimate credit risk at the individual level (Burns, 2002; 
Dietsch and Petey, 2004; Ieda et al., 2000). The Risk Management Association (RMA, 
2000) demonstrates that risk characteristics such as the probability of default, loss given 
default, exposure at default, and default correlations differ from the corporate loan 
market, and their parameters used for the corporate loan market cannot be used directly 
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in the retail market. For these reasons, just transposing the corporate default models to 
retail default models can lead to some aspects of consumer default being missed (de 
Andrade and Thomas, 2004). Thomas (2003) asserts a skeptical view of the claim that 
existing corporate credit risk models can be modified to model retail loan portfolios. 
A recent series of papers22 focused on the application of current portfolio credit 
risk models to small business or retail loan portfolios. First, a simplified form of option-
based structural model, proposed by Vasicek (1997) called “firm value model”, is one of 
the leading applications. This model assumes a very simplified homogenous asymptotic 
portfolio: (1) a portfolio consisting of a large number of exposures, (2) the exposures are 
of identical size and have identical recovery rates, (3) default of the obligors happen 
independently of each other, and (4) the probability of default for each obligor is the 
same. Schönbucher (2000) specifies a simplified firm value model resembling 
CreditMetrics. The model uses the same concept for default as an asset pricing model. A 
firm is in default if its asset value, Vn(T), which is distributed standard normal, falls 
below a pre-specified barrier, Kn:  V n(T)  Kn. The probability of default of nth firm can 
therefore be represented as: 
(3.9) )(1 nn pK −Φ= . 
The value of the firm’s assets is driven by a common, standard normally distributed 
factor Y and an idiosyncratic standard normal noise component n expressed as: 
                                                 
22
 Some of them are published as a special edition of Journal of Banking and Finance in 2004, which is 
focused on credit risk of retail credit and consisted of eight papers. They were presented at the Conference 
on Retail Credit Risk Management in 2003, sponsored by the Research Department of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia in association with Journal of Banking and Finance. 
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(3.10) nn YTV ερρ −+= 1)( .23 
Using the homogenous asymptotic portfolio assumption, an individual conditional 
default probability p(y) can be expressed, given the systematic factor Y takes the value y, 
as: 
(3.11) 






−
−Φ=
ρ
ρ
1
)( yKyp . 
The model derives the following distribution function of credit loss, which is a function 
of the probability of default (p) and common asset value correlation (AVC) among all 
consumers (): 
(3.12) ( )
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where x is a random variable indicating the fraction of defaulted loan, F(·) is a 
cumulative distribution function, (·) and -1(·) are standard normal CDF and inverse 
standard normal CDF. Basel II uses this formula for retail credit regulation along with a 
fixed correlation of 15% for mortgages exposures and 4% for revolving exposures. For 
other retail exposures, the correlation is specified as a weighted average of two extreme 
values.24   
Vasicek (1997) and Schönbucher (2000) suggest banks apply an option-based 
structural model for a corporate loan portfolio to their retail loan portfolio. This 
suggestion is followed by Dietsch and Petey (2002, 2004) for SME loans, and Perli and 
                                                 
23
 This is an example for one-factor version model. See Schönbucher for multi-factor model in detail  
24
 See the Basel Committee (2004), §330, page 70. 
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Nayda (2004) for revolving retail exposures. de Andrade and Thomas (2004) develop a 
theory for consumer default on the basis of option theory and suggest a way of 
generalizing corporate credit models to retail credit by substituting the firm’s asset value 
with a behavioral score that is a proxy of the individual’s creditworthiness. 
Another application is implementing reduced form models to retail exposures 
based on the theoretical underpinnings of an intensity-based model. Credit Risk Plus by 
itself can be applied to retail exposures because of its small data requirement and simple 
distributional assumptions discussed previously. Calem and LaCour-Little (2004, 2001) 
develop and implement a reduced form model for mortgage loans. They assume that a 
loan is subject to transitions from one segment to the other, and explicitly specify the 
conditional probability of transitions. To generate the distribution of loan loss, they 
apply Carey’s non-parametric simulation procedure, which is done by Monte-Carlo re-
sampling from historical data. An important finding of this research is that credit risk 
and economic capital depend on the degree of geographic diversification in a mortgage 
portfolio, while Basel II ignores it. Schmit (2004) developed a credit risk model for the 
leasing industry using non-parametric re-sampling method without any distributional 
assumptions.   
RMA (2003) surveys portfolio credit risk models for retail loans that are being 
used in twelve banks of the RMA Capital Working Group. Three approaches were 
identified: (1) the EL-Sigma (ELS) approach, (2) the Asset-Value-Correlation (AVC) 
Approach and (3) the Loan-Default-Correlation (LDC) approach. Among the twelve 
banks, five banks employ AVC, three banks employ LDC, and four banks use ELS. One 
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common aspect for all banks is the loss distribution estimated by loan segments, which is 
a prerequisite for classifying retail loan portfolios into individual segments. 
Segmentation of a retail loan portfolio is done by product, probability of default bands, 
multi-dimensional matrix of risk characteristics such as credit scores, and delinquency 
status. Segmentation also reflects geographic regions and type of business. Within each 
segment, the implicit assumption is that loans are homogenous with same probability of 
default and other risk characteristics. 
The ELS approach, which is similar to the simplified reduced form model, 
calculates two parameters: (1) the mean and (2) the standard deviation of the default rate 
for each loan segment from bank historical performance data. The true underlying loss 
distribution is assumed to have a particular shape that can be characterized by the 
parameters such as a beta distribution.  The basic assumption within this method is that 
the true underlying loss distribution for the bank’s portfolio has been unchanged over 
time, and will remain so in the future. Distributional stability is also often assumed in the 
structural models (AVC and LDC), but this is problematic because it does not hold in the 
real credit market. The precision of the model is associated with (1) segmentation with 
realistic homogeneity, (2) fitness and flexibility when choosing a distribution from 
historical data and (3) available cross-sectional data. 
The AVC approach is consistent with option-based structural model and Basel II, 
and it is the most widely used internal model among the RMA survey banks. It requires 
three critical inputs: (1) probability of default (PD), (2) loss given default (LGD), and 
obligor asset value correlation (AVC). There are several ways to estimate PDs for the 
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use in the structural model: (1) simple historical average, (2) observed loss rates with in 
a segment,25 (3) PD estimation model, which estimates PD as a function of several risk 
characteristics such as delinquency status, payment history, absolute balance, and (4) 
using credit migration data. Banks typically estimate PD at segment level, even those 
banks using a PD estimation model that can be carried out at the individual loan. LGD 
estimates are assigned at segment level as a constant, which is computed from the 
historical average loss rate on defaulted loans within a segment. AVC is estimated by 
one-factor or multi-factor models. Some banks use industry benchmarks. A more 
popular and simple way is backing into the implied AVC from the estimate of loss 
distribution, which is obtained from the same way one would estimate ELS, economic 
capital, PD and LGD.  
The LDC model requires three inputs: (1) PD, (2) LGD and (3) loan default 
correlation (LDC) instead of AVC. This model shares the same methodologies for 
estimating PDs and LGDs as those used in AVC, and the estimation of LDC can be also 
accomplished using similar processes to AVC model. 
 
Portfolio Credit Risk Model for Agricultural Loans 
As discussed in Chapter II, agricultural loans can be viewed as retail exposures. 
Research on portfolio credit risk models for agricultural loan portfolios is in its infancy. 
Lyubov (2003) developed the first portfolio credit model applied to agricultural lending. 
                                                 
25
 Banks first estimate expected loss (EL) and  LGD, and then EL is divided by LGD to estimate PD. 
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The model is a reduced form model rooted along the lines of Credit Risk Plus, but 
addresses a disadvantage of this approach by incorporating recent research on sector 
relationships using a more stable algorithm. The model was applied to a representative 
Farm Credit System association in Minnesota, AgStar Financial Services. The model 
output is a loan loss distribution which is used to calculate the expected and unexpected 
loan losses for the overall portfolio and to estimate required capital.  
Katchova and Barry (2005) specify an option based structural model much like 
the CreditMetrics and Portfolio Manager models. This represents the first attempt at 
applying the structure model to agricultural loans. However, this approach is difficult for 
agricultural banks because it requires extensive data. Agricultural banks need a more 
simplified and practical model. The theory  and methodology developed recently for 
retail exposures discussed in previous section should be considered. 
When modeling portfolio credit risk for agricultural loans, one must account for 
the attributes of the agricultural sector and its borrowers, which is substantially different 
from the other retail exposures. The U.S. agricultural sector, which is capital-intensive, 
has a history of liquidity problems.26 It experiences chronic cash flow pressures resulting 
from relatively low but volatile returns to production assets. These characteristics 
contribute to the aggregate debt-servicing capacity and credit worthiness during 
downward swings in farm income and reductions in asset value, as happened in 1980s 
(Barry et al., 2002). Credit risk in agricultural loans is closely tied to a farm’s net cash 
                                                 
26
 87.4% of U.S. farm assets in 2002 consist of real estate, machinery, and motor vehicles. Farm business 
balance sheet data, ERS, USDA. 
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flow just as it is for other retail loan categories. Expected net cash flows is a good 
leading indicator for the eventual credit worthiness of an agricultural borrower. The 
utilization of the expected net cash flow information in credit risk modeling makes the 
model more proactive. Asset values can be evaluated as a lagging indicator of credit 
worthiness in the agricultural sector because of their illiquidity and lags in market 
valuation. Thus, application of an asset value model for agricultural loans is questionable. 
Volatile performance of farm businesses stems mainly from fluctuating 
commodity prices and weather conditions, which are highly correlated, especially for 
farms with similar typology, commodity, and geographical region (Bliss, 2002). This 
phenomenon implies that segmentation of an agricultural loan portfolio should consider 
commodity and regional differences. Economic performance in the agricultural sector is 
also widely influenced by events in both the domestic and international economy. 
Capturing the state of these economies is critical in credit risk modeling for agricultural 
sector.  
Net cash flows in the agricultural sector typically exhibit cycles within the year. 
However, term debt repayment is typically annual in nature. These characteristics restrict 
more frequent periodicity in model specification. In addition, monthly and quarterly data 
is difficult to obtain. When an agricultural bank chooses a model among several 
candidates, applicability of the model becomes one of the essential considerations since 
data availability is more problematic in agricultural sector.  
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Summary 
This chapter provided an extensive review of literature on approaches to credit 
risk modeling. There are three categories of stand-alone credit risk models: expert 
systems, credit ratings and credit scoring models. These models are used as an input to 
portfolio credit risk modeling. Portfolio credit risk models were initially developed for 
commercial use. There are several types of portfolio credit risk model: option-based 
structural models, reduced form models, and multi-factor econometric model. Portfolio 
credit risk models for retail exposures have received recent attention from banks, but 
there have been only a few attempts to model credit risk for retail exposures, including 
agricultural loans.  
This chapter argued that a model for bank portfolio credit risk should be chosen 
based upon forecasting accuracy and applicability. In this sense, portfolio credit models 
developed for corporate exposures may not be a candidate for retail exposures because 
of applicability problem accompanied with intensive data requirement. Retail exposures 
have unique characteristics and modeling need to take those into account. One of the 
most important implications from the literature review is that default is closely related to 
their net cash flows. The consideration of net cash flows in credit risk modeling is more 
important in agricultural loan because agricultural sector is known to have liquidity 
problem and chronic cash flow pressures. Expected net cash flows is thought to be a 
good leading indicator for credit worthiness. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A PORTFOLIO CREDIT RISK MODEL 
 
This chapter proposes a portfolio credit risk model for agricultural  loans. A theory 
of loan default for farm borrowers is conceptualized first. Then, a theoretical model is 
developed that takes into account the characteristics of the agricultural sector, farm loans, 
and farm borrowers to insure the applicability of the model. Consistency with Basel II is 
addressed. For empirical application, a default model is specified by state. Simulation is 
used to project the probability of default and the other outputs for 2004 to 2007 period. 
The six steps involved in this simulation processes are explained. 
 
Theoretical Model 
This study proposes a simplified default model based on intuitive theory that a 
default event occurs when the borrower incurs negative net cash flows. This model 
therefore specifies creditworthiness in a more direct manner rather than the indirect 
manner common in asset value models. The default of an individual borrower is 
specified first. A portfolio default rate is then formulated by aggregation with 
assumptions about the loan portfolio and specific segments. 
Assumption 1 (Definition of Default): An individual borrower (i) defaults if available 
cash at t is not enough to service the loan obligation (Kit). Available cash at t is the sum 
of net cash income (NCIit), cash reserves (CRit), and available credit (ACit). 
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The condition of default for each borrower is denoted as: 
(4.1) 0<−++= ititititit KACCRNCIW . 
Wit is the difference between available cash or cash equivalents and the cash 
requirements for the loan obligation. This default condition is similar to distance-to-
default in KMV model.  
Assumption 2 (Credit worthiness of individual borrower): There is an unobservable 
stochastic variable Zit*, which is the index variable representing credit worthiness of 
borrower i at time t. Since the default of each borrower is triggered by net cash flows, 
Wit can be used as a proxy variable for the credit worthiness.  
The borrower’s credit worthiness can therefore be represented by the following 
relationship with disturbance term, it: 
(4.2) itititititit KACCRNCIZ ζ+−++=* . 
The credit worthiness, Zit*, is increasing as net cash income, credit reserves or 
available credit increases, but is decreasing as the amount of the periodic loan 
obligations increase.  
Assumption 3 (Net cash income and the others): There exists causal relationship 
between the net cash income (NCIit) and specific economic variables. NCIit is generated 
by a set of systematic factors (Yt), which is common to each borrower, and idiosyncratic 
factors (Iit). The values for CRit, ACit,and Kit are the same over all borrowers in a 
particular pool or segment.  
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The credit worthiness, Zit*, can be therefore expressed as the following regression 
relationship: 
(4.3) itittit IYCZ ε+Β+Α+= ''** , 
where C*= CRit + ACit + Kit, A and B are vector of unknown parameters, and it is error 
term.  
In practice, Zit* is unobservable variable, but banks can monitor the default (or 
non-default) of each borrower. So, the credit index variable, Zit, can be written out as a 
binary variable defined by 
(4.4) 
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By assuming the cumulative distribution of it is logistic, this study specifies a binary 
choice logit model for the credit index variable (Zit):  
(4.5) itittit IYCZ ε+Β+Α+= ''*  
(4.6) )ˆexp(1
1)1Pr(
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== . 
Equation (4.5) and (4.6) represent the credit risk models for individual borrower. In this 
specification, itZˆ is interpreted as the probability of default of borrower i at time t.  
To estimate credit risk at portfolio level, this study makes the following 
assumptions regarding the bank loan portfolios:  
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Assumption 4 (Homogenous asymptotic loan portfolio): 27 
(i) The portfolio has a significantly large number (N) of exposures: N  , 
(ii) Each exposure is homogenous and  identical in size: Li = 1 and  Li = N, 
(iii) Default event occur independently conditional on the realization of systematic 
factors (Y). 
Let Zt denote the fraction of the defaulted loan (or default rate) in the portfolio at time t. 
One can derive following equation:  
(4.7) 
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To simplify equation (4.7), segmentation of the loan portfolio and their attributes 
of each segment are assumed as follows: 
Assumption 5 (Homogenous segments): Bank loan portfolios can be classified into 
finite number (k) of segments or sub-portfolios. Even though entries and exits of loans 
                                                 
27
 This study takes the almost same assumptions to the simplified retail portfolio credit risk model such as 
Schönbucher (2000), Dietsch and Petey (2004), and Perli and Nayda (2004) 
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are continuously taken place in each loan segment, the average value of idiosyncratic 
factors in a segment is stationary over time.  
Based on this assumption, BE(Iit) in equation (4.7), the expected value of idiosyncratic 
factor at time t, can be divided into two terms; a constant value and stochastic error, et. 
Accordingly, one can rewrite equation (4.7) as: 
(4.8) ttt eYACZ ++= ' . 
Default model for pth loan segment can be expressed as follows:  
(4.9) 
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where Zp,t is the credit index for pth loan segment at time t, Yp,k,t is kth systematic factor 
for pth loan segment at time t, DRp,t is default rate of pth loan segment at time t, ’s are 
unknown parameters, and ep,t is error term. These equations can be simply transformed 
into a logistic functional form as follows: 
(4.11)  
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The systematic factors capturing the state of economy in each segment are 
determined by following multiple regression model: 
(4.12) tkptkptkp XfY ,,,,,, )( µ+=  , 
where X is the vector of factor specific, segment specific, or macroeconomic variables, 
and 	p,k,t is the error term.  
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After estimating equation (4.11) and (4.12), one can formulate a stochastic 
simulation model. By the nature of correlation among the economic factors in this model, 
the probability of default is a function of weighted average of systematic risk factor Y 
conditioned on state-of-the-economy X. This gives us a joint conditional distribution of 
default for each loan segment through simulation analysis as follows: 
(4.13) 
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(4.14) tkptkptkp XfY ,,,,,, ~)~(~ µ+= . 
 
Empirical Model 
The discussion of the empirical model in this study is disaggregated in two parts; 
(1) the default model and (2) simulation model. 
 
Default Model 
The theoretical model reflected in equation (4.11) assumes that the default rate of 
a loan segment can be expressed as a function of the systematic factors, and that they 
should be segment-specific and cash-flow-related variables if the default model is 
specified by sub-portfolio or loan segment. For example, if an agricultural bank 
segments its loan portfolio by commodity and by state (or region), i.e. loans to corn 
farmers in Iowa, Illinois, and so on, the explanatory variable of the default model should 
                                                 
28
 “~” on the variables represents that the variable is stochastic. 
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be associated with cash flows of the borrowers in the specific loan segment. However, 
this study specifies a default model by state, not by commodity because of data 
availability at the time of this study.29 As discussed in more detail in the next chapter, 
default rate data available in this study is disaggregated down to state level, and so this 
study collected state-specific data.   
This study creates three indicator variables by state to capture the robustness of 
net farm cash income; (1) net cash income per acre from crops or NCIC, (2) net cash 
income per hundred pounds (cwt) from livestock or NCIL, and (3) government payments 
per acre or GPMT. The two net cash income indicators, NCIC and NCIL, are selected 
because they are the major sources of cash income to U.S. farmers. Since government 
payments are also an important cash income source, GPMT is as an additive variable to 
the NCIC. The summation of NCIC and GPMT represents the total net cash income per 
acre from crops. The state rate of unemployment (UEMP) is introduced as a proxy 
indicator to capture the availability of off-farm income. A trend variable (TREND) is not 
a variable directly associated with net cash flows. However, at portfolio level, credit risk 
at agricultural banks has been decreasing due to the development of credit risk 
management technology such as credit scoring, improved loan approval process, and 
more extensive data availability. The trend variable can eliminate the effect of 
technological advances and enable the model to capture the impact of net cash income 
on the bank’s credit risk.  
                                                 
29
 Attempts to secure enterprise-level default information from the Farm Credit System were unsuccessful 
within the time frame of this study. 
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The default rate in each state is modeled based on equation (4.11) in the 
theoretical model. A three-year moving average of the indicator variables (NCIC, NCIL, 
GPMT, and UEMP) is used as explanatory variables with the trend variable (TREND). 
The use of a moving average is employed because the default event in a specific year is 
determined not only by concurrent net cash flows but also by past net cash flows. In 
other words, cash flow deficiencies cause default events in cumulative manner. The 
empirical default model for the agricultural loan segment in ith state is specified based as 
follows: 
(4.15) 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where DRi,t is the default rate for agricultural loans in ith state at the end of year t. The 
term movav( ) represents moving average of the variable(s) in the parenthesis ( ). NCICi,t 
is net cash farm income per acre from crops in ith state at time t, NCILi,t is net cash farm 
income per cwt from livestock, GPMTi,t is government payments per acre, UEMPi,t is 
state rate of unemployment, and TREND is trend variable representing technological 
advances in bank risk management. 
Since NCIC, NCIL, and GPMT cannot be directly collected from secondary data, 
this study creates them. Net cash farm income from crops (NCIC) is calculated as a 
weighted average of net cash farm incomes from three major crops (corn, soybeans and 
wheat), and the weights are determined by their percentage of cash receipts: 
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where NCICi,m,t is net cash income per acre of mth crop in ith state at time t, CRWi,m,t is 
the percentage of state cash receipts from mth crop among total state cash receipts from 
the three crops, and CRECi,m,t is state cash receipts from mth crop.  
Net cash income by crop is calculated from the state level yield, commodity price 
and cash cost of production: 
(4.18) tmitmitmitmi CCOSTPRICEYIELDNCIC ,,,,,,,, −×= , 
where  YIELDi,m,t is yield of mth crop in ith state at time t, PRICEi,m,t is price received by 
farmers for mth crop, and CCOSTm,i,t is cash cost of production of mth crop. 
Net cash farm income from livestock (NCIL) is generated by weighted average of 
net cash farm incomes from fed beef cattle and market hogs, and it is calculated by 
following equations: 
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(4.21) tnitnitni CCOSTPRICENCIL ,,,,,, −= , 
where NCILi,n,t is net cash income per cwt of nth livestock in ith state at time t, CRWi,n,t is 
the percentage of state cash receipt from nth livestock among total state cash receipt from 
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the two livestock, CRECi,n,t is state cash receipt from nth livestock, PRICEi,n,t is price 
received by farmers for nth livestock, and CCOSTi,n,t is cash cost of production for nth 
livestock.  
These three crops and two livestock represent 88.5% of total cash receipts in the 
states covered by this study. More details will be discussed in the next chapter.  
  
Simulation Model 
The objective of the simulation model developed in this study is to project the 
distribution of default rate and loan losses from 2004 to 2007, where 2007 is the last year 
of current U.S. farm bill. The objective is achieved through six steps of following 
simulation procedures: 
Step 1:  Generating stochastic exogenous variables 
Step 2: Solve the COMGEM30 econometric model for national prices and cash costs 
Step 3: Estimate state prices and cash cost of production 
Step 4: Calculate exogenous variables for the default model 
Step 5: Estimate the probability of default and loan loss distribution 
Step 6: Generate model outputs. 
Figure 3 illustrates the structure and processes of simulation model. This is 
followed by a detailed discussion of each step. 
                                                 
30
 COMGEM is a multi-sector macroeconomic model containing a fully simultaneous agricultural sector. 
A description of its design can be found in Penson and Taylor (1992). This model over time has been used 
for numerous analyses of government policy and agricultural issues. Taylor et al. (1991) is one of the 
applications of the model. 
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Figure 3  Structure of Simulation Model and Outputs 
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Step 1: This model identified nine exogenous variables and generated 100 
iterations using Simetar31 for each of these stochastic variables to capture the states of 
the economy. The exogenous variables are divided into two groups. The first group 
includes (1) state rate of unemployment (UEMP), (2) national rate of unemployment 
(USUEMP), (3) real weighted exchange rates for corn, soybeans, wheat and meats 
(CER), (4) rate of inflation (PGDP), (5) short term interest rate (RS), (6) long term 
interest rate (RL), and (7) consumer disposable income (YD). The second group includes 
(8) the national yields for corn, soybeans and wheat (USYIELD), and (9) the state yields 
for these crops (YIELD). It is assumed that stochastic exogenous variables take a 
multivariate empirical distribution32 within a group, but they are not correlated inter-
temporarily or between groups.  
The empirical distributions consist of two components, deterministic forecasted 
means and stochastic deviations. The stochastic deviations are selected randomly from 
historical deviations. Forecasted mean values are generated from the COMGEM model, 
and the state rate of unemployment (UEMP) and state yields (YIELD) are estimated from 
the following regression models as follows: 
(4.22) tiiti USUEMPUEMP 10, ˆˆ ββ += . 
                                                 
31
 Simetar is simulation software developed by Richardson (2003), which is used in Microsoft Excel as 
add-in program. 100 iterations for this simulation model are enough because Simetar uses Latin 
Hypercube technique.  
32
 Empirical distribution is a non-parametric distribution generated from historical data. It is useful when 
there are too small observations to estimate the parameters for the true distribution or when a parametric 
distribution assumption is not appropriate for data, i.e. crop yield typically having two peaks. See 
Richardson (2003) for the formula and calculation of multivariate empirical distribution (MVE) in detail. 
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(4.23) tmmimitmi USYIELDYIELD ,,1,0,, ˆˆ δδ += , 
where the subscript i, m, and t denote the state, commodity, and year, respectively. From 
the forecasted values and empirical distributions,33 stochastic exogenous variables are 
calculated for ,~iPUEM  ,
~PUSUEM  ,~RCE  ,~PPGD  ,~RL  ,~RS  ,~DY  ,~DUSYIEL and 
iDYIEL
~
 . 
Step 2: Generated random exogenous values are used as inputs to simulation of 
the COMGEM model. The model is solved to generate stochastic output variables; 
namely, national commodity prices ( EUSPRIC~ ) and unit cash cost of production 
( TUSCCOS ~ ) for corn, soybeans, wheat, beef cattle, and hogs. 
Step 3: The stochastic national prices and costs from the COMGEM model are 
used to estimate state prices and costs. State commodity prices ( EPRIC~ ) and cash costs 
( TCCOS ~ ) are specified as a function of national commodity prices and cash cost of 
production as follows: 
(4.24) tmitmmimitmi EUSPRICEPRIC ,,,,1,0,, ~
~
ˆˆ
~
υφφ ++=  
(4.25) tmitmmimitmi TUSCCOSTCCOS ,,,,1,0,, ~
~
ˆˆ
~
ωλλ ++= , 
where υ~  and ω~  are error terms assumed to follow a multivariate empirical distribution. 
Step 4: In this step, stochastic exogenous variables for the default model, iCNCI
~
, 
iLNCI
~
, iTGPM
~
, and iPUEM
~
 are calculated. Stochastic net cash incomes ( iCNCI
~
 
                                                 
33
 Empirical distributions are generated as percentage deviations from mean, percentage deviations from 
trend, or actual data of the regression error terms in equation (4.23) and (4.24). 
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and iLNCI
~ ) are generated by equation (4.16) through (4.21) with the stochastic 
commodity prices, cash cost of production, and yields at state level. The percentage of 
cash receipts for a commodity among total cash receipt (CRW) is assumed to be constant, 
which equal to the average contribution over the five most recent years, or:  
(4.26) )( 20031999,,,, −= mitmi CRWAverageCRW . 
Stochastic state rates of unemployment ( iPUEM~ ), which are simulated in step 1, are 
utilized directly. 
Simulating government payment per acre, iTGPM
~
 out to 2007 is problematic 
because of the data restrictions at the state level and potential changes in government 
policy prior to a new farm bill in 2008. Historical GPMT data is calculated by dividing 
state total direct payment by total planted acres for the three crops from 1985 to 2003. 
During this period, the farm bill has changed three times. Thus, the historical data 
represents four different crop policies. Estimating future GPMT through historical 
information, therefore, is not done. Instead, this study measures government payment per 
base acre using the formulas contained in the 2002 Farm Bill. Government payment 
(GPMT) is the sum of direct payments (DP), loan deficiency payments (LDP), and 
counter-cyclical payments (CCP), or: 
(4.27) 
=
++=
3
1
,,,,
)~~(~
m
tmtmimti PCCPLDDPTGPM . 
DP is calculated as a fixed payment by state and by commodity, and is expressed 
as a multiplication of direct payment rate (DPR), farm program yield (FPY) and a 
constant number 0.85, or: 
  
67 
(4.28) miDP , = DPRm × 0.85 × FPYi,m . 
LDP is a function of Loan Rate (LR) given by commodity, state price and state yield, or: 
(4.29) tmiPLD ,,
~
= (LR - PRICE
 i,m,t) ×i,m,t . 
Finally, CCP is calculated by following two equations: 
(4.30) tmPCC ,
~
= (TPm - Effective PRICE m,t) × 0.85 × Updated FPY 
(4.31) Effective PRICE m,t = Max (USPRICE m,t, LRm + DPi,m), 
where TP is target price. TP, and LR are fixed by commodity over the time period 
covered by this study, and Updated FPY is determined by state and by commodity. As a 
whole, GPMT is predetermined by the values for DPR, FPY, LR, TP, and Updated FPY, 
and by stochastic state and national commodity prices and yields.  
An inconsistency exists between historical and simulated GPMT since they are 
calculated by different approaches. The former is generated on a planted acre basis while 
the later is calculated on a base acre basis. To connect the two data series, this paper 
collects national average of government payment data per base acre (USGPMT). The 
data set is developed by Outlaw et al. (2004), and includes both crop year and fiscal year 
data from 1990 to 2002. Simulated GPMT by state is adjusted by the relationship 
between historical GPMT and USGPMT as followed: 
(4.32) tiiti TUSGPMGPMT ~ˆˆ 10, γγ += . 
Step 5: Stochastic default rates (DR) are calculated by the equation (4.15), and 
simulation model generates the probability of default or PDF for the default rate. The 
default model for simulation can be expressed as follows: 
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where ti ,~ε  is assumed to follow empirical distribution. 
Step 6: The final step of the simulation model is to generate the loan loss 
distribution and calculate management variables such as expected loan loss, VaR, and 
capital requirements. The loan loss distribution can be generated by following formula, 
which is identical to equation (2.1):  
(4.34) tititititi LGDEADRDLoanTotalLL ,,,,,
~~
×××= , 
where tiLL ,
~
 is stochastic loan loss in the ith state at time t, EAD is the exposure at default, 
and LGD is loss given default. Since the data used in this study is not bank level data but 
FDIC data aggregated by state as explained in Chapter V, the total loan, EAD, and LGD 
is not attainable. Therefore, this study makes assumptions about the variables, and 
develops the processes for generating loan loss distribution and calculating expected 
loan loss, VaR, and capital requirements from the loss distribution at the state level as 
discussed in Chapter V. 
The Basel II formula for capital requirements in retail exposures is based on the 
work of Vasicek (1997), where an analytical solution for distribution of default rate of a 
corporate loan portfolio was derived. Basel II applies this formula to retail exposures as 
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well. The capital requirements formula for other retail exposure34 is expressed as the 
multiplication of 99.9% percentile of the distribution of default rate and LGD, or: 
(4.35) 




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
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Φ×= −− )999.0(
1
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1
1 11
R
RDR
R
LGDK , 
where K represent capital requirement as a percentage of total loans outstanding,  and 

-1
 are the cumulative standard normal distribution function and its inverse function 
respectively, DR is expected value of the default rate, and R is correlation between asset 
value of borrower.35  
In retail exposures, the asset correlation cannot be observed. Basel II suggests a 
formula for indirect measure of the correlation from the default rate. The correlation was 
given by the following equation as a weighted average of minimum R (0.03) and 
maximum R (0.16):   
(4.36) 
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)*35exp(103.0 DRDRR . 
 
Summary 
This chapter presented the theoretical model proposed in this study and 
developed a default model and a simulation model based on this theoretical model 
conditioned by data availability. The empirical default model was developed as a logistic 
                                                 
34
 Basel II suggests three different formulas for retail exposures, which include residential mortgage 
exposures, revolving exposures, and other retail exposures. Agricultural exposures are fitting to the other 
retail exposures. 
35
 This formula includes asset correlation because Basel II simply introduced the formula from the asset 
value model designed for corporate exposures.  
  
70 
specification to evaluate loan portfolio credit risk by loan segment. The simulation 
model generated stochastic exogenous variables associated with the state of the economy, 
and were used as an input to the COMGEM econometric model. The COMGEM model 
generated national level variables, which were transformed into state level variables for 
use in the default model. This model is designed to generate probability of default in a 
proactive manner. The processes to generate loan loss distribution, expected default, 
VaR, and capital requirements was based on the Basel II regulation. 
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CHAPTER V 
DATA  AND ESTIMATION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a detailed description of data used in this 
study and to show the results from model estimation. Quantitative analysis is as good as 
the quality of data. The default rate and macroeconomic variables are described with the 
aid of both tables and graphs. The processes generating net cash income and associated 
variables are also explained, and details are tabulated in Appendix.  The next section of 
this chapter presents econometric estimation results, which include equations for default 
rate, state rate of unemployment, state yields, state price, and state cash cost of 
production.  
 
 Data 
Default Rate 
The default rates used in the development of the default model were graciously 
provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).36 This data contained 
requested series on loan performance for all agricultural loans at the state level from 
their Call Report 37  database. The data was collected from commercial banks and 
                                                 
36
 FDIC is an organization that insures deposits held by about 98% of all U.S. commercial banks. 
37
 All FDIC-insured institutions are required to file consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call 
Report) as of the close of business on the last day of each calendar quarter. FDIC constructed a database 
from the Call Report, and the database is publicly available on the web site from 1998. 
  
72 
aggregated at the state level for the 1985 to 2003 period. The data consists of (1) total 
loans outstanding, (2) loans past due greater than 30 days and less than 90 days but still 
accrual, (3) loans past due over 90 days but still accrual, (4) non-accrual loans, and (5) 
charge offs. The data was available quarterly, but this study uses only the fourth quarter 
balance to estimate annual default model. The sum of loans past due greater than 90 days 
but still accrual and non-accrual loans are considered as defaulted loans, or: 
(5.1) Default Loani,t = Loan past due over 90 days, accruali,t + Non-accrual loani,t, 
where i and t indicate state and year, respectively.  
This formula is consistent with the Basel II definition of default. The default rate is 
calculated by the fraction of default loans to total loans outstanding, or:  
(5.2) 
ti,
ti
ti gOutstandinLoanTotal
LoansDefault
RateDefault ,
,
= . 
This study models default rates for five states: Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
and Nebraska. These are located in the USDA’s Corn Belt and Northern Plains 
production regions. These states were chosen because the bulk of farm cash receipts 
come from the major commodities covered in this study. The following table shows cash 
receipts by state by commodity. Cash receipts for five major commodities (corn, 
soybeans, wheat, fed cattle and hogs) represent an average of 88.5% of total cash 
receipts in these states. The percentage of cash receipts from five major commodities is 
92.6% in Nebraska, followed by Iowa (89.2%), Kansas (88.9%), Illinois (88.8%) and 
Indiana (77.7%). Cash receipts in Iowa, Illinois and Indiana come primarily from crops, 
while cash receipts in Kansas and Nebraska come primarily from livestock.  
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Table 3  Cash Receipts by State, 2000-2003 Average 
                                                                                                                                         Unit: million Dollars  
Cash Receipts by commodity 
State Total Cash Receipt (a) Corn Soybeans Wheat Fed Cattle Hogs Sum (b) 
% 
(b/a) 
IA 11,376,288 3,135,676 2,236,461 2,723 1,969,281 2,805,124 10,149,264 89.2 
IL 7,581,468 2,991,317 2,258,059 126,608 543,743 810,923 6,730,651 88.8 
IN 4,864,499 1,432,689 1,241,391 69,948 813,939 220,579 3,778,545 77.7 
KS 8,294,277 703,204 314,296 1,015,588 5,072,684 271,217 7,376,989 88.9 
NE 9,557,588 1,874,317 917,512 188,418 5,217,601 649,480 8,847,327 92.6 
Sum 41,674,120 10,137,203 6,967,719 1,403,284 13,617,248 4,757,322 36,882,775 88.5 
Source: Farm Income Data, ERS / USDA: www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FarmIncome/Finfidmu.htm#receipts 
 
 
Historical data for loan performance status and default rates for the five states are 
tabulated in the Appendix 1. Figure 4 shows the historical trend for the default rate in the 
five states, while Table 4 presents summary statistics for these default rates. From the 
highest point in 1985, default rates have decreased to around 1% in 2003. Kansas 
represents the highest average default rate (1.75%), followed by Nebraska (1.68%), 
Indiana (1.60%), Illinois (1.53%), and Iowa (1.46%). Iowa recorded the highest and 
lowest default rates in history, 6.64% and 0.48%, and so it shows biggest standard 
deviation (1.71). Volatility represented by standard deviation is 0.96 in Indiana, which is 
the lowest, and followed by Illinois (1.15), Kansas (1.17), and Nebraska (1.39). 
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Figure 4  Historical Default Rate by State, 1985-2003 
 
 
Table 4  Summary Statistics of Default Rate 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Mean 1.46  1.53  1.60  1.75  1.68  
St. Dev. 1.71  1.15  0.96  1.17  1.39  
95 % LCI 0.69  1.01  1.17  1.22  1.05  
95 % UCI 2.22  2.04  2.02  2.27  2.31  
Min 0.48  0.55  0.60  0.93  0.74  
Median 0.81  1.07  1.24  1.33  1.20  
Max 6.64  4.40  4.04  5.02  5.71  
  LCI and UCL represent lower and upper confidence interval 
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The default rates in each state are highly correlated with each other as illustrated 
in Table 5. The correlation coefficients are greater than 0.9 except for those of Iowa-
Indiana and Indiana-Nebraska, and the coefficients are all statistically significant.  
 
Table 5  Correlation Matrix of Default Rate between States 
Correlation Coefficient 
  Iowa Illinois  Indiana  Kansas  Nebraska  
Iowa 1 0.96 0.89 0.99 0.98 
Illinois  1 0.93 0.96 0.94 
Indiana   1 0.90 0.84 
Kansas    1 0.97 
Nebraska         1 
  
Correlation Coefficient t-values 
  Iowa Illinois  Indiana  Kansas  Nebraska  
Iowa  14.25 8.24 24.46 23.06 
Illinois   10.46 13.76 11.38 
Indiana    8.37 6.31 
Kansas     16.99 
Critical value of t-state is 2.11 at 95% significance level  
 
As shown Table 6, the default rates in all five states had fallen from previous 
year in 1986 through 1990, 1993, 1994, and 1997. On the other hand, the default rates in 
all five states had been increased from the previous year in only two years, 1991 and 
1998. After 1999, the default rates don’t represent any trend over states and they are 
relatively stable. 
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Table 6  Changes in Default Rates 
                                                                                                                                        unit: % point 
Year Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
1986 -1.23 -0.11 -0.71 -0.42 -0.79 
1987 -2.54 -1.26 -0.64 -1.72 -1.76 
1988 -1.31 -1.14 -0.70 -1.14 -1.40 
1989 -0.62 -0.49 -0.31 -0.40 -0.57 
1990 -0.20 -0.39 -0.30 -0.13 -0.35 
1991 0.28 0.70 0.54 0.55 0.28 
1992 0.03 -0.16 0.33 -0.15 0.10 
1993 -0.14 -0.37 -0.07 -0.27 -0.36 
1994 -0.10 -0.27 -0.93 -0.10 -0.12 
1995 -0.23 -0.15 -0.35 0.23 0.21 
1996 0.10 -0.12 -0.04 0.14 0.35 
1997 -0.20 -0.08 -0.13 -0.67 -0.19 
1998 0.33 0.28 0.21 0.08 0.29 
1999 -0.01 0.18 -0.07 0.08 -0.05 
2000 -0.25 0.43 0.08 -0.14 -0.48 
2001 0.00 -0.35 0.06 0.18 0.01 
2002 0.10 -0.31 -0.12 0.05 0.06 
2003 -0.05 -0.01 -0.28 -0.03 0.53 
 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the trend of total agricultural loan outstanding and default 
loan by states. Total agricultural loan outstanding in Iowa have increased sharply from 
1987 and records the highest in 2003, followed by Illinois, Nebraska, and Kansas. 
Indiana represents the lowest total agricultural loan outstanding in 2003 and shows a 
gentle slope throughout the sample period. 
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Figure 5  Default Loans and Total Agricultural Loans Outstanding 
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Figure 5  Continued 
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Nebraska 
Figure 5  Continued 
 
Net Cash Income and Associated Variables 
Crop yields (YIELD) are measured on a planted acre basis and the price of crops 
(PRICE) is measured by marketing year average prices received by farmers. These 
variables are collected by state and by commodity from Ag Statistic Database on the 
web site of the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), an agency of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). The price of livestock commodities is measured by 
average price per cwt received by farmers and is gathered from several state web sites. 
Appendix 2 provides more details on the sources of data.  
The cash cost of production (CCOST) is calculated in several steps. First, state 
budget data is collected for crops and livestock for 2003 from state web sites. This 
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represents the base year for the total production costs data, which consists of cash costs 
and non-cash costs. Appendix 3 addresses the total cost of production in the base year, 
provides a data description, and indicates web sites where the data was collected. 
CCOST at time t is estimated by combining the base year cash cost of production with 
production cost index (PCI) as follows: 
(5.3) )/( 1,,,,1,,,, −− ×= tmitmitmitmi PCIPCICCOSTCCOST , 
where CCOSTi.m.t is cash cost of mth commodity in state i at t and PCIi.m.t is production 
cost index of mth commodity in state i at t (1982=100). The production cost index by 
state relates cash cost of production at a regional level with the U.S. cash cost of 
production data, both of which are available from ERS, USDA. Appendix 4 and 5 
provide more details on the measurement of production cost index and estimates of the 
cash cost of production by state.  
Net cash income by commodity is calculated using equation (4.18) and (4.21). 
The estimates of net cash income from crops (NCIC) and livestock (NCIL) are based on 
equation (4.16) and (4.19), and listed in Appendix 7. NCIC and NCIL are weighted 
average net cash income for each commodity, where the weight is derived from 
historical cash receipts presented in Appendix 6. For the estimates for government 
payment per acre (GPMT), government payments aggregated by state are collected, and 
then divided by the sum of planted acres to corn, soybeans and wheat. Appendix 8 
details this calculation and the results. Parameters and data required to simulate 
government payments in equation (4.27) to equation (4.32) are provided in Appendix 9 
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Macroeconomic Variables 
Rate of unemployment data at the state level and national level are collected from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor for 1982 to 2003 period. Other 
exogenous macroeconomic variables, such as real weighted exchange rates for corn, 
soybeans, wheat and meat, the rate of inflation, short term and long term interest rates, 
and real consumer disposable income were collected from the COMGEM database, 
which was also available from ERS, USDA, and are tabulated in Appendix 10.  
 
Estimation Results 
The default model and simulation models for the state rate of unemployment, 
state yields, prices, and cash cost of production were estimated by EView 3.1 
econometric software. Data series utilized in the estimation of the default model cover 
the 1985 to 2003 period. Other estimated equations were based upon data beginning in 
1982 with the same end point with the exception of the price equations, which have 
severe serial correlation problem with the extended data back to the early 1980s.  
The default rate equations were estimated with a nonlinear least squares (NLS) 
estimator because the models exhibit a nonlinear functional form as seen in equation 
(4.15). The other equations were estimated using either the OLS or NLS estimator with 
the application of the first or second-order autoregressive (AR(1) or AR(2)) model to 
correct serial correlation problem. Each model utilizes the Durbin-Watson (DW) test and 
Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test (or serial correlation LM test) to test for the 
existence of serial correlation common in the regression analysis with time series data. 
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The DW statistic is a test for first-order serial correlation and measures the linear 
relationship between adjacent residuals for regression. The DW statistic sometimes 
cannot reach a conclusion when the statistic value is located between upper and lower 
bound. The LM test can be used for high-order serial correlation. The null hypothesis of 
the test is “There is no correlation in the residuals up to the specified order.”  EViews 
generates “Obs*R-squared” statistic and its probability, which has an asymptotic Chi-
square distribution under the null hypothesis. If the statistic, which is represented as LM 
(p) in the result tables, is smaller than the critical value with high probability, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected and no correlation is implied. This paper pursues first to 
fourth order LM tests but shows only the LM (2) statistic under the result tables. 
In case of the existence of serial correlation problem, this paper specifies AR (1) 
or AR (2) model for regression residuals. To estimate an AR (1) model, following two 
models are specified first: 
(5.4) ttt Xy µ+Β=  
(5.5) ttt νρµµ += −1 , 
and then transform the linear model in the nonlinear model: 
(5.6) ttttt XXyy νρρ +Β−+= −− )( 11 , 
by substituting (5.5) into the first equation and rearranging term. Equation (5.6) is 
estimated using a nonlinear regression technique. NLS estimates are asymptotically 
equivalent to maximum likelihood estimates and are asymptotically efficient. AR (2) 
specifications are handled analogously. The nonlinear model estimates the coefficients 
using the Gauss-Newton algorithm in EViews (Quantitative Micro Software, 1998).  
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Default Model Estimation 
Estimation results for the default model are tabulated in Table 7. The default rate 
is a function of a three-year moving average of (1) total net cash income from crops 
(NCIC+GPMT), (2) net cash income from livestock (NCIL), and (3) rate of 
unemployment (UEMP), and (4) TREND. A two-year moving average value is used for 
UEMP in Illinois. In Nebraska, a two-year moving average of NCIC and GPMT are used 
since it is more significant statistically and explains well the variability of default rate in 
these states. The variables NCIL in Indiana and UEMP in Kansas were deleted during 
estimation process because significant parameters could not be attained. Different model 
specifications for the default model suggest that each state has unique economic 
structures at the micro and macro level, and demonstrates that default model should be 
specified by state or by region. 
The signs on the estimated coefficients for movav (NCIC+GPMT) and movav 
(NCIL) are negative as expected since an increase in net cash income should, ceteris 
paribus, decrease the default rate. An increase in the rate of unemployment implies 
lower off-farm income level, and so movav (UEMP) and default rate are expected to 
have a positive relationship. The sign on the TREND parameter is anticipated to be 
negative because the variable is introduced to capture technical advances in bank risk 
management. The estimation results show the signs of coefficients expected and are 
consistent with theoretical model without exception as shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7  Estimation Results of Default Rate Equations 
 Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Intercept -4.058 -1.583 -3.567 -0.242 -3.938 
 (-5.09) (-1.41) (1.07) (-0.95) (-6.51) 
      
movav (NCIC+GPMT) -0.005 -0.013 -0.007 -0.022 -0.007 
 (-4.29)    (-2.95) (-3.19) (-8.33) (-4.18) 
      
movav (NCIL) -0.058 -0.035  -0.048 -0.045 
 (-5.33) (-2.53)  (-5.06) (-2.64) 
      
movav (UEMP) 0.406 0.090 0.130  0.490 
 (6.04) (1.07) (3.41)  (5.83) 
      
TREND -0.035 -0.055 -0.029 -0.088 -0.017 
 (-1.54)      (-2.13) (-2.04) (-12.50) (-1.06) 
Adj. R2 0.992 0.917 0.942 0.956 0.955 
DW 1.542 1.510 1.330 1.750 1.916 
LM (2) 2.510 0.880 2.125 0.120 2.536 
(Prob) (0.28) (0.64) (0.35) (0.94) (0.28) 
 
 
The t-statistics for each parameter indicate the explanatory variables are 
statistically significant at 5% significance level with the exception of TREND in Iowa, 
movav (UEMP) in Illinois, and TREND in Nebraska. The DW statistics and Lagrange 
multiply (LM) test verify there is no correlation problem with the error terms of the 
estimated equations. The estimated models show high adjusted R2, meaning that the 
model explains 99.2% of variability of default rate in Iowa, and followed by Kansas 
(95.6%), Nebraska (95.5%), Indiana (94.2%), and Illinois (91.7%). In the theoretical 
model, it was assumed that default of each borrower is associated with net cash income 
(assumption 2 and 3). Therefore, empirical results support the assumptions and justify 
the theoretical model specification for default rate in equation (4.9) and (4.10).  
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Simulation Model Estimation 
Four groups of equations are estimated for inclusion in the simulation model: (1) 
state rate of unemployment, (2) state yield, (3) state price and (4) state cash cost of 
production. The first two groups of equations project forecasts and are used to generate 
random numbers for simulation analysis. The five state rates of unemployment are 
expressed as a function of US rate of unemployment with an AR (1) term except for 
Kansas to correct autocorrelation problem. Estimation results are tabulated in Table 8. 
The estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level except for 
USUEMP in Nebraska. The adjusted R2 for the Indiana rate of unemployment equation 
is the highest (0.972), followed by Illinois (0.953), Iowa (0.914), Nebraska (0.758), and 
Kansas (0.680). The DW statistics and LM test show no equation has serial correlation 
in its error terms. 
 
Table 8  Estimation Results of State Rate of Unemployment Equations 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Intercept 0.784 0.418 -0.400 1.996 1.317 
 (0.65) (0.48) (-0.56) (4.87) (1.17) 
      
USUEMP 0.536 0.995 0.884 0.435 0.337 
 (3.15) (7.13) (7.37) (6.76) (1.84) 
      
AR(1) 0.852 0.814 0.764  0.768 
 (9.36) (17.04) (11.87)  (5.84) 
Adj. R2 0.914 0.953 0.972 0.680 0.758 
D.W. 1.674 2.286 2.610 1.339 2.134 
LM (2) 1.405 1.380 2.494 1.734 4.152 
(Prob) (0.50) (0.50) (0.29) (0.42) (0.13) 
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State yields are regressed on the U.S. yield as specified in equation (4.26). The 
estimation results are summarized by commodity in Table 9. Estimated parameters for 
the U.S. yield are all significant at 1% significance level, and are all positive as expected. 
Test results report no serial correlation problem. Yield equations for major crops in a 
state (i.e. corn and soybean in Iowa and Illinois) result in high adjusted R2, but minor 
crops (i.e. wheat in Iowa) result in low adjusted R2. 
 
Table 9  Estimation Results of State Yield Equations 
Corn 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Intercept -19.218 -10.448 9.442 33.792 47.651 
 (-1.53) (-0.85) (0.57) (2.14) (3.60) 
      
USYIELD 1.337 1.276 1.039 0.803 0.681 
 (11.62) (11.28) (6.80) (5.43) (5.61) 
      
DM0103 
   -29.356  
    (-4.27)  
Adj. R2 0.865 0.857 0.683 0.615 0.592 
DW 2.212 1.450 2.068 1.870 2.164 
LM (2) 1.693 3.056 2.613 0.047 1.115 
(Prob) (0.43) (0.22) (0.27) (0.98) (0.57) 
 
Soybeans 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Intercept -1.214 3.043 5.350 -5.188 -4.683 
 (-0.21) (0.73) (0.94) (-0.55) (-0.93) 
      
USYIELD 1.228 1.067 1.008 0.935 1.218 
 (7.43) (8.78) (6.07) (3.38) (8.30) 
Adj. R2 0.721 0.784 0.630 0.332 0.775 
DW 2.081 2.064 1.776 1.481 2.834 
LM (2) 2.203 4.818 1.051 1.537 5.777 
(Prob) (0.33) (0.09) (0.59) (0.46) (0.06) 
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Table 9  Continued 
Wheat 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Intercept -0.229 9.397 3.785 -23.414 -1.316 
 (-0.01) (0.46) (0.19) (-2.59) (-0.13) 
      
USYIELD 0.977 1.123 1.369 1.754 1.078 
 (1.40) (1.79) (2.22) (6.32) (3.51) 
Adj. R2 0.044 0.095 0.157 0.650 0.351 
DW 1.313 1.574 1.327 2.111 1.717 
LM(2) 4.031 1.274 1.916 2.306 0.812 
(Prob) (0.13) (0.53) (0.38) (0.32) (0.67) 
 
 
State prices were estimated based on equation (4.24) with the addition of AR (1) 
for beef cattle and hogs in Illinois and Indiana, and AR (2) for hogs in Iowa to correct 
first order or second order autocorrelation problem in the error terms. These state prices 
are specified as a function of the U.S. price. The estimation results are summarized by 
commodity in Table 10. The estimated coefficients for the U.S. price in the state price 
equations are close to positive one, and show high t-values and adjusted R2 values except 
for a few equations, which suggest that national price movements explain the movement 
at the state level. The DW and LM test demonstrate no serial correlation problems 
existed in the estimated models. 
Estimated parameters and test statistics for fed cattle and hogs in Indiana are the 
same to those in Illinois because Indiana beef cattle data was not available, and Illinois 
data was therefore used as a proxy. The results for Nebraska and Kansas are same for the 
same reason. 
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Table 10  Estimation Results of State Price Equations 
Corn 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Intercept -0.121 0.045 -0.012 0.059 0.052 
 (-2.26) (1.17) (-0.15) (0.56) (0.80) 
      
US Price 1.017 1.006 1.034 0.998 0.970 
 (43.54) (60.04) (30.74) (21.47) (34.25) 
Adj. R2 0.991 0.995 0.981 0.962 0.985 
DW 1.297 1.238 1.480 1.776 1.264 
LM(2) 0.996 4.116 0.729 0.262 3.597 
(Prob) (0.61) (0.13) (0.69) (0.88) (0.16) 
 
Soybeans 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Intercept -0.121 0.134 0.039 -0.314 -0.177 
 (-1.40) (2.36) (0.46) (-1.48) (-2.48) 
      
US Price 1.012 0.997 1.002 1.039 1.004 
 (68.47) (102.59) (68.50) (28.47) (82.09) 
Adj. R2 0.996 0.998 0.996 0.978 0.997 
DW 1.619 1.598 1.415 1.181 2.311 
LM(2) 0.826 1.870 2.002 2.012 2.474 
(Prob) (0.66) (0.39) (0.37) (0.37) (0.29) 
 
Wheat 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Intercept 0.169 0.071 -0.031 -0.482 -0.335 
 (0.38) (0.25) (-0.12) (-3.16) (-2.87) 
      
US Price 0.865 0.901 0.933 1.117 1.076 
 (6.25) (10.13) (11.67) (23.78) (29.98) 
Adj. R2 0.679 0.850 0.882 0.969 0.980 
DW 1.578 1.613 1.188 2.274 1.574 
LM (2) 4.154 2.261 3.674 0.901 0.197 
(Prob.) (0.13) (0.32) (0.16) (0.64) (0.91) 
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Table 10  Continued 
Fed Cattle 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Intercept -1.756 -1.912 -1.912 -2.500 -2.500 
 (-0.69) (-0.69) (-0.69) (-1.11) (-1.11) 
      
USPRICE 1.015 1.014 1.014 1.044 1.044 
 (27.80) (26.83) (26.83) (32.29) (32.29) 
      
AR(1)  0.467 0.467   
  (2.56) (2.56)   
Adj. R2 0.977 0.986 0.986 0.983 0.983 
DW 1.124 1.771 1.771 1.189 1.189 
LM (2) 2.061 0.145 0.145 2.556 2.556 
(Prob.) (0.36) (0.93) (0.93) (0.28) (0.28) 
       
Hogs 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Intercept 7.941 -5.873 -5.873 5.088 5.088 
 (3.34) (-0.22) (-0.22) (2.15) (2.15) 
      
USPRICE 0.796 0.968 0.968 0.864 0.864 
 (15.83) (42.43) (42.43) (17.17) (17.17) 
      
AR(1)  1.040 1.040   
  (4.66) (4.66)   
      
AR(2) -0.636     
 (-2.68)     
Adj. R2 0.954 0.986 0.986 0.942 0.942 
DW 1.135 1.860 1.860 1.391 1.391 
LM (2) 4.417 2.922 2.922 4.251 4.251 
(Prob.) (0.11) (0.23) (0.23) (0.12) (0.12) 
 
 
 
 
  
90 
State cash cost of production are estimated by equation (4.25) specified in 
previous chapter. AR (1) terms were added as an explanatory variable for each equation 
except wheat to eliminate first order serial correlation problems. For the corn and 
soybeans equations, a dummy variable was used for the period after 2002.38 The variable 
is introduced to correct for a data inconsistency problem. The USDA data for cash cost 
of production for corn and soybeans were surveyed and calculated differently before and 
after 2002. The dummy variable is also included in simulation analysis for 2004 to 2007. 
State cash cost of production are modeled as a function of U.S. cash cost of 
production (USCCOST). The estimation results are tabulated in Table 11. The results for 
Illinois and Indiana are identical because both data are the same as explained before. All 
estimated parameters and statistics are very similar each other within a commodity. This 
stems from the fact that cash cost of production data are directly observed only in 2003, 
while historical data series are calculated using a production cost index constructed by 
region, not by state. With respect to the production cost index for crops, Iowa, Illinois, 
Indiana, and Nebraska all belong to the same USDA’s production region. Thus, the data 
series for the four states have same fluctuation. The production cost indexes for meat are 
all the same. As shown in the Table 11, coefficients are all significant statistically at 5% 
significance level, and there is no serial correlation problem. However, adjusted R2 is 
somewhat different by commodity. 
 
                                                 
38
 The dummy variable, DM(02-07), is denoted to one during the period from 2002 to 2007, otherwise, 
equals to zero.  
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Table 11  Estimation Results of State Cash Cost of Production Equations 
Corn 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Intercept -6.525 -6.543 -6.543 -41.930 -6.576 
 (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.07) (-1.13) (-0.07) 
      
USCCOST 1.096 1.099 1.099 1.216 1.105 
 (3.12) (3.12) (3.12) (5.12) (3.12) 
      
DM (02-07) -27.687 -27.762 -27.762 -27.138 -27.904 
 (-2.85) (-2.85) (-2.85) (-2.44) (-2.85) 
      
AR(1) 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.709 0.899 
 (7.50) (7.50) (7.50) (4.05) (7.50) 
Adj. R2 0.608 0.608 0.608 0.882 0.608 
DW 2.396 2.396 2.396 1.503 2.396 
LM (2) 3.177 3.177 3.177 1.707 3.177 
(Prob.) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.43) (0.20) 
 
 
Soybeans 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Intercept 49.362 61.312 61.312 49.023 70.529 
 (4.61) (4.61) (4.61) (3.87) (4.61) 
      
USCCOST 0.669 0.830 0.830 0.783 0.955 
 (4.60) (4.60) (4.60) (4.58) (4.60) 
      
DM (02-07) -16.502 -20.497 -20.497 -14.947 -23.578 
 (-2.95) (-2.95) (-2.95) (-2.40) (-2.95) 
      
AR(1) 0.402 0.402 0.402 0.473 0.402 
 (1.80) (1.80) (1.80) (2.18) (1.80) 
Adj. R2 0.687 0.687 0.687 0.728 0.687 
DW 1.334 1.334 1.334 1.344 1.334 
LM (2) 4.571 4.571 4.571 4.514 4.571 
(Prob.) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
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Table 11  Continued 
Wheat 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Intercept 46.741 46.741 46.741 -1.239 44.343 
 (5.41) (5.41) (5.41) (-0.32) (5.41) 
      
USCCOST 0.622 0.622 0.622 1.060 0.590 
 (4.43) (4.43) (4.43) (16.96) (4.43) 
Adj. R2 0.470 0.470 0.470 0.932 0.470 
DW 1.613 1.613 1.613 2.116 1.613 
LM (2) 2.170 2.170 2.170 1.451 2.170 
(Prob.) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.48) (0.34) 
Fed Cattle 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Intercept 38.527 34.487 34.487 47.287 37.103 
 (4.88) (4.88) (4.88) (4.88) (4.88) 
      
USCCOST 0.288 0.258 0.258 0.353 0.277 
 (2.51) (2.51) (2.51) (2.51) (2.51) 
      
AR(1) 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 
 (6.16) (6.16) (6.16) (6.16) (6.16) 
Adj. R2 0.780 0.780 0.780 0.780 0.780 
DW 1.479 1.479 1.479 1.479 1.479 
LM (2) 2.752 2.752 2.752 2.752 2.752 
(Prob.) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Hogs 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Intercept 9.219 9.882 9.882 7.982 8.732 
 (2.68) (2.68) (2.68) (2.68) (2.68) 
      
USCCOST 0.393 0.422 0.422 0.341 0.373 
 (4.99) (4.99) (4.99) (4.99) (4.99) 
      
AR(1) 0.742 0.742 0.742 0.742 0.742 
 (5.56) (5.56) (5.56) (5.56) (5.56) 
Adj. R2 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 
DW 1.895 1.895 1.895 1.895 1.895 
LM (2) 0.722 0.722 0.722 0.722 0.722 
(Prob.) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) 
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Summary 
Default rate data was provided by the FDIC while other variables are collected 
from selected government web sites or generated from the original data for the purpose 
of modeling. Fourth quarter balances in the loan performance data from FDIC are used 
by state to estimate an annual model from 1985 to 2003. This study covers five states: 
Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, and Nebraska. Five state models are specified and 
estimated separately. The key input of the default model, net cash income, was generated 
by state for the five major commodities in these states: corn, soybeans, wheat, fed cattle, 
and hogs. 
Estimation results show strong statistical attributes. Signs and magnitudes of the 
estimated parameters are consistent with theory or intuitive expectation. The t-statistics 
for estimated parameters are significance with a few exceptions. The magnitudes of the 
adjusted R2 differ by equation, but gave overall satisfaction. Importantly, the default 
model results high adjusted R2. The DW statistics and LM test results demonstrate there 
are no serial correlation problems. The results of the default model gave important 
implications to portfolio credit risk modeling. The results supported the assumption in 
the theoretical model that default of borrower is associated with net cash income, and 
that net cash income can be used as a leading indicator of default in agricultural loans. 
Different model specification suggests that default model should be specified by state 
and/or by region. 
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CHAPTER VI 
MODEL VALIDATION AND SIMULATION 
 
This chapter has three objectives: (1) to verify whether or not estimated models 
are appropriate to forecast the probability of default, (2) to present an application of the 
model, and (3) to discuss the interpretation and implication of the simulation results to 
bank credit risk management. Model validation of the default model is conducted within-
sample and out-of-sample simulation. For validation of the simulation model, t-statistics 
and F-statistics are used to test if the simulated exogenous variables are invariant to the 
historical data. Simulation analysis is used to project the probability of default and loss 
distribution. This is then used to calculate expected loan losses, maximum loan losses, 
Value at Risk, and capital requirements  
 
Model Validation 
Model validation refers the processes by which the model builder tests the 
completeness, accuracy and forecasting ability (Richardson, 2003). Several statistical 
tests, including t-statistics for estimated coefficients, adjusted R2, DW and LM statistics 
for serial correlation, and theoretical hypothesis tests, have already been presented in 
Chapter V. In this chapter, model validation is examined for both the default model and 
the simulation model.  
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Default Model 
Ex post and ex ante simulations are used to evaluate the forecasting accuracy of 
the default model. Ex post simulation generates forecasted values within the sample 
period, and the actual values and forecasted values are then compared. The Rood Mean 
Square Error (RMSE), Mean Absolute Error (MAE), Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
(MAPE), and Theil U are calculated to evaluate the forecasting error.39 The first two 
statistics capture the scale value of the forecasted error, while the other two statistics are 
scale invariant and lie between zero and one. The smaller the statistic, the greater the 
forecasting power of the model. The Theil U, or Theil inequality coefficient, is 
comprised of three components:  bias, variance and covariance. The bias (or variation) 
proportion indicates how far the mean (or variation) of the forecasted value is from the 
actual mean (or variation). The covariance portion captures the remaining unsystematic 
forecasting errors. The bias, variance, and covariance proportions add up to one. A good 
forecast should have a small bias and variance component so that most of the bias comes 
from the unsystematic proportion (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991). 
Table 12 presents these the statistics by state. The default model for Iowa has the 
smallest RMSE (0.134), which means that average forecasting error for the default rate 
is a 0.134% point during sample period, followed by Indiana (0.204), Kansas (0.216), 
Nebraska (0.245), and Illinois (0.283).  The default model for Iowa also has the smallest 
MAPE (13.1%); the historical forecast by the model achieved an error of 13.1%. This is 
followed by Indiana (13.2%), Kansas (13.3%), Illinois (18.1%), and Nebraska (19.6%). 
                                                 
39
 See Green (2000) for detail formula of these statistics 
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The Theil U statistic for each model is below 10 percent level. The components show a 
small bias and variation, but a covariance of almost one.  
 
Table 12  In-Sample Model Validation Statistics for Default Model 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
RMSE 0.134 0.283 0.204 0.216 0.245 
MAE 0.111 0.220 0.165 0.195 0.232 
MAPE 13.1% 18.1% 13.2% 13.3% 19.6% 
Theil U 0.030 0.075 0.055 0.052 0.059 
    Bias 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 
    Var 0.000 0.023 0.038 0.000 0.003 
    Cov 0.995 0.977 0.960 0.998 0.996 
 
Ex ante simulation analysis is used to evaluate the forecasting accuracy of the 
model beyond the sample period. The default models are estimated again with the data 
covering 1985 to 2001, and then used to forecast the annual default rate for 2002 and 
2003. The forecasted default rates are then compared with the actual default rates to 
calculate RMSE, MAE, and MAPE. Validation statistics from this out-of-sample 
simulation are reported in Table 13. RMSE and MAE statistics are close with-in-sample 
statistics except for Nebraska. The forecasted default rate for Nebraska however was 
considerably different from the actual default rate in 2003. The smallest MAPE is 
recorded for Iowa (12.2%) and followed by Kansas (15.4%), Illinois (24.3%), Indiana 
(28.0%), and Nebraska (28.7%). The MAPE is bigger than the in-sample simulation 
MAPE except for Iowa. This result stems from the fact that the default rates in 2002 and 
2003 were so small, mostly less than one, that percentage error is bigger. 
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Table 13  Out-of-Sample Model Validation Statistics for Default Model 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
RMSE 0.077 0.205 0.218 0.183 0.565 
MAE 0.076 0.184 0.175 0.178 0.416 
MAPE 12.2% 24.3% 28.0% 15.4% 28.7% 
 
 
 
Simulation Model 
Model validation for the simulation model is examined for the stochastic 
component of the model. The stochastic exogenous variables were simulated with 100 
iterations to determine whether the simulated series are statistically equal to historical 
series or whether the distributions from the two series are the same. Three statistics are 
used in the validation process: (1) t-test for mean, (2) F-test for standard deviation, and 
(3) t-test for correlation coefficient. These tests determine whether (1) the means from 
simulated variables are equal to the forecasted means, which are given by COMGEM or 
regression models, (2) the simulated variances are equal to the historical variance, and 
(3) the correlation coefficients among simulated variables are statistically the same as 
those among historical series.  
The t and F statistics and their p-values are summarized in the Table 14 to test 
the means and standard deviations of macro economic variables and crop yields. All the 
p-values in the table are greater than 0.05, which means the null hypothesis, which is a 
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test parameters of simulated values and historical (or forecasted) values are the same, 
can not be rejected at 5% significance level. For example, the p-values in the t-test for 
the rate of unemployment are ranged from 0.8 to 0.99, and those in the F-test for the rate 
of unemployment rate are distributed from 0.51 to 0.99.  
 Table 15 represents the p-values of the t-test for comparing the correlation 
coefficients between correlation matrix from the original data series and that from the 
simulated values. The null hypothesis is that the correlation coefficients are the same. 
The critical value of the test is 3.75. If looking at the p-values on the table for both 
macroeconomic variables and national and state yields, they are all smaller than the 
critical value, meaning that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and correlation 
coefficients from the original data series and the simulated values are statistically the 
same.   
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Table 14  Model Validation Statistics for Stochastic Variables 
Macroeconomic Variables 
 
    Rate of Unemployment 
    US Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
PGDP 
Test Value 0.12 0.08 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.26 t-test for 
Mean P-Value 0.91 0.93 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.80 
Test Value 98.08 89.35 102.65 104.72 101.55 96.45 93.17 F-test 
for S.D. P-Value 0.99 0.51 0.76 0.66 0.82 0.89 0.71 
 
    Real Weighted Exchange Rate 
    Corn Soybean Wheat Meat 
RS RM YD 
Test Value 0.62 0.62 -0.15 0.46 1.05 0.90 0.37 t-test for 
mean P-Value 0.54 0.54 0.88 0.65 0.30 0.37 0.71 
Test Value 94.90 98.24 105.05 95.13 75.90 76.18 109.49 F-test 
for S.D. P-Value 0.80 0.99 0.64 0.82 0.08 0.09 0.44 
 
Corn Yield 
    US Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Test Value 0.42 -0.38 0.03 0.16 -0.13 -0.24 t-test    
for mean P-Value 0.67 0.70 0.97 0.87 0.90 0.81 
Test Value 85.73 85.16 95.43 94.41 109.77 123.67 F-test  
for S.D. P-Value 0.35 0.32 0.83 0.78 0.43 0.09 
 
Soybean Yield 
    US Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Test Value -0.21 -0.31 -0.03 0.23 -0.07 -0.01 t-test    
for mean P-Value 0.83 0.75 0.98 0.82 0.95 0.99 
Test Value 99.04 112.91 91.43 105.11 102.34 100.94 F-test  
for S.D. P-Value 0.96 0.32 0.61 0.64 0.78 0.85 
 
Wheat Yield 
    US Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Test Value -0.08 0.08 -0.09 0.08 0.14 -0.04 t-test    
for mean P-Value 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.89 0.97 
Test Value 111.31 104.59 106.24 94.62 100.21 99.44 F-test  
for S.D. P-Value 0.37 0.66 0.58 0.79 0.89 0.94 
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Table 15  Model Validation Statistics for Correlation Coefficients 
Macroeconomic Variable 
 CER UEMP 
 Corn SB Meat 
US 
UEMP 
 
PGDP 
 
RS 
 
RL 
 
YD IA IL IN KS NE 
CER_W 1.38 1.50 1.84 0.45 0.44 0.15 1.21 0.97 0.84 1.71 0.22 1.97 0.51 
CER_C  1.01 0.88 0.87 0.57 1.79 0.65 0.68 1.01 0.72 0.05 2.08 0.96 
CER_S   0.74 0.55 0.34 1.94 1.15 0.06 1.07 0.77 0.44 2.33 0.70 
CER_M    0.59 0.03 2.47 0.93 0.30 1.09 0.39 0.06 3.11 0.31 
USUEMP     0.97 0.22 0.89 0.07 0.79 1.42 0.40 0.66 1.25 
PGDP      0.13 0.66 0.29 1.82 0.39 0.12 0.33 0.94 
RS       1.68 1.33 0.24 2.37 2.14 1.63 0.51 
RL        0.49 0.02 1.22 0.57 2.46 0.12 
YD         0.22 0.18 0.05 2.49 0.13 
UEMP_IA          1.33 0.95 2.01 1.11 
UEMP_IL           0.67 0.82 0.38 
UEMP_IN            0.16 1.11 
UEMP_KS             0.35 
Critical value of this test is 3.75. 
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Table 15  Continued 
Yields 
 Y2US Y3US Y1IA Y1IL Y1IN Y1KS Y1NE Y2IA Y2IL Y2IN Y2KS Y2NE Y3IA Y3IL Y3IN Y3KS Y3NE 
Y1US 1.33 0.33 0.53 0.70 0.12 0.01 0.64 1.42 0.23 0.93 0.98 0.67 1.08 0.42 0.76 1.03 0.04 
Y2US 
 0.23 0.34 0.84 0.89 0.38 0.95 0.38 0.55 0.99 0.16 0.77 1.24 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.15 
Y3US 
  1.55 0.73 0.68 1.15 0.17 1.05 0.24 0.26 0.19 1.60 0.43 0.58 0.68 0.66 1.24 
Y1IA 
   0.67 0.44 0.71 0.90 0.84 1.05 0.41 0.65 1.54 0.11 1.08 1.65 1.23 0.74 
Y1IL 
    1.13 0.14 0.37 0.46 0.24 0.46 0.12 0.05 1.02 0.39 0.47 0.82 1.52 
Y1IN 
     1.08 0.99 0.82 0.27 0.68 0.55 0.53 0.64 0.74 0.30 0.94 0.38 
Y1KS 
      0.19 0.07 0.37 0.80 0.03 0.04 0.70 0.23 1.35 0.84 2.03 
Y1NE 
       0.03 1.07 0.77 0.32 0.15 1.76 0.26 0.98 0.03 0.68 
Y2IA 
        0.24 0.26 0.88 0.01 0.92 0.05 0.01 1.05 0.74 
Y2IL 
         0.50 0.87 0.80 0.91 0.79 0.50 0.82 0.23 
Y2IN 
          0.80 0.92 1.22 0.06 0.45 0.97 0.39 
Y2KS 
           0.18 0.82 0.37 0.16 0.92 0.67 
Y2NE 
            1.77 0.78 1.12 0.01 0.25 
Y3IA 
             0.25 0.69 0.55 0.34 
Y3IL 
              0.16 1.13 0.01 
Y3IN 
               0.98 0.48 
Y3KS 
                0.48 
Critical value of this test is 3.75. 
Y1, Y2, and Y3 represent corn, soybeans, and wheat yield, respectively. 
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Simulation Results 
The key output of the default model and simulation model is the probability of 
default (or default distribution). The probability of default is measured using the 
simulated stochastic default rate, which is simulated for the 2004 to 2007 period with 
100 iterations. The probability of default can be represented graphically as a PDF or a 
CDF, and statistically by the mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum. The 
loss distribution is measured by equation (4.35) with the default distribution. Finally, the 
loss distribution is used to calculate the expected loan loss, Value at Risk, and capital 
requirements. 
 
Probability of Default 
Figure 6 illustrates the projected expected default rates simulated for 2004 to 
2007 period with historical default rates from 2000 to 2003. The graph illustrates the 
recent trend and projected default rate for each state. The overall trend for the expected 
default rates in agricultural loans suggests a decrease in 2004 and 2005 and an increase 
in 2006 and 2007. This result is tied to good economic conditions in the agricultural 
sector in 2003 and 2004. During this period, U.S. farmers experienced good yields and 
high prices. Furthermore, program commodity producers continued to receive direct 
payments from the federal government, resulting in even higher net cash income. In 
2004, the expected default rates are expected to be below 1% in five states. These rates 
could represent a historical minimum or near historical minimum default rate. Nebraska 
is anticipated to have the highest default rate throughout the forecasting horizon, 
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meaning that agricultural banks in Nebraska could be exposed to the highest risk of the 
five states over this period. The default rates in Kansas are forecasted to increase sharply 
after 2005 and will be more than double the 2005 default rate by 2007.  
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Figure 6  Expected Default Rates by State 
 
Table 16 lists the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum, for the 
simulated default rate in detail. In 2004, the default rate in Nebraska was 0.87%, the 
highest value among states, followed by Indiana (0.74%), Kansas (0.63%), Iowa (0.61%), 
and Illinois (0.44%). Nebraska is expected to have the widest default rate distribution 
with standard deviation of 0.28 and followed by Kansas (0.25), Illinois (0.23), Indiana 
(0.20), and Iowa (0.15). In 2007, the default rates are expected to be higher than those in 
2004 except for Iowa and Indiana. Nebraska still has the highest expected default rate 
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with 1.25, followed by Kansas (0.84%), Indiana (0.70%), Illinois (0.54%), and Iowa 
(0.52%). 
 
Table 16  Summary Statistics for Simulated Default Rate, 2004-2007 
    2004 2005 2006 2007 
Iowa Mean 0.61 0.45 0.42 0.52 
 St. Dev. 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 
 Min 0.33 0.07 0.10 0.14 
 Max 0.90 0.73 0.75 0.88 
Illinois Mean 0.44 0.33 0.41 0.54 
 St. Dev. 0.23 0.27 0.31 0.28 
 Min 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Max 1.24 1.17 1.36 1.25 
Indiana Mean 0.74 0.60 0.66 0.70 
 St. Dev. 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.21 
 Min 0.42 0.21 0.22 0.26 
 Max 1.36 1.39 1.37 1.34 
Kansas Mean 0.63 0.42 0.56 0.84 
 St. Dev. 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.32 
 Min 0.15 0.01 0.03 0.11 
  Max 1.12 0.88 1.04 1.64 
Nebraska Mean 0.87 0.89 1.01 1.25 
 St. Dev. 0.28 0.35 0.34 0.38 
 Min 0.30 0.08 0.37 0.47 
  Max 1.75 2.02 1.87 2.20 
 
 
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) shows the probability of the default 
rate, and provides valuable information to bank management. Figure 7 illustrates the 
CDF by state by year.  
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Figure 7  CDF for Projected Default Rate, 2004-2007 
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Figure 7  Continued 
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Figure 7  Continued 
 
Assume a bank serving farmers in Iowa has a risk management goal of 
maintaining the default rate under 0.5%. As illustrated in Figure 8, the bank has only 
27% of chance to achieve the goal in 2004. The possibility of accomplishing the goal 
will be increased up to 61% in 2005 and 72% in 2006, and then fall to 46% in 2007. If 
the bank uses a projected default rate exceeding a threshold as “a high credit risk 
condition,” the CDF can be used as early warning indicator of future loan defaults. Let’s 
suppose the bank in Iowa has 0.8% of threshold, meaning the bank regards its credit risk 
as a high level if projected default rate is greater than 0.8%. The probability of the bank 
being exposed to high credit risk conditions based upon this threshold is 17% in 2004. 
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During 2005 to 2006, the probability of exceeding this threshold is 0%, while there is 
4% possibility in 2007. 
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Figure 8  Stoplight Chart for Default Probabilities of Iowa with Two Cut-off Values 
of 0.5% and 0.8% 
 
Loan Losses Distribution and VaR 
The stochastic loan loss is calculated using (1) the default rate, (2) total loans 
outstanding, (3) the exposure at default and (4) the loss given default as discussed in 
Chapter IV. Since this study did not have access to bank level data, the calculation of 
loan loss distribution cannot be directly calculated. Instead, this study develops a process 
for generating the loan loss distribution and the other risk management variables based 
upon a set of assumptions. 
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Let’s first assume each state represents a bank.40 Each “state bank” can estimate 
total loans outstanding for coming year (2004) and ahead. Total loans outstanding in the 
future are decided by bank loan policy, available funds, and loan demand. Let’s further 
assume that total loans outstanding can be represented by a simple trend model with the 
forecasts listed in Table 17. Exposure at default and loss given default can be estimated 
from historical data. However, this study simply assumes that exposure at default is 
equal to one41 and loss given default is equal to 0.5.42 For sensitivity analysis, loss given 
default can be varied parametrically within a range of a policy value. 
Each default rate generated from the 100 iterations of the simulation model is 
multiplied by the forecasted value of total loans outstanding, EAD (1.0), and LGD (0.5). 
The corresponding 100 number of loan losses can then be generated, and used to 
calculate expected loan loss, maximum loan loss, and VaR as shown in Table 17. This 
table shows the results only for 2004. The results for the other years can be obtained 
using same procedure. Forecasted total loans outstanding for Iowa in 2004 is $7,724 
million, followed by Illinois ($6,404 million), Nebraska ($6,205 million), Kansas 
($4,309 million), and Indiana ($2,270 million). Nebraska is anticipated to have the 
                                                 
40
 Since this study uses the loan performance data for agricultural loan obtained from the FDIC, loan 
portfolio of the banks are assumed to consist of agricultural loans in the commercial banks in a state. Loan 
performance data at other lenders serving farms in these states was not included in this study. 
41
 EAD value is less than the current balance. EAD is generally taken to be equal to one for non-revolving 
loans. Banks typically ignore the EAD when they calculate VaR, which is equivalent to assuming EAD is 
equal to one (RMA, 2003). 
42
 LGD is quiet different by bank and even by loan portfolio segment within a bank. It is known that LGD 
of mortgage loan is usually low (10-20%) but that of credit card is high, more than 80% (RMA, 2003). 
However, survey data about LGD for an agricultural loan portfolio is not available. This study assumes the 
median of possible LGD range (0% ~ 100%). 
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highest expected loan losses at $27.0 million, followed by Iowa ($23.7 million), Illinois 
($14.1 million), Kansas ($13.5 million), and Indiana ($8.4 million).  
 
Table 17  Projections for Loan Loss Distribution and VaR, 2004 
                                                                                                                                  Unit: million dollars 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Total Loan Forecasts 7724 6404 2270 4309 6205 
Expected Loan Loss 23.7 14.1 8.4 13.5 27.0 
Maximum Loan Loss 34.6 39.5 15.4 24.2 54.2 
Value at Risk 10.9 25.4 7.0 10.8 27.3 
 
 
Maximum loan loss is influenced by expected loan loss as well as dispersion of 
the loan loss distribution. Nebraska has the highest expected loan losses and widest loan 
loss distribution as seen in Figure 8. As a result, Nebraska has the highest maximum loan 
losses ($54.2 million) and VaR ($27.3 million). VaR is calculated by subtracting the 
expected loan loss from the maximum loan loss.43 Illinois also has a relatively wide loan 
loss distribution, which results in the second highest maximum loan losses ($39.5 
million) and VaR ($25.4 million). Beside these two states, Iowa has high maximum loan 
losses ($34.6 million), and followed by Kansas ($24.2 million), and Indiana ($15.4 
                                                 
43
 VaR also can be measured on the PDF graph of loan loss distribution. Figure 9 could be manipulated 
just like Figure 1 in Chapter II. 
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million). VaR of Iowa and Kansas is $10.9 million and $10.8 million respectively, and 
Indiana shows the lowest VaR in 2004.  
Figure 9 illustrates the PDF and CDF for loan losses in 2004 by state. The graph 
provides valuable management information and can also be used in risk management by 
banks the same way as the CDF was used for the default rate. Bank management is 
surely interested in right hand side of the loan loss distribution. Illinois and Kansas has 
almost same value of expected loan loss, and the shape of the loan loss distribution is 
similar except for long right-hand-side of the tail in Illinois. The long tail to the right in 
Illinois means that Illinois has more risk in spite of the almost same expected loan losses. 
The big difference in VaR values between Illinois ($28.5 million) and Kansas Illinois 
($10.1 million) stems from the difference in loan loss distributions. This gives banks an 
important implication that bank management should trace expected loan loss (or risk) as 
well as the distribution of the loan loss (or risk) for coming years.  
 Banks can also compare loan loss distribution by year.44  The riskiness of a 
bank’s portfolio can be reviewed through the distributions by year. The results enable 
banks to prepare a proactive policy to future credit risk.  
 
                                                 
44
 The loan loss distribution by year is not presented. 
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Figure 9  PDF and CDF for Stochastic Loan Loss Projection, 2004 
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The loan loss distribution can be interpreted as an early warning indicator to bank 
management as well as to bank examiners and regulator. For example, let’s suppose the 
OCC classifies a bank with more than 15% of probability that loan losses are greater 
than $30 million, into as “a risky bank.” Figure 10 illustrates the probability that each 
bank could belong to a risky bank class. In term of the OCC threshold, Iowa with 18% of 
probability and Nebraska with 36% of probability in 2004 might require close attention 
from the OCC. Illinois has a long tail in loss distribution and greater maximum losses 
than Iowa, but the probability that loan losses are greater than $30 million is just 5.5%. 
Indiana and Kansas are projected to have zero percent of probability that they are 
classified into a risky bank in 2004. If agricultural banks develop a default model by 
commodity, the stoplight chart can be used to detect risky commodity segments. 
 
82%
94% 100% 100%
64%
18%
6% 0% 0%
36%
0 0 0 0 0
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
 
Figure 10  Stoplight Chart Illustrating the Probability that Loan Losses are greater 
than $30 million in 2004 
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Capital Requirements 
Capital requirements are estimated based on the Basel II formula presented in 
equations (4.35) and (4.36). Table 18 summarized the capital requirement by state for 
2004. Correlations ranged from 0.123 to 0.140. Nebraska has the smallest R value 
(0.123), followed by Indiana (0.128), Kansas (0.132), Iowa (0.133) and Illinois (0.140). 
Since the correlation is a decreasing function of the default rate, the state order for the 
size of correlations is the reverse of the size of the default rates.  
 
Table 18  Calculation Results for Capital Requirements, 2004 
  Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska 
Expected default rate (DR) 0.61% 0.44% 0.74% 0.63% 0.87% 
Correlation (R) 0.133 0.140 0.128 0.132 0.123 
Capital requirement (K)  3.48% 2.87% 3.85% 3.51% 4.18% 
 
Capital requirements are calculated using the expected default rate and the 
assumption of a normally distributed default rate.45 Under the normality assumption, the 
99.9% percentile of the default distribution is far away from the expected default rate, 
resulting conservative capital requirements. The Basel II formula also ignores 
uniqueness of the distribution for each loan portfolio. As shown in Figure 7 and 9, the 
default distributions and loan loss distributions are quite different by state, but the Basel 
                                                 
45
 Basel II formula for capital requirements assumes normality of the default rate since the formula stems 
from an option-based structural model such as CreditMetrics, which is detailed in Chapter III.  
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II assumes the distributions are the same. Capital requirements for Illinois is 2.87% of 
total loans outstanding in 2004, and followed by Iowa (3.48%), Kansas (3.51%), Indiana 
(3.85%), and Nebraska (4.18%). The capital requirements can be interpreted as the 
amount of required capital out of unit dollar of total loans outstanding. For example, 
Illinois is required to have more than 2.87 cents of capital out of one dollar of loans to 
fulfill the capital requirements regulated by Basel Capital Accord.   
 
Summary 
Model validation for the default model is examined through in-sample and out-
of-sample simulation to measure the forecasting error. Four statistics, RMSE, MAE, 
MAPE, and Theil U, were used for this purpose. The maximum forecasting errors are 
19.6% in in-sample simulation and 28.7% in out-of-sample simulation. For validation of 
the simulation model, t-statistics and F-statistics are used, and the results verify that the 
simulated exogenous variables are invariant from the historical data.  
This chapter simulated the default rate by state from 2004 to 2007. The over all 
tendencies of the expected default rates suggests a decrease in 2004 and 2005, and an 
increase in 2006 and 2007. Nebraska would be exposed to the highest risk over the 
period. This chapter provides the statistics and CDF for the default rates, and suggests, 
with Iowa sample, how CDF graphs could be used to evaluate riskiness of a bank 
portfolio example. This chapter explained how the loss distribution could be generated 
and how the loss distribution could be used to calculate the expected loan loss, 
maximum loan loss and VaR. Nebraska, which has the highest expected and maximum 
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loan loss, is projected to have the highest VaR in 2004. The calculation for capital 
requirements was performed using the Basel II formula. Nebraska was projected to have 
the highest capital requirement, and followed by Indiana, Kansas, Iowa and Illinois. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Summary 
After the heavy loan losses and riskier environments experienced in the 1980s 
and 1990s, banks became believers in the importance of credit risk management. Credit 
risk models are widely applied in banks today. Effective credit risk management has 
become an important factor of bank success. The New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) 
provides added emphasis to the development of portfolio credit risk models. However, 
credit risk models for agricultural loan portfolios are still in the infancy. The general 
objective of this study was to develop a credit risk model for agricultural loan portfolio.  
This study initially reviewed the key issues in bank credit risk management. 
Since a bank is a firm balancing risk and return characteristics among alternative 
opportunities, it cannot avoid risks to fulfill its objective. There are several categories of 
banking risks, but credit risk is the most predominant. Credit risk is regarded as the 
primary cause of bank failure in recent years. Credit risk can be measured at the 
exposure level and the portfolio level. VaR is the industry standard measure of the 
portfolio credit risk. Basel II incorporates the VaR concept in its regulations, providing 
emphasis to modeling portfolio credit risk. An important regulatory change in Basel II is 
the differentiated treatment in measuring capital requirements for the corporate 
exposures and retail exposures, which has important implication to agricultural loan 
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portfolios. Basel II allows agricultural loans should be categorized and treated as the 
retail exposures, because agricultural exposures are typically managed on a portfolio 
basis and have similar risk characteristics to other types of retail exposures. 
Chapter III presented an extensive review of literature on credit risk models. The 
review provided a historical perspective, citing existing arguments, directions, and credit 
risk modeling. There are three categories of stand-alone credit risk models: expert 
systems, credit ratings, and credit scoring models. These models are used as an input to 
portfolio credit risk modeling. Portfolio credit risk models were initially developed for 
commercial use. There are various types of portfolio credit risk models: option-based 
structural models, reduced form models, and multi-factor econometric models. Portfolio 
credit risk models for retail exposures have been developed by banks recently. However, 
little has been done to model credit risk for the retail exposures or agricultural loans.  
A model for bank portfolio credit risk should be chosen based upon forecasting 
accuracy and applicability. In this sense, portfolio credit models developed for the 
corporate exposures have disadvantages if applied to the retail exposures due to their 
intensive data requirements. Retail exposures have unique characteristics that need to be 
taken into account. One of the most important implications from the literature review is 
that, in consumer loans or small business loans, default is closely related to cash flow 
and the fact that their income may become insufficient to make scheduled loan payments. 
Consideration of the cash flow effect in credit risk modeling is important in agricultural 
loan since the agricultural sector is known to have liquidity problems and chronic cash 
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flow pressures. Net cash flows are a good leading indicator for credit worthiness and 
provide the basis for making a credit risk model proactive.  
A theoretical model and empirical model for an agricultural loan portfolio credit 
risk were developed in Chapter IV. A theory of loan default for farm borrowers was 
conceptualized based on causal relationship between creditworthiness and economic 
factors at the micro level. Several assumptions, such as homogenous asymptotic loan 
portfolio and homogenous segments, are introduced to make the model simple. The 
theoretical model emphasizes the applicability to agricultural loan portfolios where data 
availability is an issue. The empirical default model reflects a logistic specification that 
evaluates loan portfolio credit risk by loan segment. The simulation model generates 
stochastic exogenous variables associated with the state of the national economy, which 
are used as an input to the COMGEM econometric model. The COMGEM model 
generates national level variables, and they are transformed into state level variables 
used as explanatory variables (NCIC, NCIL, GPMT, and UEMP) in the default model. 
This model is designed to generate the probability of default in a proactive manner. The 
procedures to generate the loan loss distribution, expected default, VaR, and capital 
requirements, based on Basel II, are explained in detail. 
Default rate data was provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC). Other variables are collected from the government web sites or generated from 
the original data for modeling purposes. Fourth quarter balances in the loan performance 
data provided by the FDIC are used by state to estimate the annual model over the 1985 
to 2003 period. This study covers five states: Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, and 
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Nebraska. Five state models are specified and estimated separately. The key input to the 
default model, net cash income, generated by state reflects the five major commodities: 
corn, soybeans, wheat, fed cattle and hogs. 
The estimation results from the default model and simulation model show strong 
statistical attributes. The signs and magnitudes of the estimated parameters are consistent 
with theory or intuitive expectation. The t-statistics for the estimated parameters are 
significant with few exceptions. The magnitudes of adjusted R2 differ by equation, but 
are overall satisfactory. The default model reflects an exceptionally high adjusted R2. 
The DW statistics and LM test results demonstrate that there is no serial correlation 
problem. The results of the default model supported the assumption in the theoretical 
model that default by the borrower is associated with net cash income, and that net cash 
income can be used as a leading indicator for default in agricultural loans. Different 
model specification suggests that default models should be specified by state and/or by 
region. 
Chapter VI has three goals: (1) to verify whether or not the estimated models are 
appropriate for forecasting the probability of default, (2) to present an application of the 
model, and (3) to discusses the interpretation and implication of the simulation results to 
bank credit risk management. Model validation for the default model was examined 
through in-sample and out-of-sample simulation to measure the forecasting error. Four 
statistics, RMSE, MAE, MAPE, and Theil U, are used for this purpose. The maximum 
forecasting errors are 19.6% in the in-sample simulation and 28.7% in the out-of-sample 
simulation. For validation of the simulation model, t-statistics and F-statistics were used. 
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The results verify that the simulated exogenous variables are invariant from the 
historical data.  
The default rates are simulated by state over 2004 to 2007 period, providing the 
probability of default or the default rate distribution. The over all tendencies for the 
expected default rates in agricultural loans suggest a decrease in 2004 and 2005, and an 
increase in 2006 and 2007. Nebraska was shown to have the highest risk over this period. 
Statistics and CDF graphs for simulated default rates are provided by state and by year. 
The CDF can be used as a means of illustrating potential stress. The loss distribution was 
generated through multiplication of default rate by total loans outstanding, EAD and 
LGD. The calculation results for expected loan loss, maximum loan loss, and VaR were 
presented. Nebraska, which has the highest expected and maximum loan loss, is 
anticipated to have the highest VaR in 2004. This paper also provides the PDF and CDF 
for loan loss, illustrating differences in the loss distributions by state. The distribution 
can be used as a risk indicator for bank management as well as for bank examiners and 
regulators. The last section of Chapter VI was devoted to the calculation of capital 
requirements. The calculation was performed based upon the Basel II formula, and 
capital requirement were presented by percentage terms among the total loan outstanding. 
Nebraska is expected to have the highest capital requirement (4.18%), and followed by 
Indiana, Kansas, Iowa and Illinois.  
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Conclusion 
This research was motivated by the recent observations in the banking industry 
that portfolio credit risk modeling has become a key component in bank management. 
Basel II provides a new emphasis for bank credit risk management. Basel II proposed a 
differentiated treatment of measuring capital requirements for corporate exposures and 
retail exposures, and induces more focus on retail exposures. Agricultural lenders need 
to pay attention to the new regulations because agricultural loans should be classified as 
the retail exposures. Credit risk models for agricultural loan portfolios are still in their 
infancy, while existing portfolio credit risk models developed for corporate exposures 
lack applicability.  
The objective of this study was to develop a credit risk model for agricultural 
loan portfolios. The objective was accomplished by conceptualizing a theory of loan 
default for farm borrowers, deriving a theoretical model, and presenting the estimation 
and simulation results for default model by state. The essential testable hypothesizes of 
this model are (1) net cash income is a key factor affecting credit risk for agricultural 
loans, and (2) risk characteristics are different from loan segments classified by region 
and primary commodity. Therefore, portfolio credit risk models should be specified to 
consider loans at the segment level. 
The first hypothesis is proven by the estimation results in chapter V. A moving 
average of net cash income, separately measured by commodity groups, government 
payment, and a proxy of off-farm income does a good job of explaining the default rate. 
Parameters are statistically significant and consistent with theory. The default model 
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explains more than 90% of variability of the default rate. The use of net cash income in a 
default model is very important because it is a leading indicator for the credit risk for 
agricultural loans and it provides the basis for making the model proactive. The main 
stream of existing portfolio credit risk model for corporate loans captures the credit risk 
based on asset value, which can be seen as a lagging indicator in agricultural sector 
because of its illiquidity and lags in market valuation.  
The second hypothesis was not fully tested because of data restrictions. Different 
model specifications for the default model during the estimation process suggest that 
each state has a unique economic structure at the micro and macro level, making the 
attributes of the credit risk diverse by state. The simulation results for the default rate 
distribution and loan loss distribution support the importance of regional considerations 
in credit risk modeling.  
This study could not specify a portfolio credit risk model by primary commodity 
for reasons of data availability. Net cash flows for a farm enterprise differ by the primary 
commodity managed by the farmer. Naturally, credit risk of a farmer is influenced by the 
commodity, and the commodity consideration in loan segmentation for an agricultural 
bank is conceptually acceptable. This study left the commodity default model for future 
research as data become available. 
The default model developed in this study has several advantages, and has 
implications for further research. As discussed in Chapter II, the applicability of a model 
is not an optional condition but a prerequisite. This model reduces data requirements for 
modeling and focuses the applicability of the model. This is accomplished by developing 
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a segment specific credit risk model. An agricultural lender interested in this model will 
be required to develop a segmentation process and data base to support the segmentation. 
This model can provide valuable management variables such as the probability of 
default, loan loss distribution, expected loan loss, VaR and capital requirements. This 
information can be used for the internal management of a bank as well as for oversight 
reasons by regulators. 
 
Implication for Future Research 
Suggestions for the future research are closely associated with further data 
availability. Once a bank level default data is accessible and the loan portfolio is 
segmented by commodity, primary commodity specific default models can be specified. 
The model give more testable hypothesizes and applications as followed: 
 
(i) The first hypothesis in the previous section, “net cash income is a key factor 
affecting credit risk for agricultural loans,” can be fully evaluated in the commodity 
specific default model.  
 
(ii) More research is required to find appropriate economic variables to capture the 
commodity specific cash flow such as off-farm income. If data is gathered from less 
aggregated variable, i.e. cash cost of production at a county level, the model 
accuracy will increase, but modeling cost will also increase. Researchers have to 
balance data accuracy with modeling cost.  
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(iii) The commodity specific default model would give loan loss distribution by 
commodity segment in a bank portfolio. Then the information can be use to solve an 
optimal loan portfolio, expressed as a percentage share of each commodity segment. 
For example, a bank can estimate an optimal share of loans to major commodity 
minimizing the loan losses over a specific time period. For this analysis, a 
mathematical programming model, such as the Markowiz (1952) EV model or the 
MOTAD model, needs to be combined with the default model. 
 
(iv) The commodity specific default model can also be applied to evaluating alternative 
internal management policies in a bank and external policies given by government 
or regulator. If a bank has several alternative loan policies, projections of loan loss 
distribution by policy can be calculated and the result can be use to decide a 
preferred policy. 
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Appendix 1  Loan Performance Status Data 
Iowa 
                                                                                                                                                  (1000 dollars) 
Year 
Total Loan 
Outstanding 
 
(A) 
Past Due  
> 90 Days,    
still Accrual 
(B) 
Non-
accrual 
 
(C) 
Charge 
Offs 
 
(D) 
Default 
Loan 
 
(E=B+C) 
Default 
Rate (%) 
 
(E/A) 
1985 3,858,979 44,869 211,501 216,214 256,370 6.64 
1986 3,372,177 33,288 149,387 181,071 182,675 5.42 
1987 3,285,179 19,934 74,484 33,573 94,418 2.87 
1988 3,628,342 15,722 41,041 6,465 56,763 1.56 
1989 3,950,725 11,098 26,059 1,596 37,157 0.94 
1990 4,297,847 9,696 22,259 675 31,955 0.74 
1991 4,578,905 15,747 31,287 6,939 47,034 1.03 
1992 4,816,072 17,950 32,889 7,150 50,839 1.06 
1993 5,195,324 17,916 29,461 2,465 47,377 0.91 
1994 5,375,771 12,909 30,532 4,536 43,441 0.81 
1995 5,477,507 11,277 20,447 3,373 31,724 0.58 
1996 5,796,362 15,255 23,854 2,350 39,109 0.67 
1997 6,359,203 14,817 15,512 861 30,329 0.48 
1998 6,574,755 21,012 32,088 7,839 53,100 0.81 
1999 6,632,990 21,592 31,310 13,875 52,902 0.80 
2000 6,606,385 13,489 22,479 4,702 35,968 0.54 
2001 6,857,874 14,283 23,109 13,363 37,392 0.55 
2002 7,164,452 20,138 25,813 9,069 45,951 0.64 
2003 7,515,551 16,508 28,145 7,206 44,653 0.59 
 
 
 
 
 
  
135 
Appendix 1  Continued 
Illinois 
                                                                                                                                                  (1000 dollars) 
Year 
Total Loan 
Outstanding 
 
(A) 
Past Due  
> 90 Days,    
still Accrual 
(B) 
Non-
accrual 
 
(C) 
Charge 
Offs 
 
(D) 
Default 
Loan 
 
(E=B+C) 
Default 
Rate (%) 
 
(E/A) 
1985       3,015,472             29,966  102,706  88,973  132,672            4.40  
1986       2,886,532             19,374  104,419  84,065  123,793            4.29  
1987       2,889,780             12,443  74,961  35,057  87,404            3.02  
1988       3,207,571               9,620  50,730  11,520  60,350            1.88  
1989       3,332,733             10,574  35,772  4,947  46,346            1.39  
1990       3,503,958               7,544  27,500  3,863  35,044            1.00  
1991       3,677,847             17,150  45,274  7,619  62,424            1.70  
1992       3,763,594             14,160  43,774  5,245  57,934            1.54  
1993       3,866,089             11,293  33,753  1,965  45,046            1.17  
1994       4,060,074             12,190  24,234  0 36,424            0.90  
1995       4,228,193               9,454  22,131  116  31,585            0.75  
1996       4,602,772             10,296  18,472  2,303  28,768            0.63  
1997       4,829,950               9,674  16,719  3,916  26,393            0.55  
1998       5,041,931             14,643  26,798  4,028  41,441            0.82  
1999       5,650,496             16,692  39,845          6,191  56,537          1.00  
2000       5,288,209             12,549        62,985       13,809  75,534            1.43  
2001       6,339,430               9,394      58,723  30,256  68,117            1.07  
2002       6,238,046               9,233        38,539  26,151  47,772            0.77  
2003       6,352,654               8,899        38,906  4,750  47,805            0.75  
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Appendix 1  Continued 
Indiana 
                                                                                                                                                  (1000 dollars) 
Year 
Total Loan 
Outstanding 
 
(A) 
Past Due  
> 90 Days,    
still Accrual 
(B) 
Non-
accrual 
 
(C) 
Charge 
Offs 
 
(D) 
Default 
Loan 
 
(E=B+C) 
Default 
Rate (%) 
 
(E/A) 
1985       1,638,388            19,404        46,749        41,061        66,153            4.04  
1986       1,620,832             11,335        42,579        34,172        53,914          3.33  
1987       1,580,724               9,110        33,342        19,403        42,452          2.69  
1988       1,673,875               4,404        28,773         4,907       33,177         1.98  
1989       1,725,818               4,372        24,530         5,159       28,902        1.67  
1990       1,770,229               4,752        19,528          5,175       24,280          1.37  
1991       1,846,702               6,794        28,453          7,332       35,247          1.91  
1992       1,871,875               4,777      37,205          9,816        41,982          2.24  
1993       1,862,525               4,499       35,899          3,737       40,398          2.17  
1994       1,888,843               2,322       21,149          3,144       23,471          1.24  
1995       1,946,978               2,381       14,956             596       17,337          0.89  
1996       1,935,556               2,056       14,390             829       16,446           0.85  
1997       1,950,602               3,129       10,958  - 117       14,087            0.72  
1998       2,028,527               4,899       13,977  - 2,221       18,876           0.93  
1999       1,801,621               3,938       11,511         2,231       15,449           0.86  
2000       2,182,989               2,772       17,666          1,199       20,438           0.94  
2001       2,284,033               2,710       20,138          2,555       22,848           1.00  
2002       2,294,822               3,598       16,661             954        20,259           0.88  
2003       2,257,373               2,191       11,336            428       13,527           0.60  
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Appendix 1  Continued 
Kansas 
                                                                                                                                                  (1000 dollars) 
Year 
Total Loan 
Outstanding 
 
(A) 
Past Due  
> 90 Days,    
still Accrual 
(B) 
Non-
accrual 
 
(C) 
Charge 
Offs 
 
(D) 
Default 
Loan 
 
(E=B+C) 
Default 
Rate (%) 
 
(E/A) 
1985      2,545,481    27,477     100,317     83,550     127,794    5.02  
1986      2,353,310    17,645       90,615     72,441     108,260    4.60  
1987      2,388,884    13,540       55,179     40,177      68,719    2.88  
1988      2,465,513      7,467       35,330     15,380      42,797    1.74  
1989      2,591,999      7,487       27,080      5,257      34,567    1.33  
1990      2,764,871      8,166       25,055      3,640      33,221    1.20  
1991      2,823,464      8,642       40,924      4,972      49,566    1.76  
1992      2,911,058      8,929       37,702      3,604      46,631    1.60  
1993      3,065,193      8,474       32,330      1,217      40,804    1.33  
1994      3,159,650      7,180       31,834         508      39,014    1.23  
1995      3,153,519    10,304       35,931      5,143      46,235    1.47  
1996      2,990,883    13,528       34,370      4,395      47,898    1.60  
1997      3,441,612      8,583       23,488         812      32,071    0.93  
1998      3,684,634    11,493       25,656      4,677      37,149    1.01  
1999      3,780,370    10,144       31,150      3,683      41,294    1.09  
2000      3,999,823    10,949       26,975      3,279      37,924    0.95  
2001      4,130,891    10,909       35,622      6,019      46,531    1.13  
2002      4,186,634      7,979       41,331     14,583      49,310    1.18  
2003      4,283,670      8,271       40,824      5,002      49,095    1.15  
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Appedix 1  Continued 
Nebraska 
                                                                                                                                                  (1000 dollars) 
Year 
Total Loan 
Outstanding 
 
(A) 
Past Due  
> 90 Days,    
still Accrual 
(B) 
Non-
accrual 
 
(C) 
Charge 
Offs 
 
(D) 
Default 
Loan 
 
(E=B+C) 
Default 
Rate (%) 
 
(E/A) 
1985      2,860,207    24,298     139,104     143,282     163,402    5.71  
1986      2,514,607    16,531     107,271     102,213     123,802    4.92  
1987      2,534,768    11,535       68,768       29,739      80,303    3.17  
1988      2,735,070      8,166       40,251           617      48,417    1.77  
1989      2,924,791      4,800       30,165  - 982      34,965    1.20  
1990      3,223,019      4,934       22,221  - 1,872      27,155    0.84  
1991      3,555,188      8,608       31,465  - 1,775      40,073    1.13  
1992      3,747,551    13,519       32,309           818      45,828    1.22  
1993      4,034,495      6,493       28,426           493      34,919    0.87  
1994      4,289,264      8,001       23,798         3,906      31,799    0.74  
1995      4,420,028    13,493       28,750         2,161      42,243    0.96  
1996      4,534,052    14,152       45,125         5,460      59,277    1.31  
1997      4,987,209    14,856       41,004         5,799      55,860    1.12  
1998      5,169,929    17,815       55,294         8,307      73,109    1.41  
1999      5,285,182    17,073       55,144         8,217      72,217    1.37  
2000      5,558,834    16,205       32,904         3,938      49,109    0.88  
2001      5,543,183    14,144       35,165       52,964      49,309    0.89  
2002      5,806,768    12,825       42,435         6,771      55,260    0.95  
2003      5,670,630    16,100       67,934       10,307      84,034    1.48  
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Appendix 2  Yield and Price  
Crop Yields per Planted Acre  
                                                                                                                                                                                                        (Bushel / acre) 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Corn 
          
Iowa 122.8 132.3 126.9 79.5 114.7 122.1 114.2 144.2 73.3 148.5 
Illinois 132.3 132.5 129.9 70.8 121.3 124.6 105.1 147.0 123.8 154.0 
Indiana 120.1 118.9 131.8 79.8 129.3 125.5 89.6 143.9 128.4 140.7 
Kansas 117.0 125.2 109.3 115.0 113.1 117.8 114.6 140.3 108.0 130.6 
Nebraska 122.3 122.7 125.0 118.6 114.5 121.4 120.8 128.5 98.2 133.3 
U.S. 106.4 107.4 107.7 72.8 104.1 107.0 98.4 119.5 86.5 127.3 
 
          
Soybeans 
          
Iowa 37.8 41.3 43.2 30.8 38.9 41.0 40.2 43.8 29.9 50.3 
Illinois 42.0 39.8 37.6 26.7 39.8 38.6 37.1 42.7 41.6 45.2 
Indiana 41.1 36.6 39.5 26.9 36.1 40.8 38.6 42.7 45.5 46.8 
Kansas 29.1 31.5 31.4 22.4 26.3 23.4 21.9 36.0 26.6 34.2 
Nebraska 35.4 37.2 34.8 29.5 31.5 33.9 33.0 41.3 34.6 46.4 
U.S. 33.2 32.2 33.3 26.3 31.6 33.3 33.6 37.0 31.1 40.8 
 
          
Wheat 
          
Iowa 44.8 18.7 12.7 20.4 41.1 42.2 22.7 22.3 10.4 38.5 
Illinois 43.2 27.8 51.0 51.9 56.8 43.3 27.2 42.8 41.3 43.8 
Indiana 48.2 33.4 46.4 41.7 55.2 48.0 33.9 31.3 48.4 56.5 
Kansas 34.9 29.3 34.2 31.7 17.2 38.1 30.8 30.3 32.1 36.4 
Nebraska 34.5 33.0 39.0 31.3 21.7 34.9 28.6 23.6 31.3 32.5 
U.S. 32.1 29.0 32.0 27.7 26.6 35.4 28.3 34.2 33.2 33.0 
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Appendix 2  Continued 
                                                                                                                                                                                      (Bushel / acre) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Corn 
         
Iowa 119.9 134.7 134.6 141.5 145.3 140.5 142.3 158.3 151.9 
Illinois 110.8 133.5 127.3 139.0 138.1 149.0 149.9 132.6 161.8 
Indiana 110.9 119.7 118.9 131.1 129.0 142.2 152.5 117.0 140.5 
Kansas 113.6 142.9 135.2 139.7 133.4 119.4 112.3 92.8 103.4 
Nebraska 106.8 138.8 127.6 140.9 134.2 119.3 140.6 112.0 138.8 
U.S 103.5 116.5 115.8 121.7 121.9 124.6 125.5 113.7 128.5 
 
         
Soybeans 
         
Iowa 43.8 43.8 45.6 47.8 44.3 43.4 43.7 47.8 32.3 
Illinois 38.8 40.3 42.8 43.8 41.8 43.8 44.7 42.8 36.9 
Indiana 39.3 37.7 43.1 41.3 38.7 45.8 48.9 41.3 37.4 
Kansas 24.4 36.1 36.2 29.4 28.5 16.9 30.7 21.2 21.9 
Nebraska 32.6 44.4 39.9 43.4 42.0 37.4 45.0 37.5 40.1 
U.S. 34.8 37.1 38.4 38.1 36.0 37.1 39.0 37.3 33.4 
 
         
Wheat 
         
Iowa 24.5 26.9 38.9 35.2 33.3 42.3 38.9 42.4 51.2 
Illinois 46.0 25.3 57.8 46.1 57.7 55.2 58.6 46.8 61.9 
Indiana 56.6 32.2 52.2 51.1 61.2 64.0 62.7 48.3 64.5 
Kansas 24.4 21.6 44.0 46.3 43.2 35.5 33.5 27.9 45.7 
Nebraska 40.0 32.0 35.2 43.6 42.9 33.9 33.8 30.4 44.1 
U.S. 31.6 30.3 35.2 38.7 36.6 35.6 32.8 26.6 37.7 
Source: Ag Statistics Data Base, NASS, USDA (www.nass.usda.gov:81/ipedb/main.htm) 
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Appendix 2  Continued 
 
Marketing Year Average Prices Received by Farmers  
                                                                                                                                                                                                     (dollar / bushel) 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Corn 
          
Iowa 2.02 1.41 1.89 2.45 2.29 2.21 2.30 2.00 2.44 2.22 
Illinois 2.27 1.54 1.96 2.59 2.40 2.36 2.46 2.11 2.57 2.27 
Indiana 2.20 1.53 2.08 2.65 2.47 2.31 2.45 2.09 2.51 2.25 
Kansas 2.37 1.60 1.84 2.60 2.28 2.25 2.42 2.15 2.61 2.32 
Nebraska 2.22 1.52 1.96 2.48 2.30 2.28 2.34 2.09 2.52 2.33 
U.S. 2.23 1.50 1.94 2.54 2.36 2.28 2.37 2.07 2.50 2.26 
           
Soybeans 
          
Iowa 4.99 4.73 5.97 7.33 5.62 5.63 5.51 5.54 6.34 5.43 
Illinois 5.17 4.91 6.00 7.45 5.76 5.85 5.70 5.69 6.49 5.61 
Indiana 5.04 4.76 5.94 7.55 5.79 5.81 5.68 5.61 6.31 5.53 
Kansas 4.95 4.60 5.49 7.26 5.45 5.67 5.55 5.42 6.41 5.32 
Nebraska 4.86 4.56 5.82 7.31 5.45 5.59 5.47 5.37 6.20 5.29 
U.S. 5.05 4.78 5.88 7.42 5.69 5.74 5.58 5.56 6.40 5.48 
           
Wheat 
          
Iowa 2.95 2.30 2.75 3.82 3.80 2.74 2.40 3.05 2.00 3.15 
Illinois 3.02 2.41 2.51 3.50 3.80 2.75 2.56 3.28 2.81 3.04 
Indiana 2.91 2.25 2.43 3.49 3.83 2.84 2.72 3.19 2.78 3.04 
Kansas 2.86 2.25 2.43 3.58 3.74 2.51 2.81 3.13 3.00 3.32 
Nebraska 2.79 2.23 2.45 3.66 3.75 2.53 3.01 3.16 3.04 3.39 
U.S. 3.08 2.42 2.57 3.72 3.72 2.61 3.00 3.24 3.26 3.45 
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Appendix 2  Continued 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   (dollar / bushel) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Corn 
         
Iowa 3.20 2.60 2.33 1.86 1.72 1.75 1.90 2.22 2.40 
Illinois 3.30 2.79 2.53 2.04 1.91 1.91 2.04 2.35 2.50 
Indiana 3.38 2.78 2.53 2.11 1.88 1.90 1.98 2.41 2.50 
Kansas 3.24 2.83 2.47 1.96 1.81 2.00 2.03 2.48 2.55 
Nebraska 3.22 2.64 2.32 1.88 1.75 1.90 1.94 2.32 2.45 
U.S. 3.24 2.71 2.43 1.94 1.82 1.85 1.97 2.32 2.45 
          
Soybeans 
         
Iowa 6.65 7.36 6.33 4.79 4.53 4.49 4.35 5.54 7.30 
Illinois 6.88 7.55 6.56 5.01 4.75 4.62 4.55 5.66 7.35 
Indiana 6.73 7.34 6.59 5.05 4.71 4.61 4.42 5.55 7.35 
Kansas 6.69 7.17 6.42 4.98 4.53 4.50 4.16 5.49 7.60 
Nebraska 6.56 7.19 6.28 4.83 4.47 4.44 4.19 5.43 7.02 
U.S. 6.72 7.35 6.47 4.93 4.63 4.54 4.38 5.53 7.25 
          
Wheat 
         
Iowa 4.05 4.10 3.16 2.73 2.38 2.15 2.50 2.85 2.85 
Illinois 3.89 4.12 3.14 2.35 2.11 2.09 2.49 3.01 3.20 
Indiana 3.96 4.06 3.18 2.36 2.13 2.11 2.41 3.18 3.20 
Kansas 4.59 4.63 3.16 2.53 2.25 2.65 2.69 3.41 3.15 
Nebraska 4.56 4.29 3.20 2.54 2.20 2.61 2.75 3.60 3.25 
U.S. 4.55 4.30 3.38 2.65 2.48 2.62 2.78 3.56 3.35 
Source: Ag Statistics Data Base, NASS, USDA (www.nass.usda.gov:81/ipedb/main.htm) 
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Appendix 2  Continued 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 (dollar / cwt) 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Fed Cattle 
          
Iowa 57.50 57.00 64.40 70.20 73.40 78.10 75.10 73.90 76.10 68.90 
Illinois 57.56 57.18 64.08 69.57 72.58 76.63 73.43 73.19 74.57 67.65 
Indiana* 57.56 57.18 64.08 69.57 72.58 76.63 73.43 73.19 74.57 67.65 
Kansas* 58.60 58.20 65.40 71.30 74.80 80.00 76.50 75.90 76.40 69.60 
Nebraska 58.60 58.20 65.40 71.30 74.80 80.00 76.50 75.90 76.40 69.60 
U.S.** 59.75 59.25 66.28 71.19 73.86 78.56 74.21 75.35 76.36 68.84 
           
Hogs 
          
Iowa 44.70 50.00 52.50 43.90 43.80 55.40 50.90 42.90 46.50 41.20 
Illinois 44.72 50.69 51.69 43.76 44.41 54.77 49.28 42.89 45.43 39.60 
Indiana* 44.72 50.69 51.69 43.76 44.41 54.77 49.28 42.89 45.43 39.60 
Kansas* 44.70 50.80 52.50 43.60 43.90 55.30 49.90 42.40 46.60 41.40 
Nebraska 44.70 50.80 52.50 43.60 43.90 55.30 49.90 42.40 46.60 41.40 
U.S.*** 47.82 54.46 54.81 46.07 46.75 57.75 51.79 44.87 48.17 42.00 
 
 
 
 
  
144
 
Appendix 2  Continued 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 (dollar / cwt) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Fed Cattle 
         
Iowa 65.50 63.70 66.70 61.90 65.10 70.00 73.10 66.40 82.40 
Illinois 64.87 63.44 65.04 60.70 63.87 68.43 73.70 67.50 85.54 
Indiana* 64.87 63.44 65.04 60.70 63.87 68.43 73.70 67.50 85.54 
Kansas* 66.80 65.90 67.60 62.70 66.30 70.00 73.60 69.10 85.00 
Nebraska 66.80 65.90 67.60 62.70 66.30 70.00 73.60 69.10 85.00 
U.S.** 66.26 65.05 66.32 61.47 65.56 69.65 72.71 67.04 84.69 
          
Hogs 
         
Iowa 41.80 53.80 55.10 36.50 32.50 44.70 46.50 34.30 36.50 
Illinois 41.08 52.48 50.95 31.45 31.04 41.59 44.93 34.64 40.41 
Indiana* 41.08 52.48 50.95 31.45 31.04 41.59 44.93 34.64 40.41 
Kansas* 42.30 54.10 55.50 37.30 32.40 44.40 46.60 36.90 39.60 
Nebraska 42.30 54.10 55.50 37.30 32.40 44.40 46.60 36.90 39.60 
U.S.*** 44.62 56.53 54.30 34.72 34.00 44.69 45.81 34.91 39.45 
Source: Iowa Agricultural Statistics, NASS, USDA (www.nass.usda.gov/ia) 
              Illinois Average Farm Price Received Database (www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu/manage/pricehistory/price_history.html) 
              Nebraska Historic Price Data, NASS, USDA (www.nass.usda.gov/ne/nebhist.htm) 
              USDA/AMS (http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/sdp/view.asp?f=livestock/94006/) 
* Indiana uses Illinois data, and Kansas uses Nebraska data. 
** U.S. cattle price: Slaughter Steer Price, Choice 2-4, Nebraska Direct, 1100-1300 lb.   
*** U.S. hog price: Price of market barrows and gilts (Iowa, South Minnesota). 
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Appendix 3  Total Cost of Production, 2003 (Base Year) 
Total Cost (dollar / ac or cwt) 
  
Cash Non-cash  Sum 
State / Region Data Descriptions and Web Sites 
Iowa     www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/ 
Corn 187.5 191.3 378.8 State  Corn following corn, 135 bu/ac 
Soybeans 101.4 183.5 284.9 State  Soybeans following corn, Non-GMO, 45 bu/ac 
Wheat 100.0 174.0 274.0 Illinois Use Illinois data 
Fed Cattle 55.8 16.2 72.1 State  Finishing yearling steers, 1250lb 
Hogs 29.4 15.9 45.4 State  Finishing feeder pigs, 250lb 
      
Illinois 
    www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu/manage/enterprisecost_index.html 
Corn 188.0 219.0 407.0 Central Grain farms, no livestock 
Soybeans 126.0 207.0 333.0 Central Grain farms, no livestock 
Wheat 100.0 174.0 274.0 State Estimated cost for both 03 & 04, 60 bushel / ac 
Fed Cattle 50.0 7.3 57.2 State Beef feeding enterprises, per cwt 
Hogs 31.5 7.4 38.9 State Farrow-to-finish hog enterprise 
      
Indiana Illinois Illinois Illinois Illinois Use Illinois data 
      
Kansas 
    www.agmanager.info/ 
Corn 172.4 44.5 216.9 State Non-irrigated 
Soybeans 114.1 38.3 152.4 State Non-irrigated 
Wheat 88.3 29.5 117.7 State Non-irrigated 
Fed Cattle 68.5 11.3 79.8 State Beef finishing 
Hogs 25.5 6.1 31.6 State Swine fattening 
      
Nebraska 
    www.nfbi.net/2003AnnualReportwithcover.pdf 
Corn 189.0 54.3 243.2 State Dry land corn on owned land 
Soybeans 144.9 54.1 199.1 State Dry land soybean on owned land 
Wheat 94.9 17.8 112.7 State All tenures and by tenure type 
Fed Cattle 53.8 0.7 54.5 State Beef finishing beef calf 
Hogs 27.9 3.0 30.9 State Feeder pig finishing 
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Appendix 4  Production Cost Index 
Cash Cost of production by Region 
                                                                                                                                         (dollar / acre or cwt) 
  1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Corn            
North Central 213.0 200.8 212.2 199.1 172.9 164.8 168.9 180.1 184.3 172.5 173.4 
Heartland - - - - - - - - - - - 
Plains 203 207 207.5 195.9 147.7 141.6 146.3 155.3 160.9 218.4 217.7 
Prairie Gateway - - - - - - - - - - - 
Soybeans                       
North Central 110.5 124.4 128.8 101.1 93.8 100.2 105.0 112.3 111.1 119.4 115.7 
Heartland - - - - - - - - - - - 
Plains - - - - - - - 94.0 90.7 96.4 94.6 
Prairie Gateway - - - - - - - - - - - 
Wheat                       
North Central 102.0 121 123.5 93.8 78.8 88.0 101.2 115.0 106.7 115.8 112.9 
Heartland - - - - - - - - - - - 
S. Plains 75.8 73.3 72.4 67.6 61.6 56.9 61.9 62.2 65.3 63.0 62.0 
Prairie Gateway - - - - - - - - - - - 
Cow-Calf            
North Central 259 279 285.2 261.6 250.9 265.9 302.3 301.4 324.0 323.6 317.6 
Heartland - - - - - - - - - - - 
Hogs (Farrow-to-Finish) 
                  
North Central 43.9 46.0 46.5 39.1 38.2 34.3 33.0 34.0 32.7 32.3 36.9 
Heartland - - - - - - - - - - - 
  
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Corn            
North Central 166.0 184.9 193.3 - - - - - - - - 
Heartland - - - 176.4 179.2 175.0 173.1 181.0 169.7 152.9 168.8 
Plains 215.1 236.8 252.5 - - - - - - - - 
Prairie Gateway - - - 209.4 212.2 204.0 201.1 213.8 218.7 199.7 220.3 
Soybeans                       
North Central 116.7 123.0 126.1 131.6 - - - - - - - 
Heartland - - - - 100.0 99.0 96.9 97.9 102.3 89.0 94.6 
Plains 96.6 100.9 103.0 108.6 - - - - - - - 
Prairie Gateway - - - - 104.4 104.0 103.9 107.4 112.6 100.2 104.0 
Wheat                       
North Central 117.4 103.4 116.6 118.2 123.9 - - - - - - 
Heartland - - - - - 87.0 83.4 86.0 95.8 82.9 97.2 
S. Plains 65.2 76.0 85.9 86.1 93.4       
Prairie Gateway - - - - - 58.4 57.0 60.3 68.1 60.7 70.8 
Cow-Calf            
North Central 346.1 340.5 345.4 - - - - - - - - 
Heartland - - - 659.8 662.2 622.0 615.0 631.8 649.0 641.8 641.3 
Hogs (Farrow-to-Finish)                   
North Central 38.9 38.4 38.5 47.8 45.3 - - - - - - 
Heartland - - - - - 33.3 30.2 31.7 33.0 34.2 34.9 
Source: Commodity Costs and Returns, ERS, USDA (www.ers.usda.gov/data/costsandreturns/testpick.htm) 
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Appendix 4  Continued 
 
U.S. Cash Cost of production 
(dollar / acre or cwt) 
  1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Corn 133.5 128.3 132.8 136.8 120.4 117.4 122.8 133.4 134.2 137.9 139.5 
Soybeans 61.4 59.6 61.1 56.7 49.1 50.8 54.1 71.3 69.7 72.8 73.3 
Wheat  56.0 56.8 55.0 51.1 45.7 44.2 46.3 53.0 52.6 52.3 53.3 
Fed Cattle 41.7 44.6 44.4 41.4 38.2 41.8 48.5 50.3 52.6 53.0 48.9 
Hogs 32.6 37.5 36.9 31.3 28.2 25.1 33.5 35.1 33.7 33.1 37.1 
            
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Corn 138.9 147.1 158.1 158.9 160.4 164.4 168.5 176.1 184.0 192.3 201.0 
Soybeans 73.0 75.8 75.9 80.0 80.2 82.2 84.3 88.1 92.0 96.2 100.5 
Wheat  53.9 60.0 65.3 70.0 70.5 67.6 69.3 72.4 75.7 79.1 82.6 
Fed Cattle 51.2 47.3 43.3 40.4 46.6 45.2 47.1 52.2 53.8 51.0 55.9 
Hogs 39.0 34.2 33.7 43.4 40.1 41.1 42.1 44.0 46.0 48.1 50.2 
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Appendix 4  Continued 
Production Cost Index by Region (1982=100) 
  1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Corn            
IA, IL, IN, 
NE 100.0 94.2 99.6 93.5 81.2 77.3 79.3 84.5 86.5 81.0 81.4 
KA 100.0 101.9 102.4 96.7 72.9 69.9 72.2 76.7 79.4 107.8 107.4 
Soybeans   
         
IA, IL, IN, 
NE 100.0 112.6 116.6 91.5 84.9 90.7 95.1 101.7 100.6 108.1 104.7 
KA 100.0 112.6 116.6 91.5 84.9 90.7 95.1 101.7 98.2 104.3 102.4 
Wheat   
         
IA, IL, IN, 
NE 100.0 119.1 121.1 92.0 77.2 86.3 99.2 112.7 104.6 113.6 110.7 
KA 100.0 96.8 95.6 89.2 81.3 75.1 81.7 82.0 86.2 83.2 81.8 
Fed Cattle   
         
All State 100.0 107.5 110.0 100.9 96.8 102.6 116.6 116.3 125.0 124.9 122.6 
Hogs 
 
 
         
All State 100.0 104.7 105.9 89.0 87.0 78.2 75.1 77.5 74.4 73.5 84.0 
            
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Corn            
IA, IL, IN, 
NE 77.9 86.8 90.7 91.1 92.6 90.4 89.4 93.5 87.7 79.0 87.2 
KA 106.2 116.9 124.6 125.2 126.9 122.0 120.2 127.8 130.8 119.4 131.7 
Soybeans 
           
IA, IL, IN, 
NE 105.6 111.4 114.1 119.1 119.4 118.2 115.8 116.9 122.2 106.3 113.0 
KA 104.6 109.2 111.4 117.5 117.8 117.4 117.3 121.2 127.2 113.2 117.4 
Wheat 
           
IA, IL, IN, 
NE 115.1 101.4 114.3 115.9 121.5 116.5 111.8 115.2 128.2 111.0 130.1 
KA 86.1 100.3 113.4 113.6 123.2 118.1 115.3 122.1 137.9 122.9 143.2 
Fed Cattle 
           
All State 133.6 131.4 133.3 123.5 123.9 116.4 115.1 118.2 121.4 120.1 120.0 
Hogs 
           
All State 88.6 87.4 87.6 108.8 103.1 105.7 95.9 100.6 104.9 108.6 111.0 
Index is made by the % change of production cost by region.     
At the break point of the data series, % change in national cost is used.   
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Appendix 5  Estimates of Cash Cost of production 
                                                                                                                                         (Dollar / acre or cwt) 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Iowa           
Corn 200.9 174.5 166.3 170.4 181.7 186.0 174.1 174.9 167.5 186.6 
Soybeans 82.1 76.2 81.4 85.3 91.3 90.3 97.0 94.0 94.8 100.0 
Wheat  70.7 59.4 66.3 76.3 86.6 80.4 87.3 85.0 88.4 77.9 
Fed Cattle 46.9 45.0 47.7 54.3 54.1 58.1 58.1 57.0 62.1 61.1 
Hogs 23.6 23.0 20.7 19.9 20.5 19.7 19.5 22.3 23.5 23.2 
           
Illinois           
Corn 201.4 175.0 166.7 170.9 182.2 186.5 174.5 175.4 168.0 187.1 
Soybeans 102.0 94.7 101.1 106.0 113.4 112.2 120.5 116.7 117.7 124.2 
Wheat  70.7 59.4 66.3 76.3 86.6 80.4 87.3 85.0 88.4 77.9 
Fed Cattle 42.0 40.3 42.7 48.6 48.4 52.0 52.0 51.0 55.6 54.7 
Hogs 25.3 24.7 22.2 21.3 22.0 21.1 20.9 23.9 25.2 24.8 
           
Indiana 
          
Corn 201.4 175.0 166.7 170.9 182.2 186.5 174.5 175.4 168.0 187.1 
Soybeans 102.0 94.7 101.1 106.0 113.4 112.2 120.5 116.7 117.7 124.2 
Wheat  70.7 59.4 66.3 76.3 86.6 80.4 87.3 85.0 88.4 77.9 
Fed Cattle 42.0 40.3 42.7 48.6 48.4 52.0 52.0 51.0 55.6 54.7 
Hogs 25.3 24.7 22.2 21.3 22.0 21.1 20.9 23.9 25.2 24.8 
           
Kansas 
          
Corn 126.6 95.4 91.5 94.5 100.4 104.0 141.1 140.7 139.0 153.0 
Soybeans 88.9 82.5 88.2 92.4 98.9 95.4 101.4 99.5 101.6 106.1 
Wheat  55.0 50.1 46.3 50.3 50.6 53.1 51.3 50.4 53.1 61.8 
Fed Cattle 57.6 55.3 58.6 66.6 66.4 71.4 71.3 70.0 76.2 75.0 
Hogs 20.4 20.0 17.9 17.2 17.8 17.1 16.9 19.3 20.3 20.1 
           
Nebraska 
          
Corn 202.5 175.9 167.6 171.8 183.1 187.4 175.4 176.3 168.9 188.0 
Soybeans 117.3 108.9 116.3 121.9 130.4 129.0 138.6 134.3 135.4 142.9 
Wheat  67.0 56.3 62.9 72.3 82.2 76.3 82.8 80.7 83.9 73.9 
Fed Cattle 45.2 43.4 46.0 52.2 52.1 56.0 55.9 54.9 59.8 58.8 
Hogs 22.3 21.8 19.6 18.8 19.4 18.7 18.4 21.1 22.2 21.9 
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                                                                                                                             (dollar / acre or cwt) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Iowa          
Corn 195.0 195.9 199.0 194.3 192.3 201.0 188.5 169.8 187.5 
Soybeans 102.4 106.9 107.2 106.1 103.9 104.9 109.7 95.4 101.4 
Wheat  87.8 89.1 93.3 89.5 85.9 88.5 98.5 85.3 100.0 
Fed Cattle 62.0 57.4 57.6 54.1 53.5 55.0 56.5 55.9 55.8 
Hogs 23.2 28.8 27.3 28.0 25.4 26.7 27.8 28.8 29.4 
          
Illinois          
Corn 195.5 196.5 199.5 194.8 192.8 201.6 189.0 170.3 188.0 
Soybeans 127.2 132.8 133.2 131.8 129.1 130.3 136.2 118.5 126.0 
Wheat  87.8 89.1 93.3 89.5 85.9 88.5 98.5 85.3 100.0 
Fed Cattle 55.5 51.4 51.6 48.5 47.9 49.2 50.6 50.0 50.0 
Hogs 24.9 30.9 29.3 30.0 27.2 28.6 29.8 30.8 31.5 
          
Indiana 
         
Corn 195.5 196.5 199.5 194.8 192.8 201.6 189.0 170.3 188.0 
Soybeans 127.2 132.8 133.2 131.8 129.1 130.3 136.2 118.5 126.0 
Wheat  87.8 89.1 93.3 89.5 85.9 88.5 98.5 85.3 100.0 
Fed Cattle 55.5 51.4 51.6 48.5 47.9 49.2 50.6 50.0 50.0 
Hogs 24.9 30.9 29.3 30.0 27.2 28.6 29.8 30.8 31.5 
          
Kansas 
         
Corn 163.2 164.0 166.1 159.7 157.4 167.3 171.2 156.3 172.4 
Soybeans 108.3 114.2 114.5 114.1 114.1 117.8 123.6 110.0 114.1 
Wheat  69.9 70.0 75.9 72.8 71.1 75.2 85.0 75.7 88.3 
Fed Cattle 76.1 70.5 70.7 66.4 65.7 67.5 69.3 68.6 68.5 
Hog 20.1 25.0 23.6 24.3 22.0 23.1 24.1 24.9 25.5 
          
Nebraska 
         
Corn 196.5 197.5 200.6 195.8 193.8 202.6 190.0 171.2 189.0 
Soybeans 146.4 152.8 153.2 151.6 148.5 149.9 156.7 136.4 144.9 
Wheat  83.3 84.5 88.6 84.9 81.5 84.0 93.5 81.0 94.9 
Fed Cattle 59.7 55.3 55.5 52.1 51.5 52.9 54.4 53.8 53.8 
Hogs 22.0 27.3 25.9 26.5 24.1 25.3 26.3 27.3 27.9 
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Appendix 6  Cash Receipts 
Cash Receipts by State and by Commodity 
                                                                                                                                                 (1000 dollars) 
State  Commodity  1985   1986   1987   1988   1989  
Iowa Corn  2,811,561   2,269,852   1,893,485   1,531,604   1,781,850  
 Soybeans  1,629,572   1,485,215   1,771,631   2,011,335   1,724,807  
 Wheat       13,528         5,488         2,629         3,805         9,330  
 Cattle & Calves  1,644,732   1,647,057   1,904,168   1,996,671   2,030,861  
 Hogs  2,474,317   2,629,449   2,700,822   2,407,457   2,420,996  
 Sum  8,573,710   8,037,061   8,272,735   7,950,872   7,967,844  
 (% out of S. Total) (91.3%) (91.1%) (91.2%) (90.2%) (88.8%) 
  State Total  9,391,051   8,818,474   9,066,506   8,810,933   8,974,921  
Illinois Corn  3,545,577   2,500,588   2,034,452   1,558,337   2,072,369  
 Soybeans  2,007,424   1,770,316   1,752,786   1,907,584   1,865,731  
 Wheat     122,902        83,783      123,068      217,534      395,210  
 Cattle & Calves     668,451      757,077      798,392      906,925      807,547  
 Hogs     992,810   1,008,098   1,049,157   1,023,498      984,086  
 Sum  7,337,164   6,119,862   5,757,855   5,613,878   6,124,943  
 (% out of S. Total) (92.3%) (89.4%) (88.7%) (88.1%) (87.7%) 
  State Total  7,948,850   6,845,541   6,494,751   6,373,401   6,984,999  
Indiana Corn  2,811,561   2,269,852   1,893,485   1,531,604   1,781,850  
 Soybeans     956,061      820,372      772,128   1,028,004      870,315  
 Wheat     103,401        69,842        78,773      114,791      192,008  
 Cattle & Calves     304,755      322,248      365,703      364,081      291,874  
 Hogs     705,372      778,932      823,275      717,189      708,401  
 Sum  4,881,150   4,261,246   3,933,364   3,755,669   3,844,448  
 (% out of S. Total) (102.9%) (105.5%) (99.5%) (92.7%) (89.9%) 
  State Total  4,741,452   4,040,240   3,952,978   4,051,506   4,275,720  
Kansas Corn     293,437      296,713      225,792      202,084      356,775  
 Soybeans     170,651      240,567      361,331      316,273      327,428  
 Wheat  1,386,322      772,037      853,295   1,075,084      840,050  
 Cattle & Calves  2,826,717   2,946,126   3,559,053   3,874,471   3,937,423  
 Hogs     278,469      295,809      288,616      269,144      269,304  
 Sum  4,955,596   4,551,252   5,288,087   5,737,056   5,730,980  
 (% out of S. Total) (84.3%) (85.6%) (87.2%) (88.0%) (87.2%) 
  State Total  5,881,675   5,317,543   6,062,433   6,518,106   6,569,010  
Nebraska Corn  1,980,357   1,517,672   1,192,253   1,188,540   1,717,525  
 Soybeans     462,143      410,069      394,282      533,052      493,560  
 Wheat     273,342      146,075      193,855      229,485      255,835  
 Cattle & Calves  3,360,428   3,286,713   3,912,898   4,468,106   4,633,788  
 Hogs     560,094      699,392      768,762      667,776      723,211  
 Sum  6,636,364   6,059,921   6,462,050   7,086,959   7,823,919  
 (% out of S. Total) (89.8%) (89.6%) (90.5%) (90.8%) (89.7%) 
  State Total  7,388,600   6,761,065   7,139,132   7,801,045   8,724,692  
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                                                                                                                                                 (1000 dollars) 
State  Commodity  1990   1991   1992   1993   1994  
Iowa Corn  2,414,654   2,619,206   2,913,217   2,643,774   2,500,924  
 Soybeans  1,786,226   1,832,031   2,026,912   1,784,586   2,055,438  
 Wheat        7,886         4,808         5,004         2,405         5,768  
 Cattle & Calves  2,295,123   1,906,341   2,144,651   2,162,749   1,796,604  
 Hogs  2,989,051   2,916,499   2,732,215   2,818,155   2,579,925  
 Sum  9,492,940   9,278,885   9,821,999   9,411,669   8,938,659  
 (% out of S.Total) (90.4%) (91.0%) (91.0%) (90.5%) (89.8%) 
  State Total 10,504,432 10,194,360 10,797,093 10,396,940  9,956,047  
Illinois Corn  2,691,187   2,654,527   2,492,739   2,892,700   2,849,442  
 Soybeans  2,023,274   1,918,286   2,103,622   2,378,341   2,384,976  
 Wheat     229,715      145,978      177,836      170,238      179,244  
 Cattle & Calves     799,657      733,242      707,872      779,520      704,655  
 Hogs  1,206,275   1,174,896   1,037,381   1,125,981      939,362  
 Sum  6,950,108   6,626,929   6,519,450   7,346,780   7,057,679  
 (% out of S.Total) (89.3%) (88.7%) (87.7%) (89.3%) (88.7%) 
  State Total  7,779,756   7,468,593   7,435,276   8,231,446   7,959,523  
Indiana Corn  2,414,654   2,619,206   2,913,217   2,643,774   2,500,924  
 Soybeans     987,202      963,135   1,018,174   1,322,329   1,174,001  
 Wheat     139,659        81,565        76,983        95,245      103,647  
 Cattle & Calves     330,813      307,403      320,881      331,549      305,953  
 Hogs     885,696      826,421      732,307      822,088      678,459  
 Sum  4,758,024   4,797,730   5,061,562   5,214,985   4,762,984  
 (% out of S.Total) (97.0%) (107.3%) (113.9%) (97.9%) (101.6%) 
  State Total  4,904,615   4,471,651   4,443,234   5,326,688   4,686,308  
Kansas Corn     334,678      389,830      454,139      399,075      522,082  
 Soybeans     265,532      225,075      322,913      327,289      405,278  
 Wheat     945,885   1,160,885   1,051,783   1,144,263   1,373,980  
 Cattle & Calves  4,416,126   4,228,441   4,306,486   4,371,940   4,294,531  
 Hogs     320,920      321,341      271,867      280,374      254,059  
 Sum  6,283,141   6,325,572   6,407,188   6,522,941   6,849,930  
 (% out of S.Total) (89.8%) (90.1%) (89.3%) (88.9%) (89.8%) 
  State Total  6,993,039   7,021,362   7,173,331   7,334,715   7,624,853  
Nebraska Corn  1,521,792   1,879,148   1,857,517   1,776,979   1,734,881  
 Soybeans     421,205      476,545      498,451      538,562      630,145  
 Wheat     180,688      218,052      176,823      213,191      235,609  
 Cattle & Calves  4,879,882   4,783,085   4,619,794   4,706,951   4,380,389  
 Hogs     899,524      878,134      778,068      857,546      751,851  
 Sum  7,903,091   8,234,964   7,930,653   8,093,229   7,732,875  
 (% out of S.Total) (90.6%) (91.5%) (91.3%) (91.2%) (90.9%) 
  State Total  8,718,506   8,999,359   8,685,604   8,871,543   8,509,617  
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                                                                                                                                                  (1000 dollars) 
State  Commodity  1995   1996   1997   1998   1999  
Iowa Corn  3,630,136   3,869,920   3,828,383   3,186,534   2,672,726  
 Soybeans  2,425,006   2,603,442   3,287,303   2,854,681   2,059,389  
 Wheat        5,515         6,279         3,809         3,469         3,096  
 Cattle & Calves  1,798,250   1,467,234   1,711,836   1,386,143   1,640,243  
 Hogs  2,493,239   2,946,643   3,007,488   2,413,704   2,205,658  
 Sum 10,352,146 10,893,518 11,838,488  9,844,531   8,581,112  
 (% out of S. Total) (90.9%) (90.0%) (91.3%) (89.2%) (89.1%) 
  State Total 11,388,284 12,101,465 12,966,773 11,035,205  9,632,167  
Illinois Corn  3,410,014   3,274,141   3,359,023   3,034,194   2,443,353  
 Soybeans  2,447,663   2,533,994   3,031,421   2,782,398   2,049,141  
 Wheat     250,708      169,881      182,284      158,674        96,596  
 Cattle & Calves     608,736      536,144      506,618      473,818      487,166  
 Hogs     892,042   1,054,898   1,014,474      682,706      619,902  
 Sum  7,609,163   7,569,058   8,093,820   7,131,790   5,696,158  
 (% out of S. Total) (89.7%) (89.2%) (89.9%) (89.1%) (87.1%) 
  State Total  8,480,201   8,481,824   8,999,278   8,004,148   6,538,555  
Indiana Corn  3,630,136   3,869,920   3,828,383   3,186,534   2,672,726  
 Soybeans  1,304,531   1,392,497   1,653,332   1,165,293   1,002,542  
 Wheat     164,392      108,078      114,328        74,853        71,988  
 Cattle & Calves     284,136      192,472      276,774      190,340      200,949  
 Hogs     710,692      819,923      797,545      559,591      513,177  
 Sum  6,093,887   6,382,890   6,670,362   5,176,611   4,461,382  
 (% out of S. Total) (117.1%) (115.4%) (115.4%) (114.9%) (102.2%) 
  State Total  5,205,613   5,531,270   5,777,954   4,506,297   4,365,044  
Kansas Corn     681,858      753,410      819,185      770,372      593,330  
 Soybeans     366,074      361,287      551,610      523,707      333,838  
 Wheat  1,323,850   1,058,710   1,390,509   1,367,764      939,673  
 Cattle & Calves  4,080,676   3,965,635   4,285,479   4,025,903   4,520,982  
 Hogs     236,600      330,828      414,835      249,282      227,040  
 Sum  6,689,058   6,469,870   7,461,618   6,937,028   6,614,863  
 (% out of S. Total) (87.9%) (86.1%) (86.5%) (87.2%) (88.2%) 
  State Total  7,609,837   7,510,882   8,624,258   7,956,634   7,496,940  
Nebraska Corn  2,320,296   2,481,231   2,493,458   2,231,480   1,733,530  
 Soybeans     696,618      652,985      984,672      966,916      686,940  
 Wheat     336,243      299,135      241,353      238,510      145,387  
 Cattle & Calves  4,125,873   4,135,208   4,403,133   4,267,526   4,583,159  
 Hogs     744,898      860,485      805,808      553,336      527,073  
 Sum  8,223,928   8,429,044   8,928,424   8,257,768   7,676,089  
 (% out of S. Total) (91.5%) (91.2%) (91.1%) (91.6%) (91.7%) 
  State Total  8,983,526   9,242,132   9,805,771   9,018,091   8,374,336  
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                                                                                                                                   (1000 dollars) 
State  Commodity  2000   2001   2002   2003  
Iowa Corn  2,632,991   2,589,019   3,612,084   3,708,608  
 Soybeans  2,102,622   1,889,300   2,353,508   2,600,412  
 Wheat        2,199         2,554         2,799         3,340  
 Cattle & Calves  1,908,548   1,824,202   1,809,823   2,334,551  
 Hogs  3,072,456   3,121,306   2,424,512   2,602,223  
 Sum  9,718,816   9,426,381  10,202,726 11,249,134 
 (% out of S. Total) (90.2%) (88.1%) (89.5%) (89.0%) 
  State Total 10,733,264 10,705,165 11,393,524 12,633,200 
Illinois Corn  2,649,369   2,827,873   3,229,174   3,258,853  
 Soybeans  2,080,876   2,047,787   2,343,887   2,557,704  
 Wheat     135,138        97,957      115,980      157,356  
 Cattle & Calves     532,016      527,954      505,762      609,241  
 Hogs     787,693      913,067      709,833      833,100  
 Sum  6,185,092   6,414,638   6,904,636   7,416,254  
 (% out of S. Total) (88.4%) (87.8%) (89.3%) (89.5%) 
  State Total  6,996,356   7,307,508   7,732,048   8,289,958  
Indiana Corn  2,632,991   2,589,019   3,612,084   3,708,608  
 Soybeans  1,110,111   1,204,893   1,260,243   1,390,317  
 Wheat       69,172        66,726        53,905        89,987  
 Cattle & Calves     238,604      215,717      203,538      224,456  
 Hogs     580,979      662,297      500,510      619,626  
 Sum  4,631,857   4,738,652   5,630,280   6,032,994  
 (% out of S. Total) (102.5%) (93.7%) (119.3%) (116.9%) 
  State Total  4,517,714   5,059,721   4,718,953   5,161,609  
Kansas Corn     786,401      667,326      722,405      636,683  
 Soybeans     254,342      301,481      333,856      367,506  
 Wheat     909,524      858,407   1,000,533   1,293,888  
 Cattle & Calves  4,947,707   4,915,470   4,809,880   5,617,679  
 Hogs     310,000      294,135      228,721      252,010  
 Sum  7,207,974   7,036,819   7,095,395   8,167,766  
 (% out of S. Total) (89.6%) (87.7%) (87.9%) (90.3%) 
  State Total  8,040,160   8,020,702   8,070,149   9,046,096  
Nebraska Corn  1,722,187   1,691,224   2,043,200   2,040,658  
 Soybeans     794,070      869,283      917,104   1,089,591  
 Wheat     183,404      145,303      200,117      224,846  
 Cattle & Calves  4,941,090   5,066,786   4,958,569   5,903,957  
 Hogs     682,204      712,715      591,011      611,988  
 Sum  8,322,955   8,485,311   8,710,001   9,871,040  
 (% out of S. Total) (92.9%) (91.9%) (92.4%) (92.9%) 
  State Total  8,956,360   9,230,640   9,422,076  10,621,275 
 
  
155 
Appendix 6  Continued 
 
Fraction of State Cash Receipts from Each Crop 
State  Comm. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Iowa Corn  0.63 0.60 0.52 0.43 0.51 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.55 
 Soybeans 0.37 0.39 0.48 0.57 0.49 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.45 
 Wheat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
Illinois Corn  0.62 0.57 0.52 0.42 0.48 0.54 0.56 0.52 0.53 0.53 
 Soybeans 0.35 0.41 0.45 0.52 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.44 
 Wheat 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
            
Indiana Corn  0.73 0.72 0.69 0.57 0.63 0.68 0.71 0.73 0.65 0.66 
 Soybeans 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.38 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.33 0.31 
 Wheat 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 
           
Kansas Corn  0.16 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.21 0.23 
 Soybeans 0.09 0.18 0.25 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.18 
 Wheat 0.75 0.59 0.59 0.67 0.55 0.61 0.65 0.58 0.61 0.60 
            
Nebraska Corn  0.73 0.73 0.67 0.61 0.70 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.67 
 Soybeans 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.24 
  Wheat 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 
 
State  Comm. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Iowa Corn  0.60 0.60 0.54 0.53 0.56 0.56 0.58 0.61 0.59 
 Soybeans 0.40 0.40 0.46 0.47 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.39 0.41 
 Wheat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
           
Illinois Corn  0.56 0.55 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.55 
 Soybeans 0.40 0.42 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.43 
 Wheat 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
           
Indiana Corn  0.71 0.72 0.68 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.73 0.71 
 Soybeans 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.26 0.27 
 Wheat 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 
          
Kansas Corn  0.29 0.35 0.30 0.29 0.32 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.28 
 Soybeans 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.16 
 Wheat 0.56 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.56 
           
Nebraska Corn  0.69 0.72 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.61 
 Soybeans 0.21 0.19 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.29 0.32 
  Wheat 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 
This table is calculated from the state cash receipts 
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Fraction of State Cash Receipts from Livestock 
     
State  Comm. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Iowa Cattle 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.44 0.43 0.41 
 Hogs 0.60 0.61 0.59 0.55 0.54 0.57 0.60 0.56 0.57 0.59 
 
           
Illinois Cattle 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.47 0.45 0.40 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.43 
 Hogs 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.55 0.60 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.57 
 
           
Indiana Cattle 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.31 
 Hogs 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.66 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.71 0.69 
 
           
Kansas Cattle 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 
 Hogs 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 
           
Nebraska Cattle 0.86 0.82 0.84 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.85 
  Hogs 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15 
 
State  Comm. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Iowa Cattle 0.42 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.43 0.38 0.37 0.43 0.47 
 Hogs 0.58 0.67 0.64 0.64 0.57 0.62 0.63 0.57 0.53 
 
          
Illinois Cattle 0.41 0.34 0.33 0.41 0.44 0.40 0.37 0.42 0.42 
 Hogs 0.59 0.66 0.67 0.59 0.56 0.60 0.63 0.58 0.58 
 
          
Indiana Cattle 0.29 0.19 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.29 0.27 
 Hogs 0.71 0.81 0.74 0.75 0.72 0.71 0.75 0.71 0.73 
 
          
Kansas Cattle 0.95 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.96 
 Hogs 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 
 
          
Nebraska Cattle 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.91 
  Hogs 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.09 
This table is calculated from the state cash receipts 
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Appendix 7  Estimates of Net Cash Income 
                                                                                                                                        (dollar / acre or cwt) 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Iowa 
          
NCIC 68.9 54.2 123.2 90.2 103.7 107.7 103.1 127.9 45.0 156.5 
NCIL 16.9 21.2 25.5 20.4 21.5 28.9 25.7 19.0 19.1 13.8 
           
Illinois 
          
NCIC 103.9 57.7 103.3 59.6 113.7 106.8 83.6 128.0 147.3 144.3 
NCIL 17.9 22.1 26.0 21.8 23.2 30.0 25.7 20.3 19.7 14.0 
           
Indiana 
          
NCIC 73.4 25.9 113.0 63.4 123.6 107.6 58.1 122.5 156.8 130.1 
NCIL 18.3 23.3 27.0 22.0 22.9 31.2 26.5 20.0 19.9 14.2 
 
          
Kansas 
          
NCIC 62.7 44.5 60.2 82.4 54.1 67.2 55.4 82.4 69.0 82.6 
NCIL 3.1 5.5 8.9 6.1 9.5 10.6 7.2 7.0 1.7 -3.9 
           
Nebraska 
         
NCIC 62.5 21.1 74.4 105.1 64.0 77.0 86.3 84.5 73.0 109.9 
NCIL 14.7 17.3 21.7 19.8 22.9 26.0 22.3 21.0 17.8 12.0 
 
  
        
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  
Iowa 
          
NCIC 188.6 178.7 145.3 94.3 74.6 64.9 81.1 176.7 159.6  
NCIL 12.3 18.8 21.0 8.2 9.0 16.9 17.9 7.7 16.3  
           
Illinois 
          
NCIC 154.6 169.5 133.1 86.3 69.5 76.7 94.9 132.3 182.7  
NCIL 13.4 18.4 18.9 5.9 9.1 15.5 18.1 9.5 20.2  
           
Indiana 
          
NCIC 167.2 136.4 115.3 79.5 50.6 71.7 101.6 110.9 158.5  
NCIL 14.2 19.8 19.6 4.2 7.2 14.8 17.1 7.8 16.0  
 
          
Kansas 
          
NCIC 91.0 122.0 105.1 62.1 42.6 32.2 23.7 36.4 65.1  
NCIL -7.6 -2.0 0.0 -2.8 1.1 3.6 5.3 1.1 16.4  
           
Nebraska 
         
NCIC 126.0 158.4 91.3 62.9 39.0 20.4 62.1 78.7 139.4  
NCIL 9.1 13.4 14.8 10.6 14.1 17.3 19.3 14.7 29.4  
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Appendix 8  Government Payments 
Total Government Payments by State 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               (1000 dollar) 
State 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Iowa 691,136  1,161,181  1,987,685  1,664,991  981,206  753,732  644,955  662,278  1,229,544  732,429  
 (9.0%) (9.8%) (11.9%) (11.5%) (9.0%) (8.1%) (7.9%) (7.2%) (9.2%) (9.3%) 
 
          
Illinois 491,492  882,519  1,477,640  1,373,972  725,941  506,603  441,408  480,651  851,190  302,915  
 (6.4%) (7.5%) (8.8%) (9.5%) (6.7%) (5.4%) (5.4%) (5.2%) (6.4%) (3.8%) 
 
          
Indiana 218,300  411,275  670,244  616,336  333,691  244,172  210,055  232,518  378,953  136,806  
 (2.8%) (3.5%) (4.0%) (4.3%) (3.1%) (2.6%) (2.6%) (2.5%) (2.8%) (1.7%) 
 
          
Kansas 482,151  870,760  966,320  847,994  588,446  834,745  697,895  592,145  783,963  467,531  
 (6.3%) (7.4%) (5.8%) (5.9%) (5.4%) (9.0%) (8.5%) (6.5%) (5.8%) (5.9%) 
 
          
Nebraska 518,369  858,412  1,274,843  1,091,521  542,306  624,643  490,658  478,729  806,273  348,246  
 (6.7%) (7.3%) (7.6%) (7.5%) (5.0%) (6.7%) (6.0%) (5.2%) (6.0%) (4.4%) 
 
          
Sum 2,401,448  4,184,147  6,376,732  5,594,814  3,171,590  2,963,895  2,484,971  2,446,322  4,049,923  1,987,928  
 (31.2%) (35.4%) (38.1%) (38.6%) (29.1%) (31.9%) (30.3%) (26.7%) (30.2%) (25.2%) 
 
          
U.S. 7,704,154  11,813,351  16,746,732  14,479,808  10,886,702  9,298,030  8,214,399  9,168,920  13,402,015  7,879,129  
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Appendix 8  Continued 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        (1000 dollar) 
State 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Iowa 786,652  508,278  712,839  1,168,724  2,061,881  2,302,094  1,971,677  737,107  1,050,621  
 (10.8%) (6.9%) (9.5%) (9.4%) (9.6%) (10.1%) (9.5%) (6.7%) (6.6%) 
          
Illinois 543,753  386,706  552,452  944,879  1,798,822  1,943,916  1,849,769  612,706  865,813  
 (7.5%) (5.3%) (7.4%) (7.6%) (8.4%) (8.5%) (8.9%) (5.6%) (5.4%) 
          
Indiana 246,026  213,649  265,132  468,917  852,051  938,464  925,278  332,782  446,374  
 (3.4%) (2.9%) (3.5%) (3.8%) (4.0%) (4.1%) (4.5%) (3.0%) (2.8%) 
          
Kansas 422,226  554,988  529,786  879,853  1,401,286  1,231,923  1,068,706  452,680  807,739  
 (5.8%) (7.6%) (7.1%) (7.1%) (6.5%) (5.4%) (5.2%) (4.1%) (5.1%) 
          
Nebraska 507,302  388,738  454,549  814,690  1,411,884  1,406,971  1,297,623  485,091  725,799  
 (7.0%) (5.3%) (6.1%) (6.6%) (6.6%) (6.1%) (6.3%) (4.4%) (4.6%) 
          
Sum 2,505,958  2,052,359  2,514,758  4,277,063  7,525,925  7,823,368  7,113,054  2,620,366  3,896,347  
 (34.4%) (28.0%) (33.6%) (34.5%) (35.0%) (34.2%) (34.3%) (23.9%) (24.4%) 
          
U.S. 7,279,451  7,339,570  7,495,294  12,380,016  21,513,119  22,896,433  20,727,496  10,961,465  15,949,402  
Source: Farm Income, ERS, USDA (www.ers.usda.gov/data/FarmIncome/finfidmu.htm) 
(  ) represents the percentage among total U.S. government payments   
 
 
 
  
160
 
Appendix 8  Continued 
 
Government Payments per Planted Crop Acre 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  (dollar / acre) 
State 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Iowa 31.10 55.59 107.79 85.34 46.77 36.10 30.32 30.85 59.51 33.67 
Illinois 22.81 42.13 76.76 68.70 33.53 23.19 20.02 21.70 39.68 13.61 
Indiana 18.87 37.22 66.03 59.61 30.64 22.50 19.10 20.31 33.93 12.02 
Kansas 31.72 58.84 68.05 62.81 37.55 52.17 44.74 37.60 48.69 28.60 
Nebraska 40.50 70.94 114.85 94.10 43.21 49.77 37.60 36.41 62.26 25.42 
 
State 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Iowa 37.02 22.84 31.37 50.95 89.88 100.00 86.76 32.51 45.63 
Illinois 25.37 17.15 24.72 42.09 80.13 85.82 82.40 27.40 38.74 
Indiana 22.16 18.03 22.19 38.75 71.30 79.87 78.41 28.84 38.78 
Kansas 26.47 33.94 32.01 54.14 87.58 76.04 66.38 28.83 50.48 
Nebraska 38.29 28.07 31.35 56.19 95.40 94.43 87.68 32.89 49.88 
Government payment per acre = State GPMT / Sum of planted area of corn, soybeans and wheat 
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Appendix 8  Continued 
Sum of Planted Area of corn, soybeans, and wheat 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  (1000 acres) 
State 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Iowa 22220 20890 18440 19510 20980 20880 21275 21470 20660 21755 
Illinois 21550 20950 19250 20000 21650 21850 22050 22150 21450 22250 
Indiana 11570 11050 10150 10340 10890 10850 11000 11450 11170 11380 
Kansas 15200 14800 14200 13500 15670 16000 15600 15750 16100 16350 
Nebraska 12800 12100 11100 11600 12550 12550 13050 13150 12950 13700 
 
State 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Iowa 21250 22252 22727 22940 22940 23020 22725 22670 23025 
Illinois 21430 22550 22350 22450 22450 22650 22450 22360 22350 
Indiana 11100 11850 11950 12100 11950 11750 11800 11540 11510 
Kansas 15950 16350 16550 16250 16000 16200 16100 15700 16000 
Nebraska 13250 13850 14500 14500 14800 14900 14800 14750 14550 
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Appendix 9  Parameters and Data for GPMT Calculation 
Direct Payment Rate, Loan Rate and Target Price 
 Corn Soybean Wheat   
DP Rate 0.28 0.52 0.44   
Loan Rate 1.95 5.00 2.75   
Target Price 2.63 5.80 3.92   
 
     
Direct Payment Yield 
 IA IL IN KS NE 
Corn 116.1 115.3 108.9 102.1 105.8 
Soybean 35.7 34.9 35.2 22.1 32.9 
Wheat 36.5 44.3 45.4 34.1 36.3 
      
Counter-Cyclical Payment Yield 
 IA IL IN KS NE 
Corn 122.1 127.4 120.6 123.0 118.2 
Soybean 38.5 39.0 39.1 24.2 36.6 
Wheat 36.5 47.0 49.7 35.6 37.0 
Source: Farm Service Agency, USDA, "2003 Direct and Counter-Cyclical Program Final 
             Enrollment Report": www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/farmbill/2002_2003_enroll.htm 
 
Crop Year Support per Base Acre 
Year Dollar 
1990 84.12 
1991 69.45 
1992 80.93 
1993 62.82 
1994 66.50 
1995 9.45 
1996 51.21 
1997 63.09 
1998 124.13 
1999 201.24 
2000 201.14 
2001 170.60 
2002 80.63 
Source: Outlaw et al.  (2004) 
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Appendix 10  Macroeconomic Variables, 1982-2003 
Rate of Unemployment (%) 
 Iowa Illinois Indiana Kansas Nebraska U.S. 
1982 8.5 11.3 11.9 6.3 6.1 9.7 
1983 8.1 11.4 11.1 6.1 5.7 9.6 
1984 7.0 9.1 8.6 5.2 4.4 7.5 
1985 8.0 9.0 7.9 5.0 5.5 7.2 
1986 7.0 8.1 6.7 5.4 5.0 7.0 
1987 5.5 7.4 6.4 4.9 4.9 6.2 
1988 4.5 6.8 5.3 4.8 3.6 5.5 
1989 4.3 6.0 4.7 4.0 3.1 5.3 
1990 4.3 6.2 5.3 4.5 2.2 5.6 
1991 4.6 7.2 6.0 4.5 2.8 6.8 
1992 4.7 7.6 6.6 4.3 3.0 7.5 
1993 4.0 7.5 5.4 5.0 2.7 6.9 
1994 3.7 5.7 4.9 5.3 2.9 6.1 
1995 3.5 5.2 4.7 4.4 2.6 5.6 
1996 3.8 5.3 4.1 4.5 2.9 5.4 
1997 3.3 4.7 3.5 3.8 2.6 4.9 
1998 2.8 4.5 3.1 3.8 2.7 4.5 
1999 2.5 4.3 3.0 3.0 2.9 4.2 
2000 2.6 4.3 3.2 3.7 3.0 4.0 
2001 3.3 5.4 4.4 4.3 3.1 4.7 
2002 4.0 6.5 5.1 5.1 3.6 5.8 
2003 4.5 6.7 5.1 5.4 4.0 6.0 
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Appendix 10  Continued 
Real Weighted Exchange Rates  
Year Corn Soybeans Wheat Meat 
1982 119.90 127.50 111.80 115.55 
1983 122.90 134.20 118.60 118.88 
1984 127.60 142.40 124.40 120.82 
1985 131.30 146.60 130.00 125.19 
1986 110.20 119.40 121.70 109.91 
1987 99.80 106.10 121.20 103.09 
1988 88.10 95.70 112.90 93.53 
1989 94.66 105.04 122.13 97.57 
1990 99.70 99.40 121.12 101.54 
1991 100.80 99.40 121.12 93.56 
1992 100.80 92.48 124.97 87.61 
1993 100.80 92.48 124.97 80.21 
1994 90.80 92.48 124.97 74.47 
1995 89.10 92.48 124.97 73.77 
1996 96.40 96.00 100.70 78.12 
1997 115.70 115.20 103.90 83.21 
1998 121.67 131.07 108.36 91.47 
1999 131.72 142.63 115.02 87.02 
2000 125.85 140.97 121.59 85.76 
2001 126.17 156.78 127.33 93.74 
2002 138.42 167.93 136.81 95.84 
2003 142.99 161.85 139.79 102.16 
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Appendix 10  Continued 
Other Macroeconomic Variables  
Rate of Short Term Short Term Disposable 
Year 
Inflation Interest Rate Interest Rate Income 
1982 5.16 10.72 15.61 2341.40 
1983 3.37 8.62 13.07 2513.70 
1984 3.60 9.57 13.84 2805.10 
1985 2.78 7.49 12.43 2994.90 
1986 2.37 5.97 10.04 3163.10 
1987 2.79 5.83 10.04 3358.10 
1988 3.72 6.67 10.48 3648.40 
1989 3.54 8.11 10.33 3898.40 
1990 4.06 7.51 10.17 4139.38 
1991 3.10 5.41 9.38 4310.28 
1992 2.14 3.46 8.46 4601.33 
1993 2.31 3.02 7.51 4761.92 
1994 2.15 4.29 8.52 4992.73 
1995 1.95 5.51 8.18 5226.78 
1996 1.85 5.02 8.19 5485.23 
1997 1.48 5.07 7.90 5765.63 
1998 1.13 4.78 7.04 6156.30 
1999 1.54 4.64 7.61 6441.05 
2000 2.27 5.82 8.26 6907.73 
2001 2.51 3.39 7.03 7187.43 
2002 1.51 1.63 6.54 7535.20 
2003 1.74 1.01 5.19 7871.60 
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